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Responses to contradictory objections to biotechnology patents have in the main been
applied through validity requirements and exclusions to patentability, largely with
reference to morality provisions at the time of grant. This is not appropriate because
the legitimacy of each issue depends upon its expression at different stages within an
innovation time line. This thesis examines, with reference to three case studies, defects
in the current approach ofEuropean Patent law, which arise in part due to confusion in
(or fusion of) objections to inventions as opposed to exploitation. The conclusion
suggests that it is not the grant of patents per se that causes difficulties but rather the
way in which inventions are exploited and patent law should be focused accordingly.
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and single minded person I am ever likely to meet. Without his encouragement I would
never have begun this journey nor come near to completing. Rather more abstractly




The role of morality within patent law requires re-evaluation. The ambit of the
morality clause has swollen to the extent that it is creating tension between patent law
and the regulation of science with the result that it is usurping the role of regulation
and conflicting with its aims. This expansion of a priori exclusions is unwelcome
because it has manifested without due consideration of the causes of moral concern
and the effect of patent exclusions. This thesis examines the relationship between
patent law and other regulations so as to establish boundaries for the exclusion of
inventions from patentability.
Biotechnology raises numerous difficult ethical questions which are not answerable by
one specific 'biotechnology law' but instead there is a myriad of disparate legislation
of which patent law is increasingly becoming an important component. The extent to
which patent law can usefully play a part in this regulation is not yet settled, so this
work seeks to discover what is possible for patent law to achieve and what ought to be
dealt with by other means.
This thesis is divided into six chapters, as follows:
• Chapter one - introduction
• Chapter two examines the stages of influence of patent law through a
hypothetical innovation time line and how the aims and justifications of patent
law are realised within that time line. Patent law is effective only in the event
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of achieving a paradox of decreasing access in order to increase access, and the
section finishes with an outline of the difficulties that arise when a paradox is
not achieved.
• Chapter three looks at the changes to patent law brought about by the patenting
of biotechnology-related inventions. Difficulties of access explored in section
one are potentially exacerbated and moral concerns become important.
• Chapter four illustrates how exclusions to patent law for moral reasons have
expanded, giving rise to the 'new' patent law from traditional patent law.
• Chapter five explores regulation theory and patent law from both traditional
and new perspectives. The section aims at understanding how 'new' patent
questions can be addressed at different stages of the innovation time line. By
way of illustration three case studies are used; the exploitation of human
embryonic stem cells, the requirement for consent for the removal and
exploitation of human material, and specific examples of breakdown in the
patent paradox. The case studies illustrate the limitations of the current
approach and this section looks at some alternatives to address the concerns
raised.
• Chapter six concludes that the temptation to object to innovation through patent
law should be resisted. Instead emphasis should be placed upon the effect that
the grant of a patent has and not what particular inventions do or how they are
created. This may call into question the methodology or the effect of
exploitation of patented inventions and suggests a continuous role for morality
after the grant rather than an on/off switch at the time of grant.
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(1) Chapter One - Introduction
The purpose of this thesis is to ask whether there is a legitimate role for the a priori
exclusion of patents or restriction of patent monopoly for moral reasons within patent
law. The study will, inter alia, untangle objections to patents for biotechnology-related
inventions and suggest achievable solutions to those objections which are consequent
upon the grant of patents and relevant to the aim of patent law. It will do so through
separating objections to the grant of patents into different stages within an innovation
time line. Those aims should not be thwarted by issues, however important, that lie
outside the remit of patent law. The conclusion indicates that focus should move away
from the current trend of reacting to expanding objections on the grounds of morality
towards control of patents after they have been granted.
Patent law has been challenged by many new issues raised by the activities of the
bioscience industry which has sought patents for inventions ranging from DNA
sequences to stem cells. Relevant law has risen to the challenge by methods of
imaginative interpretation that have been extremely accommodating. Other possible
methods of protection, such as trade secrets1 or copyright2, could be used, but these
may not be as attractive to the bioscience industry and/or policy makers as patents, and
so have not been adopted. Therefore there have been increasing demands for patent
1 '...but patent protection is not the only such tool: other mechanisms exist to ensure exclusivity in an
effort to secure market share', A Warren-Jones, 'Patenting DNA: A lot of controversy over a little
intangibility', (2004) 12 Medical Law Review 97, 98.
2 See Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria. 'The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs' (2nd edition
Butterworths. London 2000) Volume 1. paragraph 21.9, 'Could copyright be a solution?'.
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protection to be extended to biotech products and processes. Much of the tension
within patent law has been caused by the previously rarely-used morality clause which
has been interpreted to take account of pressures from 'alternative voices'3. The result
of this has been not only to increase the size of the arena in which patent law operates,
but to place it in a different arena altogether. Traditionally patent law relates to
encouraging innovation but new pressures have enabled wider questions of science and
ethics to enter into the patenting process.
Patent law regulations govern the grant of monopoly rights over inventions. It is not
necessary when considering the patentability of an invention to assess what it
physically is (as long as it is an 'invention'4) or how it was made or what has been
done with it. A patent is clearly a separate entity from the invention it protects and can
be sold, licensed and mortgaged without affecting the invention in any way. It is
detached and independent from the invention that it protects and often it will be under
different ownership: '.. .patents can be sold or licensed even before a product based on
the invention has been developed'56. A patent over invention 'X' is a singular concept
but at the same time 'X' is likely to be numerous and to be owned by separate entities.
Grants of patents create intangible rights whereas inventions are tangible property.
3 G Dutfield, 'Intellectual Property Rights and the Life Science Industries: A Twentieth-Century
History' (Ashgale, Aldershot 2002) 210.
4 There is no definition of what amounts to an 'invention' within UK patent rules. Instead the law
describes what is patentable, i.e. that an invention must be novel, involve inventive step and be
capable of industrial application.
5 G Dutfield, 'DNA Patenting: Implications for public health research' (2006) 84(5) Bulletin of the
World Health Organization, page 388-392, at page 388.
6 See also S 30 (1) United Kingdom Patents Act 1977, " Any patent or application for a patent is
personal property (without being a thing in action), and any patent or any such application and rights
in or under it may be transferred, created or granted in accordance with subsections (2) to (7) below."
These include, according to S30 (2) assigned or mortgaged, S30 (3) vest as any other personal
property and by an assent of personal representatives, S30 (3) licence or sub-licence.
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This distinction between the abstract right and the physical invention is fundamental at
all stages of patent law.
Although these clearly defined entities are governed distinctly, issues have arisen that
are relevant to both inventions per se and patents, and, as we shall see, are appearing in
the patent grant process within Europe. The similarity of issues may account for a
failure to distinguish between problems and solutions that should be outside patent law
and those that are quite correctly answered within it. Distinguishing between issues
will form part of the untangling process noted above. The thesis will argue that
increasingly patent law, mainly through use of the morality provisions7 to remove
otherwise qualifying inventions from patent protection8, is deployed in attempts to
regulate the science and not the monopoly.
The patent system is intended to balance public interests through publication and
enforcement of patents whilst at the same time encouraging increased growth through
providing incentives to private interests in the form of a monopoly. In some cases a
balance is not achieved so the thesis examines ways to redress the balance through
greater post-grant control of the methodology of exploitation.
This thesis supports the control of patent monopoly. It will examine the ethical and
economic pressures exerted upon patent law by biotechnological patents and will use
7
See Chapter four below and Biotechnology Directive Article 6
x The requirements of novelty, inventive step and industrial application (see chapter two) as applied to
biotechnology innovation (see chapter three) have helped to shape the way in which the biotech
industry has developed and how the protects valuable innovation. The thesis is more concerned with
those inventions which may qualify for patentability but are opposed because of objections to the
specific inventions rather than their failure to qualify for patentability.
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a regulation theory perspective to establish how those pressures can best be managed
or regulated. Its conclusion favours post-grant regulation rather than continuation of
expansion of the current grant-stage influences, being primarily the morality
provisions introduced into a number of patent systems. It will be argued that attempts
to adapt patent law in response to repercussions of granting patents over
biotechnology inventions through a simple on/off switch at the time of patent grant
are insufficient when confronted by the increasingly complex, important and
contentious but sometimes extraneous issues that are raised by inventions derived
from human biology. It will be argued that a post-grant mechanism of regulation will
provide for a more flexible and effective legal tool in hard cases.
The focus will be upon biotechnology patenting and the ethical rules that govern
biotechnology research. This focus is maintained because the particular characteristics
of biotechnology, combined with critical pressures, have led, inter alia, to much debate
over the legal and ethical rules governing biotechnology spilling into the patent arena.
The result has been that patent decisions are increasingly being influenced by ethical
and legal questions in science, causing real and potential unforeseen knock-on effects
from patent decisions. This may be because patent law has an increasingly broad role
to play, so the thesis will examine whether, and or when, this is desirable.
Patent law is distinct from the ethical and legal regulations that operate within the
realm of scientific research. Although patent law and the rules that govern the conduct
of research in science have some similar interests, the aims of both are at times also
contradictory. One enduring feature of patent law is the continuing balance of interests
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by patent offices, courts and the legislature9. Some of the objections to biotechnology
patenting, often reflected in the balance of decisions, can be met at different stages in
the patent process, with varied effectiveness. So it is necessary to examine pre- and
post-grant options to objections to patenting to assess efficacy and to suggest that a
reassessment of post-grant controls could help address the patent balance in difficult
cases.
(1) (a) Methodology
Objections to the application of patent law to biotechnological invention can be
classified into two types. The first relates to patents hindering research and decreasing
access to health care and the second relates to ethical objections to biotechnology.
There are clear distinguishing features between the two but they are connected by an
ethical dilemma in the granting of patents: access must be restricted against some in
favour of others. In some circumstances this can be unethical.
Two objectives must be satisfied before a conclusion can be reached upon the role for
patent law in exclusion of particular inventions from patentability; first a full
appreciation of objections against patents and/or inventions, and second an
understanding of how patent law can address them. The thesis therefore begins with a
study of patent theory followed by an examination of how patent law has adapted to
biotechnology and the impact that biotechnology has had upon patent law. In
9 This balance of interests will be discussed in greater detail in section one. covering the nature of patent
law. Suffice for now to indicate that there is a vast array of different interests, from the inventor,
investors and business to the public, competitors and consumers, which can be affected by the patent
system and the variety of interests, are. as we shall see. increasing.
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particular, the work will look at how objections to biotechnology concerning access
and the patenting of biotech inventions have been addressed in patent law.
Chapter four examines the morality provisions within European patent law and the
extended use to which they have been put. It is understandable that concerns regarding
inventions are being addressed, but the way in which they are being addressed will be
questioned. In particular, it is important to note and to understand that ethical
objections to biotechnology occur at different stages within the innovation process, yet
the only remedy that patent law can provide is to refuse to grant patents at one specific
point in an innovation process. In many cases this fails to address the core ethical
issues at hand.
Chapter five questions whether, or to what extent, the objections discussed in the
previous two sections can be addressed within patent law. This involves a number of
tasks:
(1) An examination of regulation theory and how patent law offers different forms
of regulation at different times within the innovation process.
(2) Case studies (two concerning pre-grant consent/specific exclusions and a third
concerning post-grant restriction on access) to illustrate the different times and
different regulation.
(3) Using the results of (1) and (2) to understand what patent law can achieve.
The way objections have been dealt with to date suggests that patent law should take a
broader roll in regulation. The conclusion argues that, if this is so, it cannot be
19
approached in the way that patent law is set up at present but that it would be possible
with a different emphasis. Specifically, patent law could take account of objections
before grant, at the time of grant and post-grant; thus distinguishing objections to
science from objections to exploitation of the science and from objections as to how
the results are exploited. Only in this way could full effect be given to the range of




In this thesis, I do not intend to review the arguments for and against biotechnology
and the patenting of biotechnological inventions10 nor to look in detail at the various
alternatives. The aim is to understand how objections to biotechnology can be
addressed by patent law. I will argue that biotechnology is beneficial, that it should be
encouraged and that patenting is the best way to do this, but it does not follow that
other methods11 and their advantages should be ignored. I am aware that there are
alternatives to the legal protection of genetic inventions such as 'utility patents'12,
copyrights or separate sui generis regimes that may have advantages over patent
10 For a discussion of the arguments for and against patenting, see, inter alia: George Monboit, ' The age
of consent: A manifesto for a new world order (Flamingo 2003). Monboit's argument is that
developing countries should ignore patent rules in order to develop because this is what the developing
countries did. See also A Jaffe and J Lerner. 'Innovation and its discontents: How our broken patent
system is endangering innovation andprogress, and what to do about it' (Princeton Press 2004). For a
general discussion of the justifications of patenting see, inter alia, T Cook, 'A User's Guide to Patents'
(Butterworths. London 2002) part 1 chapter 1; Sven JR Bostyn, 'Enabling Biotechnological
Inventions in Europe and the United States: A study of the patentability of proteins and DNA
sequences with special emphasis on the disclosure requirement' (European Patent Office 2001);
Gowers Review of Intellectual Property (HMSO, London, December 2006). For specific arguments
for and against the justification for patents and biotechnology see, inter alia, Nuffield Council on
Bioethics, 'The ethics ofpatenting DNA. A discussion paper' (July 2002); Sven JR Bostyn, 'Patenting
Human Genes and Stem Cells, A Report to the Danish Council of Ethics' (2004); Sven JR Bostyn,
'Patenting DNA Sequences (polynucleotides) and Scope of Protection in the European Union, an
evaluation. Background Study for the European Commission within the Framework of the Expert
Group on Biotechnological Inventions', European Commission, 2004, EUR 21122.
11 One such alternative method of protection for DNA was through copyright. Indeed in some ways the
nature of DNA is quite suitable for this with its strings of unique combinations of A, G, T and C. An
interesting comparison was made by Sir Jolm Sulston: The essence of a gene is the information - the
sequence - and copying it into another format makes no difference. It is as though I took a hardback
book that you had written, published it in paperback, and called it mine...' (J Sulston and G Ferry,
'The Common Thread: A Story of Science, Ethics and the Human Genome' (Bantam Press. 2002)
268. The theory did obtain some judicial support; see Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria. 'The Modern Law
ofCopyright and Designs', vol. 1, ch. 21. Another alternative would be to provide a sui generis regime
for human biotechnology in the way that separate rules were drafted in respect of plant life or indeed
industrial designs, thus specific rules could cater for the new challenges that are presented. Another
possible alternative is more government funding for research and development so as to avoid the need
to raise money through venture capitalists or to provide for a series of prizes, as suggested by
Professor Joseph Stiglitz of Columbia University 'A Better Way to Crack it' (New Scientist. 16
September 2006, page 20).
12 The utility patent model involves a second layer of patent protection whereby a cheaper and shorter
fonn of patent could be obtained in 'fast' industries; similar systems operate in Finland and Denmark.
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protection. However founding new rights can create further difficulties such as
generating complex interactions between these new rights and existing rights, thereby
creating new layers of bureaucracy with litigation risks and increased expense and
which are, in any event, unlikely to be adopted in the UK13. Such novel extensions of
intellectual property law are not contemplated by this work.
1 am also aware that strong arguments against any forms of legal protection have been
raised. Arguments against biotechnological patents are often submitted with weight,
not only by pressure groups14, but also by governments15 and motivated by
biodiversity, ethical or religious interests. This is not surprising as . .new technologies
such as... .genetics require IP protection but do not fit easily into existing categories'16.
This is in part due to narrowing of differences between invention and discovery17.
13 Such novel extensions of intellectual property are not contemplated in this thesis but see Gowers
Review, paragraphs 4.109-113, 'Clarify the UK position on New Rights'.
14
Greenpeace and the Green Party, and some religious groups, such as the Church of Scotland, have
strongly opposed what they claim to be patents over life. See also work by Human Genetics Alert
(www, hgalert.org), and Genewatch UK (www,genewatch,org). Strong arguments against the
patenting of biotechnological invention have been made by 'open science' groups: see The Royal
Society, 'Keeping Science Open: The effects of intellectual property on the conduct of science'
(London, April 2003) and Joly, Yann, 'Open Source Approaches in Biotechnology: Utopia Revisited'.
Maine Law Review. Vol. 59, No. 2, p. 386. 2007 Available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=943011. See also Sulston and Ferry, The 'Common Thread'. In the public
'race' to sequence the human genome between Craig Venter and Sir John Sulston, the latter strongly
supporting open source.
15
Developing countries have criticised patents over pharmaceuticals and biotechnology, partly because
of the expense of paying for patented drugs but also because of criticism ofpatenting something which
may have originated within their boundaries but which has been isolated and copied outside at their
expense and loss. A good summary of these arguments can be found in Medecins Sans Frontieres,
'Drug patents under the spotlight: Sharing practical knowledge about pharmaceutical patents' (June
2004). See also Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, 'Integrating Intellectual Property Rights
and Development Policy', Report (London September 2002) (CIPR Report 2002), and the UK
government's response, available from www.dfid.gov.uk.
16 Gowcrs Review, paragraph 2.16.
17 The difference between biological material amounting to a discovery that is not patentable and
inventions that may be patentable is that the latter must be '...isolated from its natural environment or
produced by means of a technical process...' (Article 3 of Directive 98/44 of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions (hereafter,
'Biotechnology Directive'). This is an artificial distinction to some.
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Nevertheless it does seem that patenting of biological inventions is here to stay, so the
practical reality is reflected in this work.
Discussions concerning biotechnology patenting are multidisciplinary, involving
science, ethics and social science as well as law. Each of these disciplines will have
diverse attitudes and language for particular problems:
... [participants in the debate simply speak different languages. The
languages of science, of commerce, of ethics, of ecology, of law are
foreign to each other; each can hardly understand what the other is saying,
let alone why they should be saying it.18
These linguistic and disciplinary factions complicate this area of law. Scientists
assess an early embryo as a mere ball of cells, religious scholars argue that there is
more to our early origins than simple cell structures, social scientists query whether
or not embryos should have rights, and lawyers seek to define, in the form of clear
rules, what is permitted and how that should be carried out.
This is a thesis in Law that does not attempt to reconcile the different perspectives of
these disciplines, but the area of genetics is fraught with complex problems which
the law cannot ignore. This work attempts to reflect this reality and identifies with
policy makers who have to account for disparate interpretations and prejudices
18 J Black. 'Regulation as facilitation: Negotiating the genetic revolution' in R Brownsword. WR
Cornish and M Llewelyn (eds), 'Law and Human Genetics: Regulating a Revolution' (Hart 1998) 29-
68 at page 68.
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relating to complex and ethically difficult areas to reflect and weigh concerns and to
enable progress. The overall challenge is whether diverse views can be realistically
incorporated.
This thesis will proceed on the assumption that patent law and patents over
biotechnology, and stem cells in particular, are desirable for the progress of science.
This stance cannot be supported by empirical evidence and thus is made in the
knowledge that full justification may not be possible. It should therefore be appreciated
that in order to discuss the topic of the thesis, the effect of exclusion from patentability,
certain assumptions must be accepted. If the proposition was that patent law has a
negative effect on technology or that biotechnology should not be patented then the
discussion would be very different. Recognising that opposing arguments exist,19 does
not detract from the conclusion that this is a reasonable view to adopt20 and it is a view
that receives support. According to Sven Bostyn: 'That the patent system has positive
effects on innovation is not the subject ofmuch debate'21. He comments further:
There is no doubt that the patent system has proved its value for technological
developments, and as a means to find the financial resources to make them.
19 There is no certain proof of the effectiveness of patenting. Whilst there is empirical evidence to
support the importance of patents to industry, there are also empirical studies that have 'found little
evidence to support the view that there would be more and better public health-orientated research
without DNA patenting' (Dutfield, 'DNA Patenting: Implications for public health research', Bulletin
of the World Health Organisation, May 2006 84 (5) p.389). More on this later, but what is good for
industry may not necessarily have a correlative positive effect on public benefit - and after all that is
the ultimate aim of the patent system. See also Monboit. The age of consent.
2,1 See also chapter two below.
21 SJR Bostyn, 'DNA Patents in Europe: Controversy Remains" in The Danish Council of Ethics. The
Ethics of Patenting Human Genes and Stem Cells. Conference Report and Summaries (University of
Copenhagen, 28 September 2004) 27. Available from <lntp://etisk inforce.dk/s\\475.asp>.
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The patent system has also had an enormously stimulating effect on the
development ofmedicaments and more generally for cures for diseases.22
Furthermore reports into the patenting of biotechnological inventions almost invariably
proceed on the basis that patents are necessary for innovation and, despite the
particular characteristics of biotechnology patents, are necessary for the biotech
industry. This can be seen in the OECD Report, 'Patent and Innovation' (2004)23,
Article 16 of the European Commission Reports of 200224 and 200525, and the
Gowers Review of Intellectual Property (2006)26. The pertinent issue that arises from
the reports is not whether biotechnological inventions should be patented but how
should their complex and competing interests be balanced at each stage of the patent
process. Andrew Gowers comments, in the foreword to his 2006 report: 'I do not think
the system is in need of radical overhaul. However, taking a holistic view of the
system, I believe there is scope for reform to serve better the interests of consumers
and industry alike'27. He goes on to refer to the importance of balance and ends by
stating: 'Getting the balance right is vital to driving innovation, securing investment
22
Bostyn, 'Patenting DNA Sequences (polynucleotides) and Scope of Protection in the European
Union', 126.
23 'Patents play an increasingly important role in innovation and economic performance...the patent
system has been instrumental in the recent waves of innovation which have occurred in the fields of
biotechnology and ICT' (OECD. 'Patents and Innovation: Trends and Policy Challenges' (2004) 5 and
8).
24
Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. 'Development and
implications of patent law in the field of biotechnology and genetic engineering' Brussels, 7 October
2002, COM (2002) 545 final.
25
Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, 'Development and
implications of patent law in the field of biotechnology and genetic engineering'. Brussels 14 July
2005, COM (2005) 312 final.
26 'In the modem world, knowledge capital, more than physical capital, drives the UK economy. Against
the backdrop of the increasing importance of ideas, IP rights, which protect their value, are more vital
than ever.' Gowers Review. Foreword.
2 Gowers Review, page 1.
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and stimulating competition'28. Balance is also a recurring theme throughout Sven
Bostyn's29 report for the European Commission which ends with the recommendation:
'...the practice of the EPO, and the current patent system, are capable of providing
solutions for most of the problems that were discussed in this report'. Bostyn also
• • 30
mentions that '...there are a number of unclarities which require further analysis or
clarification, with a view to make the system even more balanced...'31. Weaknesses
have also been highlighted in other reports. The OECD32, for example, stated: 'This
strengthening of the patent system in European Union, Japan and the United States has,
however, raised new concerns and exacerbated old ones'.
Concerns mentioned include hampering the 'diffusion of knowledge', concern over
'...access to basic technologies and research tools...' and Bostyn's European
Commission report33 mentions uncertainty with compulsory licensing, blocking effects
of patents on further research and patent pools.
The practice of patenting biotechnological inventions has created an industry reliant
upon patents to encourage the raising of finance and creation of income34.
28 Ibid.
29
Bostyn. 'Patenting DNA sequences (polynucleotides) and scope ofprotection in the European Union ',
137.
30 These include research exemption, patent and royalty stacking, patent pools which are discussed in
more detail later.
31
Supra note 26 at page 137.
32
OECD, 'Patents and Innovation: Trends and Policy Challenges'.
33
Supra note 26 at page 137.
34 Several studies into the importance of patents for different industries have taken place. See note 5
above, but in the case of the pharmaceutical industry the potential for patent grant is rated by the
industry as very important and the biotechnology industry has evolved around a culture of patenting to
the extent that it could almost be claimed to be industry dependent. Patents have had such an effect on
26
Biotechnology is a capital intensive research industry but its results are easily
reproduced or copied. Legal protection therefore is essential and so the biotechnology
industry is particularly suited to and has become reliant upon the use of patents. This
underpinning of the modern patent system is not a subject for contention herein but
leaves open the opportunity to discuss how the operation of the patent system can be
improved.
It is logical, with these points in mind, to examine areas of the patent system that are
placed under stress and thereby open to criticism. Potential for rational questioning
arises in the absence of means to react when criticisms metamorphose into attacks on
the patent system per se when the sources of the criticisms are the real problems. In
other words, the argument is that, rather than submitting that X should not be patented,
the fact is that X can be patented but with limitations or means to provide redress to
correct any imbalance.
The award of a patent need not always be commensurate with the contribution, for this
would be impossible to achieve. Further the '...size of the monopoly profits earned
under patent protection is not at all correlated with the efforts, capital funds, or
sacrifices invested in the inventive work'35. So to quote the Gowers Review of
Intellectual Property, in relation to competition law: '...regulating IP markets should
not extend to price regulation: patents are exclusive rights which enable owners to
the biotechnology industry that they have changed the way in which early stage inventions are brought
on and how the science has developed. More on this topic later.
35
Bostyn. Enabling Biotechnological Inventions in Europe and the United States, 34.
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charge monopoly prices'. Patents should encourage, promote, provide and correctly
balance opportunities in ways that do not inhibit beneficial objectives.
This work centres upon objections to biotechnology patents because the particular
characteristics thereof emphasise the tensions within patent law as noted by the Royal
Society:
The area in which debate about excluded subject matter has been the most
vigorous is the biosciences. The patenting of life forms and human tissue not
only raises practical and, at least in some people's eyes, moral questions but
also has the potential to impact upon the conduct of basic science. Yet nowhere
is the debate more critical.36
However the same dilemmas are relevant to any form of inventive activity promoted
through the patent system, in particular within new industries such as biotechnology or
nanotechnology, where there are moral concerns with reference to inventions and
where embryonic industries produce early stage innovation with potentially broad
reaching patents. So although the thesis is primarily concerned with biotechnology it is
not suggested that similar issues will not arise or be relevant for other areas of
technology, just that biotechnology has highlighted the relevant concerns.
This study is concerned with European Patent Law although many of the issues
discussed are relevant to the provision of patent protection in general in other
36 The Royal Society, 'Keeping Science open'.
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countries. European Patent Law is unique because moral37 exclusions of patentability
are decided in the absence of an accepted European moral standard, and this
centralised European interpretation is affecting areas of innovation policy38 within
Member States. Thus the study provides a window through which to observe the
interaction between regulatory systems and also, from a point of European political
policy, to illustrate tensions between the European Patent Office and the practices of
National States.
3
Many jurisdictions allow patents to be excluded for moral reasons, such as in Europe and Japan, whilst
others, including the United States, have no specific provision. The United States did take moral
concerns into account if an invention was "...frivolous or injurious to the well-being, good policy, or
sound morals of a society" Lowell v Lewis, 15 (a. IOI8N0. 8568) (CD. mass.1817)
38 This is examined in chapter four and five and reflects the tension between countries which adopt a
facilitative regulatory regime towards controversial innovation but incentive to carry out such research
is thwarted centrally. The case of human embryonic stem cells below is such an example.
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(1) (c) Grounds of Objection
It is important to examine the criticisms against biotech patenting and to assess how
patent law is facing up to them. Opposition to the patenting of biotechnology falls into
several categories ranging from objections to the science of biotechnology per se39 to
objections over the commodification of natural elements. These have been aired with
the European Patent Office40 and in opposition to the Biotechnology Directive41. These
sorts of objections, although aimed at the patent system, can be out ofkilter in that they
can be contradictory and are sometimes confused and/or are misdirected. They relate in
the main to ethical concerns about inventions although allegations have also been
made that patenting unnecessarily restricts access without commensurate return.
Rebuttals to the various objections can be put within and out-with patent rules and
there is a need to assess how objections can best be met.
This work will untangle objections that have been made against the patenting of
biotechnology and interpret them through understanding what a patent is, what it does
and whether the objections can be answered by adapting patent law. The diverse
objections arise in two categories; there are those that object to biotechnology as such
and see patent law as a method to promote biotechnology, and those that are concerned
that the commodification of limited resources restricts scientific progress. These distil
39 There is a fine dividing line between objecting to the science of an invention and objecting to its
promotion through the patent system, and this will be discussed in due course.
40 See cases such as HARVARD/ ONCO-mouse [19911 EPOR 525. HOWARD FLOREY/Relaxin [1995]
EPOR 541, PLANT GENETIC SYSTEMS/Glutamine Synthetase Inhibitors [1995] EPOR 4,
NOVARTIS/Transgenic Plant [2000] EPOR 303. See also below at section three for a fuller discussion
41 Case C-377/98, Kingdom ofthe Netherlands v European Parliament and the Council ofthe European
Union, 2001 ECR1-7079. especially the opinion of Advocate-General Jacobs. 14 June 2001.
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into two extremes; the first opposes patents on biotechnology because patents
encourage bioscience research42 and the second because patents are deemed to stifle
research in the biotechnological industry.
These grounds of opposition are not entirely incompatible nor are they mutually
exclusive. One is an ethical issue, that biotechnology per se or its techniques, for
example the use of embryos, is wrong and should not be encouraged by the provision
of patent incentives - the classic uncompromising dogmatic that sees no shades of
grey, only black or white. The second is an access issue43 that alleges that
biotechnology patents restrict the dissemination of information thereby hampering
innovation and that they do not fulfil the objectives ofpatent law; it being related to the
rights that a patent provides and how those rights affect research. Both arguments have
validity but they are relevant at different stages of the patent process; the first at the
grant stage and the second at the enforcement or validity stage. These two categories of
opposition should be distinguished, the first is a paradox and the second questions the
role of patent law within public policy.
42 There are some interesting statistics that support these 'for and against' positions. There had been
10,547 applications for patents for genetic engineering subject matter to the European Patent Office by
2006 (DTI Report, below). A simple search for 'DNA' at esp@cenet
<http://gb.espacenet.com/search97cgi/s97 cgi.exe?Action=FormGen&Template=gb/en/quick.hts>
produced 76,047 results on 9 August 2006. On the other hand, in support of stronger patent rights: Tt
is worth bearing in mind that to date no UK court has upheld a biotech related patent" (Intellectual
Property Institute. "Patents for Genetic Sequences: The Competitiveness of Current UK Law and
Practice. A study by the Intellectual Property Institute (IPI) on behalf of the DTI' (May 2004) 78,
available from <www.dti.gov.uk>).
43 This could also be an ethical issue as the 'right' tiling to do is to share. As will be shown later there is a
crossover between access, ethics and economics.
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(1) (d) The Patent Paradox
A patent provides the patentee with a monopoly, usually for 20 years44, that restricts
others from making, disposing of, offering to dispose of, using or importing patented
inventions45. It seems paradoxical to enable patent holders to block competition and
thereby to restrict public access through the patent system; the purpose of which is to
increase access: 'We limit access to innovative products now, to enhance incentive to
innovate and commercialise new products, in respect of which access will also be
limited'46.
A monopoly situation arises when '...a firm or individual produces and sells the entire
output of some commodity'47. The obvious consequence is that the monopolist can
control the supply of the commodity to the level that maximises his profit and he will
rarely choose other options such as allowing an optimum level of distribution to
benefit the public or anyone else. This conflicts with open competition where demand
and supply determine efficient and economic levels of price and quantity. A
44 See s. 60 Patents Act 1977 (UK). Although patent law allows for protection of 20 years, many patents
do not survive for (heir full tenn. This may be for many reasons; there may be no economic reason to
continue to pay for the patent fees, for example where the invention is no longer in demand. This often
occurs in 'fast" industries where the rate of progress is swift, such as in the computer industry. A
report by Science and Technology Policy Research at the University of Sussex suggested that the main
reasons for abandoning granted patents were; lack ofbusiness, cost cutting and tire scope of the claims
being insufficient. See also The PATGEN Project, 'The Patenting of Human DNA: Global Trends in
Public and Private Sector Activity' (Final Project Report. November 2006), Priority: FP6-2003-
Lifescihealth-II, 26. In particular circumstances, patents for pharmaceuticals and agrochemicals can be
extended for five years through Supplementary Protection Certificates. This is justified on the basis
that there are often delays, due to safety regulations, before such inventions reach the market place
(COUNCIL REGULATION (EEC) NO." 1768/92
45 Section 60 Patents Act 1977
46 E Cameron. 'Patents and Public Health: Principle, Politics and Paradox'. Inaugural British Academy
Law Lecture. Edinburgh University. 19 October 2004.
47 G Bannock. RE Baxter and Rees. 'The Penguin Dictionary of Economics' (2nd edition. Penguin.
London. 1978) 313.
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monopolist can therefore reduce supply to maintain a higher price and profits, the term
for any excess being the 'monopoly profit'. There are valid economic objections to
monopoly situations, not the least ofwhich is that supply becomes artificially restricted
so that a monopoly '...reduces aggregate economic welfare...'48. There is a moral
argument that it is unfair that the monopolist should profit excessively at the expense
of the public but that does not sit well with economics, which is concerned more with
market efficiency. This is reflected in many areas of law including Competition Law
and Articles 81 and 82 European Union Treaty.
Monopolies can however benefit the economy, for instance when higher profits
encourage others into the same market resulting in increased competition and more
production which increases supply thereby causing prices to fall. If others are
prevented from entering the market place then monopolists can continue to restrict
supply and charge monopoly prices. Monopolies can be artificially maintained with
barriers to the entry of potential competitors into the marketplace and sometimes they
may be acceptable; for example market barriers, regulatory barriers, natural barriers,
legal barriers, intellectual property in particular patents, and so on.
Market barriers can occur when the demand for a product is so small that it would not
be financially attractive for others to enter the market. Regulatory barriers, such as
those within the pharmaceutical industry arise when government regulation of a
specific industry creates expense to the extent that competition is discouraged. A
4S GJ Stigler. 1The Concise Encyclopaedia of Economics\ available from
<www.econlib.org/librarv/Enc/Monopoly.html> last accessed 30th December 2007
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monopoly may resist market forces because set up costs are too high, as with the utility
sector, or where there is government protection, such as in the postal service. Patents
are special cases because patent law intentionally permits and facilitates monopolies
that are seen to be ultimately for the public good. This creates the 'the patent paradox'.
The patent paradox - using early restriction of access to increase late access - can be
seen in some of the arguments49 used to support patent law as it has developed until
now:
1. Incentives encourage more inventions, many of which will eventually benefit
an increasing number of people;
2. Inventions become available to the public which in the absence of patent law
may not have been developed;
3. Publication of patents inspires others to create alternatives thus increasing
competition;
4. The hope ofjoining the 'band-wagon' instigates others to invent around patents
to enter same market which may have the effect of increasing quality,
knowledge, competition, commerce etc.;
5. Patenting encourages others to develop improvements to patented inventions
which may be separately patentable in their own right;
49 These are some of the common arguments used to support the grant of patents and can be seen in more
detail in intellectual property and patent text books. See for example Cornish W R & Llewelyn D,
'Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks and Allied Rights' (6th edition. Sweet &
Maxwell, 2007) Dutfield G, 'Intellectual Property Rights and the Life Science Industries': A
Twentieth- century History (Globalisation and the Law series, Ashgate, Aldershot Hants. 2003 Cook
T, 'A User's Guide to Patent's (Buttcrworths. London 2002). See also Nuffield Council on Bioethics,
"The ethics ofPatenting DNA. a discussion paper' July 2002
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6. Patent law enables generic production after the patent expires resulting in
cheaper alternatives.
It will be seen that if a patentee acts in a manner that reduces access and prohibits or
inhibits the fulfilment of the paradox (i.e. restriction of access without subsequent
increase in access represented by points 1-6 above) the patent system fails.
(1) (e) Stimulate or stipulate?
There is some confusion or perhaps fusion between the objections to biotechnology
as a form of science and to the patenting of the inventions stemming from it. This
may, in part, be due to the tendency to see promotion of inventions through patenting
as having a direct correlative effect on research. This is understandable given the
logic of incentive briefly outlined above but the two are different. The question (1)
'Is it acceptable to patent an invention?' requires a different set of values than (2) 'Is
this an appropriate line of research?'. Also distinct is the issue as to whether it is
appropriate to use the power of monopoly over research. Arguing that patents should
not be granted for reasons relating to the appropriateness of research ignores many
features of the nature50 of a patent. As the potential grant of a patent is a strong
incentive factor and if research is perceived to be unethical then the temptation arises
to try to use patent law as a method of control or influence: remove the potential of a
patent and the incentive for research goes too51. These questions have arisen on
50
Chapter two below discusses the nature of a patent in more detail.
51 There are other incentives; the wish to progress science, notoriety for doing so, the possibility of profit
for being first on the market.
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several occasions in commentaries and reports with the emphasis on the importance
of distinguishing objections to research and objections to providing patent incentives.
What the following commentaries appear to be saying is that patent law should not
ask question (2). The Intellectual Property Institute in its 2003 study on behalf of the
UK Department of Trade and Industry52 summarised the issue thus:
It will be particularly important to disentangle objections to the pursuit of any
experimentation involving embryonic stem cells, where arguably the public
policy decision should be left to bodies such as the Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Authority which are already charged with making decisions about
the legal ethical status of living tissue etc, from objections to offering the
stimulus to medical research which is the objective of the patent system.
The point has been raised elsewhere too:
...but it is not for patent law to address that concern if the objection is to the
science rather than to the grant of a monopoly right. Not only is it a matter
more appropriately tackled by regulatory authorities using their entire gamut of
legal tools, but the deep irony is that patent law cannot53 address such a
concern.54
52 WR Cornish. M Llewelyn and M Adcock. 'Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) and Genetics - A study
into the impact and management of intellectual properly rights within tire healthcare sector'. Public
Health Genetics Unit. Cambridge Genetics Knowledge Park, funded bv the Department of Health
(UK), July 2003.
53 This is addressed in more detail below. The refusal of a patent for a specific invention may have an
influence through removal of incentive but using patent law as a method of addressing concerns
regarding a particular form of inventive activity throughout an industry is flawed.
54 G Laurie, 'Patenting Stem Cells ofHuman Origin' [2004] EIPR 14. 59-66, at page 64
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The European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies noted this in their
report on stem cell research in 2002:55
Patent law and biomedical research regulations largely legislate the same
issues, but from a different angle. Biomedical research regulations try to
outline the type of research which is considered legitimate.. .Patent law deals
with the same subject matter, but mainly focuses on the research applications
and the ethical implications the exploitation50 might entail.
...and
There is a disturbing trend to consider patents as invalid under Article 53 (a)57
EPC, not for anything to do with the use of the invention but because of what
the inventor did before filing the application.58
55
European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies, 'Study on the Patenting of inventions
related to human stem cell research'. Report to the European Commission: Office for Official
Publications of the European Communities, 2002.
56
Although this quotation illustrates different questions that arise from patenting it is not strictly correct
that patent law focuses on ethical implications of exploitation. The moral focus of patent law is
discussed below and the thesis later makes the case that perhaps the patent system should concentrate
more upon ethical implications of exploitation rather than the ethical implications of science.
57 Article 53 (a) is the EPC version of what has become know as the 'morality clause' and states:
"European Patents should not be granted in respect of (a) inventions the publication or exploitation of
which would be contrary to ordre public or morality provided that the exploitation shall not be deemed
to be so contrary merely because it is prohibited by law or regulation in some or all of the contracting
states'.
78 P W Grubb. 'Patents for Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology, Fundamentals of Global
Law, Practice andStrateg'y (4th Edition. OUP 2004) 286.
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These distinctions, between objections to research science and/or exploitation illustrate
the time differences in which the influence of patent law is felt. The patent system
creates an incentive to innovate and that incentive exists before any single patent is
granted. At the time of patent grant the inventive quality of the invention is
investigated and after a patent is granted the pertinent issue is the method by which the
invention is exploited. Although it is possible to separate areas in respect of their
position in time, pre-grant, grant, post-grant, the rules within each group have a
bearing upon how balanced a patent system is and it is this important element of
balance that will now be examined.
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(1) (f) 'A Good Armchair'59
The primary function of a patent system is to encourage innovation by providing an
incentive in the form of a limited, temporary monopoly over the claimed aspects of an
invention and the disclosure of information that would otherwise be kept secret.60
The overall goals of the patent system are to stimulate innovation for the
public good and to reward people for useful new inventions....whilst at the
same time promoting competition and innovation by ensuring that such
inventions are fully disclosed to the public.61
The cost to society of providing an inventor with a reward in the form of a limited
monopoly is reflected in the restriction in the use of the patented invention. This
restriction is justified because it is believed that in the long run more inventions will
emerge which compensate for the temporary restriction:
59 'What I dream of is an art of balance, of purity and serenity devoid of troubling or depressing subject
matter...a soothing, calming influence on the mind, rather like a good armchair...' (Henri Matisse
1908, 'OxfordDictionaryofQuotations' (OUP 1999) 501:13).
60 'The aim has been to stimulate innovation and further technology diffusion. Besides adding the "fuel
of interest to the fire of genius" the disclosure of information is the classical core of patent law.' (Jens
Schovsbo. The ethics of patenting human genes and stem cells' (The Danish Coimcil of Ethics,
2005) 95-101, at 95. This is a simplified description and the following section deals with the
justifications and aims of patent law in more detail. In 1988 the report of the Commission to the
European Council stated: 'The primary purpose of the modern patent system is to promote technical
innovation as the major factor of economic growth by encouraging inventive activity through
rewarding inventors for their creative efforts.. ..Simultaneously, the patent system encourages an early
and beneficial dissemination of knowledge in the field of activity involved which, without such
protection, might be kept secret.' (Com(88) 496 final SYN 159, 17 October 1988; [1989] OJ C10/3
para. 11 page 6). We shall see in the following chapter that there are several theories which attempt to
justify the patent system, ranging from the protection of the personal rights of the 'inventor' to
disclosure of information for the greater benefit of all to creating an incentive for other inventive
people to seek a method of financing research. There are differing views as to the importance of each
but stimulation of innovation and distribution of information remain at the core of the patent system.
61 Nuffield Council on Bioethics: 'The ethics of patenting DNA. A discussion paper' (July 2002). page
12, paragraph 2.3.
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On the one hand IP rights provide economic incentives to innovate, but on the
other hand, the exclusive rights they confer to achieve this allow monopoly
prices and associated welfare losses. So there is a trade-off between incentives
on the one side and costs to consumers and limited access for follow on
62innovators on the other.
Admittedly this oversimplifies the role of patent law because within every patent
decision there are complex balances of interests to be considered. This is well
summarised in Holyoak and Tonemails.
Clearly no one interest group can shape the patent system. If there is a single
justification or common purpose that underpins the system it must be the
attainment of a balance between the different interests involved.03
These interests include the patent applicant seeking to protect his invention and the
public64 having to pay more for a patented invention because of the existence of a
patent. The public can be said to be benefiting nevertheless because it achieves access
to that invention, which might not have been created in the absence of potential to
profit at the earlier marketing stages in order to recoup research costs.
62 Gowers Review. Foreword, paragraph 3.6
63 P. Torremans (ed.), 'Holvoak & Torremans Intellectual Property Law' (4th Edition. Butterworths.
London 2005)41.
64 'The system is intended to balance the interests of the public with those of the inventors', Nuffield
Council on Bioethics. ' The ethics of patenting DNA'. page 12, paragraph 2.3.
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Balance is a vital quality at each stage of the patent process. 'Understanding and
applying patent law presumes a continuous balancing of interests...'65 and the patent
system is equipped with a number of'... checks and balances...' with which to address
or achieve harmony. The issue of patent equilibrium cannot be overstated and is a
recurring theme within the 2006 Gowers Review which from the start emphasises that
'It must strike the right balance...', that it must concentrate on 'improving the
balance...', and that 'Getting the balance right is vital to driving innovation securing
investment and stimulating competition'66. The factors that are weighed in the balance
change throughout the innovation time line and the argument will be made that correct
considerations should be given at the appropriate stages not only at the time of grant.
Achieving a balanced patent system is made all the more difficult because the life of a
patent is fluid and is influenced by diverse factors at different stages. The innovation
process reveals four main phases within what could be called the patent time line;
incentive stage, grant, exploitation and generic competition.
(1) Incentive Stage - The effect of a patent regime begins with knowledge of the
potential or availability of patent rights. Inventors have different motivations to
proceed down particular roads so the part the availability of patents will play
will differ from one person to another and from industry to industry67. Thus the
65
Bostyn, 'Patenting DNA Sequences (polynucleotides) and Scope of Protection in the European
Union', 125.
66 Gowers Review. Foreword, page 1.
67 See Ernst & Young, 'Total Value of Information' (2004) available from
www.ev.com/global/eontent.nsiyUS/Health sciences - Articles - WEF 2004 - Innovation Divide
Ernst & Young and Yale Levin Survey 1987. Carnegie-Mellon University survey 2000. See also
OECD, 'Patents and Innovation: Trends and Policy Challenges', which includes a suggestion that the
differences in characteristics of inventions could require: '...a more differentiated approach to patent
protection diat depends on specific characteristics of the inventions, such as their life cycle or their
value (as opposed to the current uniform system)".
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importance of the availability of patent protection varies but at the very least
there will be awareness of the availability of patent protection and what is
excluded from it that could be decisive in taking strategic decisions. To put it
another way, if patents are seen to be difficult to obtain or are not granted over
particular inventions this is likely to have a bearing on the direction of research
taken. The effects of excluding patents over particular inventions will be
discussed later but an important issue is whether the patent system can be or
should be used to influence the direction of inventive activity. Individual patent
decisions within the system can have far reaching consequences within science
generally and it is highly debatable whether specific cases should address the
broader picture.
(2) At the application/grant stage there is an assessment of how patent criteria are
formulated to achieve a balance. Reports repeatedly68 stress the importance of
applying the criteria for patentability; novelty, inventive step and commercial
application/utility strictly, so as to maintain quality and balance. Certain
inventions may also be excluded from patentability for reasons ofmorality or if
considered to be contrary to ordre public. The test for this is applied at grant
stage but the specific objection may relate to an event in the past or may relate
to a possible event that might be objectionable in the future. The patent system
is not capable, in its present form69, of effectively addressing different moral
issues which arise at each stage within the innovation time line.
68
Including: Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 'The ethics ofpatenting DNA Bostyn, 'Patenting DNA
Sequences (polynucleotides) and Scope ofProtection in the European Unionand Gowers Review.
69 The moral issues that arise at different stages and the problems that may arise for patent law as means
of addressing those issues will be examined.
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(3) The patent holder profits most assuming commercial circumstances are
favourable during the exploitation stage, between patent grant and the end of its
validity. It is at that stage that the tension between access and exploitation is
most acute. That is when competitors are encouraged to produce alternatives to
patented products and/or processes or to improve upon technology that
becomes available, and patent law does not normally70 stand in the way of such
activities. The extent that this is enabled depends upon the breadth of the patent
- too narrow then incentive too is weak - too broad could lead to market
control which could in turn hinder further research or otherwise frustrate the
aims of the patent system.
(4) At end of the patent term it is open to competitors to manufacture, sell and/or
distribute versions of the previously protected invention. If demand exists then
in all likelihood copies will soon appear on the market in direct competition
resulting in falling prices and more consumer choice. This open season is a
beneficial part of the initial patent bargain. Full disclosure of the invention
means that on patent expiry71 copies can be made but the inventor has already
been rewarded through the monopoly that he has enjoyed for the designated
period. The length of the period, up to 20 years72, is intended to be an
appropriate length for all types of inventions so as to balance the interest of the
70 Patent law usually contains provisions for compulsory licences, revocation and opposition
proceedings. See the UK Patents Act 1977 SS 48 - 50 regarding compulsory licences and discussion
below page 65, Patents Act s 72 regarding revocation and opposition proceedings. However providing
a patent is not infringed the patent system will encourage alternatives and improvements to patented
inventions by allowing separate patents for such activities.
71 Clinical trials can begin before this.
'2 The term is potentially longer for pharmaceutical, agrochemicals and pharmaceutical patents and
extended protection may be granted by way of Supplementary Protection Certificates ("SPC") to
compensate patentee for time lost, for up to five years, due to regulatory delay - Supplementary
Protection Certificate Regulations 1992 and 1996.
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inventor and public. Thus there is a short term restriction of supply
compensated for by a long term benefit of availability. The term of a patent
may be limited in time but the effects are much greater, reaching from initial
concept to after patent expiry.
Bostyn also points out that there are some types of innovation that may not be suited to
promotion through the patent system. Even supporters of strong patent rights have
some doubts about some aspects of the patent system, as Bostyn continues: 'No one
will doubt that for some types of innovations, the patent system is probably not the
most suited system, but that does not take away the positive effects of the system in
general' 3. He also indicates that:
One should not refrain from pointing to features of the patent system which
might give rise to objections to the system. In view of the fact that a patent
provides an exclusionary right, it could be used by patent holders in a way
which is not necessarily beneficial to society, but is more concentrated on the
financial interests of patent holders and/or investors.74
These two negative points, system/invention unsuitability and abuse by patent holder,
may be exceptions but they are real possibilities nevertheless.
The factors to be weighed within this balance became more complex and more
numerous with the development of biotechnology. Research costs in the biotechnology
3
Bostyn, 'Patenting DNA Sequences (polynucleotides) and Scope of Protection in the European
Union126.
14 ibid at page 126
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industry are enormous but are compatible when compared to the potential benefits in,
for example, health care and the specific profit for those fortunate enough to be first on
the market with the particular product. Thus the traditional patent balance between
incentive/cost on the one hand and availability/access on the other is further
highlighted.
(1) (f) (i) Moral Balance
This complexity is not merely expressed within the traditional patent equation; it
extends to morality issues which are specifically considered in, inter alia, European
patent law. No longer is patent morality confined to obvious immoral inventions, such
as the letter bomb, but is being directed at new and complex questions affecting
embryonic life75, slavery76 and harm to the environment77.
No correct answer can be given to the issues posed within the 'new' moral equation so
this 'new' situation has a number of consequences. First, patent law is straying into the
territory of ethics (and vice versa) that govern science as distinct from invention. There
are precedents in the history of patent law that tackle a range of issues not merely the
granting of a privilege. In England, for example, the prime impetus for the origins of a
strong patent system was to encourage the inwards migration of engineers from
abroad78. Similarly the Venetian State in the fifteenth century79 began granting patent
privileges partly for disclosure of invention but these '...were often not a reward for
75 See discussion below in chapter four, and also see Edinburgh Patent (EP 0695351).
76 HOWARD FLOREY/Relaxin [1995] EPOR 541.
7
PLANT GENETIC SYSTEMS/ Glutamine Synthetase Inhibitors [1995] EPOR 4.
7X Dutfield 'Intellectual Property Rights and the Life Science Industrie's, 3.
9 The first recorded patent was issued in Venice in 1474 but there also seems to have been a patent
issued in Florence in 1421 and before that in ancient Greece. See GA Stobbs. (2000); 'Software
patents' [1996] Aspen Law & Business, and Grubb. 'Patents For Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals and
Biotechnology', 10.
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invention but a reward for royal supporters, and patents were granted simply so as to
reward loyalty with monopoly'.80 Despite these previous examples of the use of patent
reward to control behaviour through incentive, the success of this is limited by the
extent that the incentive of a patent influences those who are involved in its invention.
If patent protection is prohibited for a specific subject matter, that does not prevent
further invention because inventors have other methods such as secrecy to deter rivals.
Second, this ethical balance has the potential to upset the traditional patent balance. If
an invention is controversial the morality of providing a patent has to be balanced
against the morality of not granting it. How far do these issues of weight/balance
extend? If, for example, research is ethically controversial but the potential invention
promises great benefit, is it the place of patent law to address this difficult balance?
It is reasonable to assume that if the system does not balance these sorts of interests
appropriately it is not working effectively, and if that is the case what reforms to patent
law are appropriate? If the grant of a patent carries with it the probability of unforeseen
harm or undesirable consequences, is it the role of patent law to interfere in any way81?
Does the role extend further to influence, for instance, invention that could be harmful
to the environment? Indeed could the role reach back in time into elements of research
or forward to take into account and impose conditions upon how an invention is
manufactured or exploited?
80
"Holyoak and Torremans Intellectual Property Law,' 38. This can be differentiated from the patent
incentive in modem patent law which rewards inventiveness rather than loyalty to die Crown. It serves
to illustrate that there have been other reasons behind the grant of patents. The thesis examines 'other
reasons' behind the refusal of patent grants.
81 At the time of patent grant it is debatable whether such interference is warranted but once
consequences arc apparent could patent law have a role to play? The final chapter explores this
possibility.
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Whilst it is important to appreciate the influence of a patent grant this ought not to be
overstated because there are other factors relevant to assessing the success of an
invention. These include the ethical and economical rules that are outside patent law82,
the effect of not granting a patent, the applicants position in the marketplace and the
tactics of the applicant, competitors and consumers. These factors affect the
importance of a patent in a given situation yet are not known at the material time so are
not capable of being assessed in the grant-time balancing act. On the other hand, moral
questions are emerging more frequently in the patent grant process and some of these
are, arguably, irrelevant to patent law.
In conclusion, there are four separate time sectors within which patent rules can be
changed so as to achieve a balanced decision process. Each sector has different
questions and different emphasis so as to maintain the overall aim of creating an
innovative environment without at the same time restricting further development. Like
Matisse's armchair if the balance is achieved it is devoid of 'trouble', but there is
plenty of 'trouble' lurking for biotech patents.
x: The existence of a patent does not provide permission to use the invention and this could be limited
through separate regulation such as the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act in the UK.
Competition law may prevent a patentee from abusing a dominant position.
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(1) (g) A Regulatory Chameleon
Table One - Innovation Time Line and Patent Effect
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4
innovation or grant stage exploitation stage generic
incentive stage stage
The Incentive to Assess inventive Monopoly Open
patent commence research quality - publication - encourages (a) competition
effect and development novelty/inventive further research (b) inventing
distinguish between step and utility - around patent (c) compulsory
incentive to research morality licenses (d) research
and incentive to priority date exemption
commercialise the (application) patent
results of research publication within pools/stacks/abuse/restrictive





to grant 4.5 years
Morality Is research moral? What is the moral Is commercial exploitation An important
To what extent is objection - immoral? Can this be part of the
research influenced research - the anticipated at the time of patent
by individual patent actual provision grant? bargain is
decisions, is research of incentive or to disclosure so
regulated and if so keep invention in as to enable
should patent law the public reproduction
adopt a variant domain? Each of after patent













The four stages of innovation process are represented in the above table and I have
touched upon the balancing act required during the patent decision making process.
During these four stages of the innovation process the effects of changes to patent rules
will be different and will involve various regulatory strategies. For example the result
of the incentive created by the potential for a patent will be seen initially within stage
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one. The incentive of a patent may be different for different people within a particular
development. A hypothetical inventor embarking upon research may be influenced by
his area of expertise, his peers, the wish to spread knowledge and suchlike, but a
venture capitalist will more likely be on the look out for commercial gain that is
capable of being ring fenced through the patent system.
Stage three on the other hand relates to exploitation of inventions under protection of a
patent. Incentive no longer plays a part - at least on the part of the exploiter - because
he is reaping his reward. A balance must be achieved at stage three regarding the
exploitation of inventions as it does over stage two over the breadth of patent granted.
These different questions require different regulatory approaches in order to achieve
equilibrium.
It is important to appreciate where patent law sits in each of the stages within the
regulatory system in each of the stages. In other words, we need to see how it functions
so as to understand the effects that changes to patent law may have upon wider issues.
Focusing concerns upon granting patents is no longer appropriate and so the intention
is to understand how else patent law can address those concerns of ethics and access.
How can the custodians of patent law, the patent examiners, the patent agents and
lawyers, the judges and the arbitrators, perform; what methodology can they adopt to
help achieve equilibrium?
It is difficult to pin down the position of patent law within the regulatory structure, in
part because patent law illustrates a wide variety of regulatory characteristics and also
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in part, and despite this, it is atypical of what is perceived to be regulation. As Ogus
has said, 'It is not a term of art, and unfortunately it has acquired a bewildering variety
of meanings'83. This perception may arise because it is difficult to define the concept
of regulation, though some have tried with differing results: '... a sustained and focused
control exercised by a public agency over activities that are valued by a community' 84,
and 'a specific set of commands...deliberate state influence...all forms of social
85control or influence...' , are two such examples. There does, however, appear to be
agreement on the complexity of regulation both in terms of concept and execution and
this complexity usually has the result that in order to understand or explain what is
meant by regulation, the term is split into several categories. The categories could be in
the form of their social goals, such as free market regulation86 or collectivist
regulation,87 or they could be classed according to their purpose, for example,
economic regulation88 or social regulation89. Alternatively classification could be
addressed according to the methodology of execution90 as with self regulation91,
83 AI Ogus. Regulation. 'Legal Form andEconomic Theory' (Hart 2004) 1.
8'1 Noll R G. 'Regulatory policy and the social sciences'. Berkeley: University of California Press,
1985:9-64.
85 R Baldwin and M Cave, 'UnderstandingRegulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice' (OUP 1999) 2.
86
Ogus. Regulation: 'Legal Form and Economic Theory'. In brief, the free market regulation could be
characterised as having the aim of preserving the freedom to act and choose at will and regulation is
necessary only insofar as it promotes that purpose. Property rights, tort, monetary systems, are
examples. Thus patent law as a method of protecting property could fall within this category.
87 Collectivist regulation could be described as interventions in free market regulation so as to achieve a
goal which would not occur without intervention. Instances of market failure for example may require
interference, as with competition law. Social welfare law is a good example. Patent law is aimed at
correcting market failure - see below - and so could also fall into this category. As we shall see.
however, patent law is not easily categorised.
88 For example, taxation, competition law.
89 As with health and safety law or social welfare law, town planning.
90 See discussion in Baldwin and Cave, ' Understanding Regulation: Theory Strategy and Practice',
chapter 4. 'Regulatory Strategies'.
91 This can be seen in some industries such as insurance, advertising or finance. Self-regulation will be
discussed in due course as will the position of patent law and self regulation but is generally
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command and control regulation92, incentive based regulation, or categorised through
manner of enforcement; is action taken by the state or by individual complainant? The
manner in which regulation operates varies between each category. Patent law, as we
shall see, is interesting as it shows characteristics of different forms of regulation and
we shall examine these in the following chapters. It is useful now to remind ourselves
of the distinction between an invention and the monopoly that a patent provides.
Changes to patent rules may exercise control over the monopoly but will only be able
to challenge wider issues relating to an invention indirectly and in order to do so will
use a different form of regulatory strategy.
A traditional or narrow view of regulation would appear to exclude patent law from
discussion under that topic: 'Regulation is often thought of as an activity that restricts
behaviour and prevents the occurrence of certain undesirable activities (a red light
concept)'93. This understandably contracted initial reaction to patent law is summarised
concisely by Black, 'At first glance, including intellectual property rights in a
discussion of the regulation of genetic technology seems misplaced'94. Patent law
encourages an action, it does not restrict it, but at the same time it is complex and this
complexity allows patent law to provide a platform to study the various forms of
regulation. The aim of this study is to support the view that patent law is a form of
regulation albeit sui generis, and that a post-grant control mechanism is beneficial.
characterised by control exerted through the individual members of a particular group taking some
fonn of control over their own members.
92 In other words regulation that aims at forcing a certain type of behaviour. This may be characterised
by being backed by sanctions of some sort. e.g. fines or criminal penalties.
93 Baldwin and Cave, 'Understanding Regulation: Theory Strategy and Practice', 2.
94 Black. "Regulation as Facilitation: Negotiating the genetic revolution', 52.
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The regulatory impact of patent law changes during the phases of a patent. Starting
from the point when a patent may be an incentive to begin research through to the
period after a patent has expired, we can see that there are distinct stages which offer a
number of different perspectives with which to study patents. Stage one is the
incentive stage where the potential for a patent creates the stimulus for research -
research that may lead to stage two, the application stage, which if successful leads to a
patent grant and on to stage three, the exploitation stage. After the term of a patent of
20 years95, stage four, competition, is open to all comers with the result that cheap
generic copies may appear. Patent law plays a different 'role' or at least places a
different influence on each stage and these will be examined in chapter five whilst
looking at patent law from a regulatory perspective.
95
Although a patent may be granted for 20 years the average life of a patent in the United Kingdom is 10
to 11 years. Further a patent application takes on average a little less than 4V2 years before being
granted. The term of a patent is calculated from tire date of application and so the 'exploitable time' of
a patent is not as long as may be expected. The exploitable period may be reduced further if lengthy
testing is required by the government which I (he case of drugs and biotechnology will inevitably be
the case.
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Table Two - Regulation and Morality
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Consider, for now, how research takes place in a different time to exploitation of an
invention. There may be valid objections to particular research but these may differ
from objections to exploitation and or use of any invention resulting from research. For
instance, country A opposes stem cell research for ethical reasons but country B does
not and so proceeds to produce stem cell lines leading to treatments for various
ailments and diseases. Country A will have different ethical considerations if it were
either to import the treatment or stem cells produced in country B. Similarly there will
be different questions about whether that particular invention should be monopolised
through the patent system.
(1) (h) Conclusion
An effective patent system must balance the negative effects of granting and
maintaining a monopoly with the positive effects of providing an incentive. The patent
process is lengthy, and the effects of the grant of a single patent are felt in an industry
before an application is made and long after a patent expires. In order to keep the
various interests in harmony patent law has a variety of legal methods upon which it
can draw at different stages of the patent process.
Much of the emphasis on calming the negative effects of patent grant monopoly arises
when a patent is granted, yet negative effects, if any, of patent grant are not felt until
after this stage96. Despite this there are only a limited number of resources open to
confront relevant negative effects of a patent monopoly post-grant. If a balancing
process is to be effective it should be assessed after the grant of a patent, which is the
appropriate time to consider the stability of a decision.
96 Effects of refusal of patent grant are felt in stage one of a new innovation time line in similar area of
science
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A patent system that provides a level of protection that blocks further research is
unstable in favour of patentees but on the other hand any threat to the monopoly that is
provided by the grant of a patent will have repercussions as to the effectiveness of the
incentive. In other words an imbalance at incentive stage may result in unequal or
unfair reduction in access during post-grant stage but if access is too flexible against
the patentee during post-grant then that may reflect negatively upon other innovation.
The thesis first looks at patent law in general so as to understand what it is about patent
law, which should encourage and promote innovation, but which can in fact do the
opposite. Secondly an understanding of patent law is necessary to appreciate what
steps patent law can take to address an imbalance. The following chapter examines
these issues and chapter three looks at them from the perspective of biotechnology.
The work will commence with the premise that the pressure that is being exerted upon
patent law is likely to create a fissure somewhere in the system and will argue that this
is best tackled during the exploitation of patented inventions rather than through moral
equations at the times of grants.
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(2) Chapter Two - Patent Law
This chapter explores patent law with particular reference to the aims of the patent
system97 and how and when those aims are achieved. A central issue is the importance
of balancing varieties of interests at different times during the innovation process so as
to achieve those aims and therefore justify the award of a monopoly. The chapter is
divided as follows:
• (1) Describes a hypothetical innovation time line illustrating different stages of
an innovation process. The aim is to apprise the reader of the part that patent
law can play at each individual stage.
• (2) Examines, in more detail, the factors that may be taken into account within
patent decisions when trying to obtain a balance between encouraging both
information disclosure and innovation whilst at the same time addressing wider
issues. The aim is to illustrate: (a) a diverse range of issues, and (b) how
different issues are relevant at each stage within the innovation time line
discussed in sub-section one (c) how some issues should not and cannot be
addressed at particular stages.
• (3) - Looks at the aims and justification of patent law and how they are
addressed at each stage of the innovation process. It is of value to appreciate
that patents exert dissimilar influences upon different objectives at each stage
97 97 Many books on intellectual property contain a section on the development of patent law. A good
description is contained in Bostyn. 'Enabling Biotechnological Inventions in Europe and the United
State's. See also Cook, 'A User's Guide to Patents', chapter 1; "Holyoak & Torremans Intellectual
Property Law', chapter 2, and WR Cornish and D Llewelyn, Intellectual Property: Patents,
Copyrights, Trademarks andAlliedRights' (5 th edition. Sweet & Maxwell 2003) Part II, chapter 3
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of an innovation process98 - incentive during early stages and a unique form of
exploitation post grant99. Excluding patents for moral reasons will have diverse
consequences at each stage and the effect will be different depending upon
when objections arise. Understanding when and how the aims of patent law are
achieved will help to understand the effects of exclusion of particular
inventions may have.
• (4) - Examines a breakdown in the patent paradox, (A) when further
innovation could be hindered, and (B) where reward far exceeds the
contribution.
This chapter is about access; how the patent system is intended to increase information
flow and innovation through the provision of monopoly incentive (which can decrease
access) and it illustrates the circumstances that may give rise to a potential breakdown
of the patent paradox. The issue can be particularly acute in biotechnological
innovation, as will be discussed in the next chapter.
98 Sec innovation time line table page 48
99
Unique in that a patent provides the holder with a limited monopoly enforceable in the courts. Sec
discussion below pp 76-86
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(2) (a) The Patent or Innovation Time line
This sub-section describes a hypothetical innovation time-line which illustrates how
and at what stage the aims and justifications of patent law are realised. The time line
can be separated into different stages of innovation offering the opportunity to assess
how the influence or promise of patents is felt at various times in the process of
innovation.
The hypothetical innovation time line shows the following processes: conception of an
idea, research and development, definition of inventive concept, draft of patent, grant
of patent and journey to market. The distinct stages are; pre-grant, grant, post-grant and
expiry. It will be used to illustrate the following throughout the thesis:
(1) The manner in which patent law interacts in the innovation process.
(2) Objections against (a) particular inventions and (b) particular patent/monopoly,
and
(3) Means available to patent law at different stages of inventive process.
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Table Three - Innovation Time Line - 2nd Stage
Pre-Grant - Innovation
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(2) (a) (i) Innovation Stage
The innovation stage begins with the research and development of an invention. At this
stage, according to patent theory, knowledge and access (through new invention) will
be increased through encouraging development of something new thus fulfilling part
one of the patent paradox100. The effect of the patent system, at this time, is the
incentive created by the possibility of a monopoly over the invention at some later
date. Meanwhile the inventor has to comply with the regulations applicable to the
relevant area of research and depending upon its nature that could be complex, costly
and onerous. In the event that the prospect of a patent is removed then one would
anticipate that there would be an adverse effect upon innovation. The effect that would
have upon development depends upon each particular industry101, what finance is
100 That patent law increases access and knowledge over time dirough enabling patentees to decrease
access through patent monopoly. The incentive of the ability to use the monopoly is the first step in
die paradox.
101 Sec Ernst & Young 'Total Value of Infonuation' (2004) available from
<www.ev.com/global/content.nsfAJS/Healtli sciences - Articles - WEF 2004 Innovation Divide>.
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available, whether other methods of protection are available etc. In an industry
reliant upon patent protection there will doubtless be a subsequent negative effect in
the same way as withdrawal of funding would have a reducing effect (but not
preventative altogether) upon a particular area. The withdrawal of patent incentive
could have an effect, albeit not a decisive one, upon the direction of research. To use
the analogy of traffic lights103, the withdrawal of patent incentive acts as an amber
light, neither stopping (red light) nor encouraging (green light) innovation, although
such withdrawal could encourage scientists to carry out research in more facilitative
jurisdictions.
If patents were used for that purpose it would be inconsistent if regulation outside the
patent system encouraged or facilitated the same area. Further such a stance would be
an indecisive and inadequate method of attempting to direct the course of innovation
and would create an atmosphere of uncertainty. Nevertheless questions arise as to
whether patent law has a role to play at this stage in directing research. Such a role
envisages a greater connection between patent law and other regulations and also
therefore greater cohesion between rules that govern inventions and those that relate to
patents.
102 Trade marks or trade secrets, for example.
103 R Bro\vns\vord. "Red lights and rogues: regulating human genetics' in H Somsen (ed). 'The
Regulatory Challenge ofBiotechnology: Human Genetics, Food and Patents' (Edw ard Elgar 2007)
39.
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(2) (a) (ii) Grant Stage
The inventive qualities of each invention are assessed between application for and
grant of patent. These tests show whether an applicant can be a member of the patent
club. They provide for patent protection only over those inventions which are new104'
involve an inventive step105 and are capable of industrial application106. There are a
number of exclusions from patentability, for example, in the UK, Section 1 (2) of the
Patents Act 1977 lists entities which are 'not regarded as inventions'107 for the
purposes of patentability. These include discoveries, mathematical methods, literary
works, schemes for performing mental acts and presentation of information. These
non-inventions are a mix of creations or abstracts that may already be protected by
other forms of intellectual property law108 or else be unsuitable for any protection109.
104 An invention is considered to be 'new' according to s. 2(1) Patents Act 1977 (UK) 'if it does not fonn
part of the state of the art'. The state of the art' is defined expansively by section 2(2) 'to comprise all
matter (whether a product a process, information about either, or anything else) which has at any time
before the priority date of that invention been made available to the public whether in the UK or
elsewhere) by written or oral description, by use or in any other way'.
105 '... not obvious to a person skilled in the art. having regard to any matter which forms part of the state
of the art by virtue only of section 2(2)'. Section 2(3) is excluded from the definition of the state of the
art. Section 2(3) includes published patent applications if the priority date is earlier than the
application in question. The result of this exclusion is that obviousness does not entail taking into
account patent applications that are filed but not published.
106
'...any kind of industry, including agriculture.' (s. 4(1) Patents Act). A further interesting question
arises below in relation to industrial applications. Inventions are excluded from patentability on the
grounds of morality if they are for '...uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes.'
As there is a requirement for industrial application and uses of embryos for industrial purposes is
excluded, this would exclude embryo-related inventions. If an invention does not claim such a use but
has required such a use in order to be created then will that invention be precluded from protection?
More on this shortly, but at what point in the inventive process is it appropriate for patent law to
question?
1117 In the UK the following are 'not regarded as inventions' by s. 1 (2) Patents Act 1977: (a) a discovery,
scientific theory or mathematical method: (b) a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work or any other
aesthetic creation whatsoever; (c) a scheme, rule or method for performing a mental act, playing a
game or doing business or a program for a computer; (d) the presentation of information.
"'x For example aesthetic creations: literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works could be protected
through copyright or perhaps industrial design.
109 As with discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical methods are excluded in so far as a
'...patent or application for a patent relates to that thing as such." (SI (2) Patents Act 1977) There has
been much debate about the distinction between invention and discovery, some of which is discussed
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Some inventions which may appear to qualify for patent protection can be excluded, in
European Patent Law, for moral reasons. There are slight variations in the wording of
morality within European Patent Law. For example, Section 1 (3) of the Patents Act
1977 (UK)110 states:
A patent shall not be granted for an invention the commercial exploitation of
which would be contrary to public policy or morality... .For the purposes of
subsection (3) above exploitation shall not be regarded as contrary to public
policy or morality only because it is prohibited by any law in force in the
United Kingdom or any part of it.
Article 53 (a) of the European Patent Convention stipulates:
European Patents should not be granted in respect of:
(a) inventions the publication or exploitation of which would be contrary to
'ordre public' 11'or morality, provided that the exploitation shall not be deemed
to be so contrary merely because it is prohibited by law or regulation in some
or all of the Contracting States.
below, in relation to biotechnology. Essentially a discovery already exists in nature whereas invention
applies such infonnation to specific needs.
""As amended by Statutory Instrument 2000 No. 2037.
11 'Ordre public and morality have a long and distinguished history as criteria for the lawfulness of the
grant or exercise of intellectual property rights.' (Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs. Case C-
377/98, Kingdom ofNetherlands, 14 June 2001, para. 95). The United Kingdom does not share the
same historical connections and refers instead to public policy in s. 1 (3) Patents Act 1977.
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This slight difference in wording should be of little consequence112 but interpretation
of what is moral or not differs in many instances between countries. There are of
course some instances where there is a consensus as to what is immoral113 whilst in
others there may be disagreement114.
The terms 'ordre public' and 'public policy' are slightly different to the scholar but in
practical terms it is suggested that they make no difference; there being no equivalent
English phrase for ordre public which for some may 'have come in from the continent
like the influenza'115 however the closest referable equivalent is public policy. Some
European countries exclude inventions where the 'application' runs counter to ordre
public or morality and it '... is rather unclear to what extent this different redactions
lead to a different scope in exclusion'116. Apart from the morality clause, issues
relating to the acceptability of inventions per se or questions about whether an
invention should have commercial protection are not relevant for the purposes of
patent grant. Inevitably the morality clause has been used to object to particular
inventions117. The European Patent Office has aired ethical arguments against
112 Lord Justice Jacob in the case ofAerotel Ltd v Telco Holdings and Others [2006] EWCA Civ 1371on
the interpretation of Article 52 (2) and 53 (3) stated "The provision was implemented in the UK law
by s. 1 (2) of the Patents Act 1977. Although si (2) pointlessly uses somewhat different wording from
that of the EPC no-one suggests that it has any different meaning.", at para. 6. The word "publication"
in EPC Article 53 (a) has been removed by European Patent Convention 2000, which came into force
on 13th December 2007, so as to bring the clause into line with Article 6 of the Biotechnology
Directive.
113 Instruments of torture, anti-personnel mines and letter bombs, for example.
114 Research upon human embryos, for example.
115
Joseph Conrad. 'The SecretAgent: A simple Tale' (Twentieth Century Classics), 31st May 1990
116
European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies, 'Study on the patenting of inventions
related to human stem cell research'. Report to the European Commission Office for Official
Publications of the European Communities, 2002.
117 Sec chapter four.
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inventions118 thereby raising interesting grant-stage questions about the relationship
between the morality clause and ethical rules of science. This in turn has led to
discussions as to what is the appropriate role for the morality clause. It is open to
parties to object to a patent application at the time of grant but the effects of (a) patent
grant and (b) refusal to grant are felt at different stages of innovation. Whether this is a
problem or not will be discussed in due course.
(2) (a) (iii) Exploitation Stage
One way of looking at the patent grant procedure is that the grant stage tests for
membership of the patent club and the exploitation stage explains the membership
rules. The period between the time of grant and the end of a patent term provides a
patent holder with opportunity to exploit the benefit of the monopoly conferred by the
patent. Exploitation is enabled or more precisely supported through the ability to deter
infringers or obtain compensation in the event of infringement, which is defined in
Section 60 United Kingdom Patents Act as when: 'a person ....without the consent of
the proprietor of the patent.... (a) makes, disposes of, offers to dispose of, uses or
imports the product or keeps it whether for disposal or otherwise... '119.
But the existence of a patent does not itself determine commercial success or create a
position whereby there is danger to public policy or welfare, therefore consideration
llx Such as inventions that may cause harm to the environment PLANT GENETIC SYSTEMS/Glutamine
Synthesase Inhibitors [1995] EPOR 4 or those that are used for euthanasia in animals MICHIGAN
STATE UNIVERSITY/Euthanasia Compositions [20051 T 0866/01, see discussion in chapter four.
119 Further provisions apply to patentable processes
64
has to be given to outside factors that must be present that may combine to create such
a situation.
(2) (a) (iii) (a) 'Interplanetary Alignment'
This expression illustrates the commercial equivalent to the personal astrological
bonus supposedly experienced when planets come into line. A patent is of little use by
itself and will be worth very little in the absence of important additional factors. The
existence of a patent does not give rise to a legal presumption that the holder has
• • 120 • • •harnessed market power or dominant position , which is the 'ability to raise the price
•• *121 • • ••
profitably above the competitive price' , a situation which is possible only if 'no
substitute exists'122. The holder of a patent may be in a position to control pricing
through restricting supply but other factors such as, for example high demand and few
if any substitutes, need for the invention, must be present.
It is clear that market demand plays a vital role and the greater the demand the more
opportunity there is for a patent holder to enjoy control over pricing or licensing.
Demand is raised further when alternatives for the invention are unavailable. In
markets for medicinal products or other essentials, for example, the demand is often
inelastic; so high prices through patent protection do not deter demand. The longer a
patent holder is the sole market provider, the greater the profit and, better still, if a
patent is obtained over an early stage process or product and/or the protection provided
is broad in scope. It is unusual for such a situation to arise of high demand coupled
'20 See F Leveque and Y Meniere. The Economics ofPatents and Copyright (2004). 83 and RTE Case.
1-00743.
121 Ibid at 83.
122 Ibid.
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with no or few alternatives in favour of one party simultaneously but it is easy to see
how aggressive business models coupled with preference could lead to abuse of the
system and give rise to reservations about the justification for awarding patents in the
first place.
(2) (a) (iii) (b) Restrictions on Patents
In certain restricted circumstances the monopoly power of a patent may be curtailed.
These circumstances are described below and will only arise if specific factors are
present and thus they are not designed to curb excesses that may arise through
exploitation of a patented invention.
(2) (a) (iii) (b) (1) Compulsory Licences
A patent can be a powerful commercial tool and compulsory licences are intended
'...to qualify this full potential in the name of some other policy objective.'123 The
grounds for compulsory licences are restrictive124 and so they are not easily obtained
nor are they granted frequently125. The Patents Act 1977 (UK) provides for
compulsory licences three years after the grants of patents in the following
circumstances:
123 Cornish and Llewelyn, 'Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks and Allied Rights',
page 289.
'24 The TRIPS Agreement permitted compulsory licenses but only subject to stringent requirements due
mainly to opposition to such licenses by the United States.
125 This is probably due in the main to the restrictive hurdles that are required before a compulsory
license may be applicable. The aim is mainly to ensure that patents are not used to prevent the
commercialisation of inventions rather than opening up competition.
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(1) Where the patented invention is capable of being commercially worked in the
United Kingdom, that it is not being worked or not worked to the fullest extent
practicable.
(2) Where the demand for a patented invention in the UK is not being met on
reasonable terms or is being met to a substantial extent by importation.
(3) Where the invention is being hindered from being commercially worked in the
UK because of importation.
(4) Unreasonable refusal of a licence on reasonable terms by the proprietor in three
specific circumstances; market for export not being supplied, prevention of
working of other patented invention or unfair prejudice to development of
commercial or industrial activities in UK.
(5) Unfair prejudice to industrial or commercial activities in the UK.
(6) The patent must have been granted for three years
Added to these restrictions is the discretion of the Comptroller to refuse a licence, so it
is not surprising that compulsory licences are rarities: '...a compulsory licence system
which is directed at one or other form of insufficient exploitation, and which thus
requires careful investigation of the circumstances before grant, is not likely to be
much used'.126
126 Cornish W R & Llewelyn D, 'Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks and Allied
Right's ibid note 123 at page 293
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Despite this there have been, calls for the system to be used more widely127 in respect
of biotech inventions, but this could be seen to be a change in direction that conflicts
with the objectives of the patent system and so may attract opposition from business
and supporters of the purity of the present patent system. The debate continues because
in some circumstances further innovation is hampered by a combination of broad
patents and inflexible commercialisation.
(2) (a) (iii) (b) (2) Crown Rights
The government of the UK, in exceptional circumstances, can compel use of patented
inventions without infringement of patent subject to the provisions for reasonable
licence fees. The most obvious justification is national security, but crown licence for
128
pharmaceuticals for the National Health Service is an example that has been the
subject of a House of Lords decision. This is a rarely used Crown power and other
governments, particularly those within the EC, have reservations about it and are not
equipped with legislation to dent the power of the patent monopoly.
(2) (a) (iii) (c)(3) Research Exemption
The research or experimental use exemption stipulates, according to section 60 (5) (b)
of the UK Patents Act 1977, that an act which would otherwise constitute an
infringement shall not do so if, 'it is done for experimental purposes relating to the
• 129
subject matter of the invention'
127
'Broadening the application of the compulsory licensing scheme has also been suggested as a possible
solution to tackle unwanted patents, such as e.g. the BRCA patents'. Bostyn. 'DNA Patents in Europe:
Controversy Remains", 27.
128 This was the justification provided in 1965 when the House of Lords held that the Ministry of Health
could import drugs not manufactured by the patentee (Pfizer vMinistry ofHealth [1965 ] AC 512).
129 Sec also Article 27 (b) of the European Patent Convention.
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The research exemption has been particularly controversial in relation to
biotechnology patents130. It is difficult to define what differentiates experimental
purposes from other purposes or activities. This is an obvious problem made all the
more perplexing because the subject matter of inventions has to be taken into account
and because there is no definition of 'experimental purposes': 'Confusion arises
because there is no definition of what is in relation to, and what is different from the
subject matter. Some technologies, such as genes, may fall into both categories'131.
The issue arises with clinical trials because it may be unclear whether they fall into
research or commercial activity. The interpretation of this varies across Europe132 and
as there are different stages during clinical trials some may fall into research and others
into commercialisation. As it stands ambiguity causes inhibition of research for fear of
litigation and/or because of expensive licence fees133. This situation frustrates the
purposes of the patent system which exists to encourage research. So the '... research
exemption remains an important, but difficult concept under patent law'134. Expansion
of research exemptions and compulsory licences could ease some of the concerns
raised against biotechnology patents but could have a negative effect upon incentives.
130 Cornish and Llewelyn, 'Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks andAllied Rights'.
This exception has proved increasingly controversial in connection with patents over pharmaceutical
products' See Rebecca Eisenberg. Genes. Patents, and Product Development. 257 Science 903
Rebecca S. Eisenberg. Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use,
56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1076-77
131 Gowers Review, paragraph 4.5
132 The Netherlands sees clinical trials as part of the commercialisation process whilst Germany sees
them as a way of continuing knowledge. See Danish Council of Ethics, The Ethics of Patenting
Human Genes and Stem Cells, 38.
133 See Gowers Review, paragraph 4.5: IPI. "Patents for Genetic Sequences: The Competitiveness of
Current UK Law and Practice', A study by the Intellectual Property Institute (IPI) on behalf of the
DTI. May 2004. available from <www.dli.gov.uk>.
134 Danish Council ofEthics, The Ethics of Patenting Human Genes and Stem Cells.
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The core problem that may arise within exploitation stage is one of access or the extent
that patent law frustrates its own purpose of increasing availability of new inventions
for public benefit. Different issues arise within the innovation stage, mentioned above,
which are relevant more to ethical questions that may arise from inventions under
patent protection and the extent that patent law is complicit in those inventions or the
research behind them. i.e. because patents create an incentive they may encourage
immoral inventions. The incentive of patents occurs because patents enable patent
holders to restrict others and this too is a moral issue and in certain circumstances,
which will be discussed later, raises an immoral problem. Importantly patent law does
not create the problem at the core of the ethical issues during the innovation stage
because inventions arise independently of patent law, whereas patents can result in
difficulties of access by virtue of their grant and use. There is an overlap between the
two in the event that an invention, for example, a form of medical treatment, is
exploited in such a way that the grant of a patent enables the patentee to unreasonably
restrict not only those in need but also those who are seeking to establish further
treatments, then that too is a moral concern.
(2) (a) (iv) Generic Stage
The benefits of patents are expressed in different ways over different stages. They are a
long-term policy instrument. Initially they are to the advantage of the patent holders
and to those who can afford to benefit from new patented inventions. So the public
benefits through later publication of information and the availability of the invention
(albeit with high costs during the life span of the patent), transforming into lower costs
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after expiry and incentive for other possible inventions to emerge. It is easy to criticise
patents and in particular patents over biotechnology and pharmaceuticals for increasing
the price of medical treatments. An increase in cost of treatments can be seen as an
acceptable certainty: 'There is no denial here that biotechnological innovation in the
sphere ofmedicine will mean that treatments become more expensive'135.
It can be argued that whilst commercially successful patentees will likely profit to a
greater extent, through the restriction of access, than would be the case in the absence
of patents, it is the provisions for patents that drives innovation, much of which may
not have occurred otherwise. In any event, the patent system restricts the term of the
monopoly so the patentee's profit period is limited to the period of restriction and
thereby curtailed. At the end of the patent term competitors can copy and reproduce
inventions without fear of litigation thus generally reducing prices and increasing
access.
There are therefore different stages within the timeline of innovation and at each stage
patent law exerts a different influence whilst raising potentially diverse moral
questions. The point for this work is to understand how moral issues which arise at
each stage can be addressed so as to present a balanced system which, as the following
section discusses is a vital component for patent law.
135 Warren-Jones. "Patenting DNA: A lot of controversy over a little intangibility', 124.
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(2) (c) The Patent Balance
'If there is a single justification or common purpose that underpins the system it must
be the attainment of a balance between the different interests involved'136. Ultimately
the public interest137 is intended to be served by the innovation encouraged through the
patent system. Two separate 'equations' are balanced through the process of
innovation and the patent system, the first an ethical equation and the second an access
equation and both have played a greater part in the patent process as biotechnology
issues have developed.
(2) (c) (i) Access Balance
It can be argued that the patent system creates broad rights for commercial interests at
the short-term expense of the public, but the character of the patent system is that the
encouragement of commerce prompts further invention thereby creating increased
public benefit overall. The increase in access brought about by patent incentive occurs
in different,period of the time line and in different ways: for example increasing access
through (a) incentive, (b) publication, and (c) encouraging generics after patent term
has ended. There is a restriction in access associated with the grant of patents which
occurs in the exploitation stage in varying degrees depending upon all the relevant
circumstances. This may be through consumers who may not be able to afford the
higher prices of patented inventions. The nature of a monopoly is that the monopolist
136
'Holyoak and Torremcms Intellectual Property Law41.
137 There can be arguments against this view, for example, 'The fact that it can actually promote
activities which are contrary to the public interest is well documented and this leads to the conclusion
that securing the public's interest is not the primary purpose: promoting innovation is', Warren-Jones
'Patenting DNA: A lot of controversy over a little intangibility', 103.
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will produce enough to maximise profit rather than maximising distribution138 and the
steeper the demand curve the more the supply can be reduced so as to maximise the
profit. We shall see that there can be restrictions upon further research in some
situations caused because of the grant of a patent and these potential restrictions can be
weighed against the increase in access provided, discussed above. It is helpful to relate
this to the innovation time line:
Pre-Grant -
Innovation Stage
Grant Stage Post-grant -
Exploitation
Stage






















































Table Four - Patent Access and Restrictions
The interests of patentees are set off against the interests of consumers and other
inventors who will have to pay higher prices for patented inventions or obtain licences
to use or sell. The different justifications for a patent system are reflected within this
138 See discussion in the introduction "The Patent Paradox'
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balance: - inventors with claims to protection for risk investment and innovation and
the public receiving opportunity to purchase something new and to obtain information
about it.
Increasing incentive through offering patent rights may encourage innovation but if
patent rights are too broad there is less scope for others to improve or invent around
inventions which could decease innovation. Consumers do not benefit from new
inventions unless they can afford to buy them. 'The interests of consumers as a class is
of course served by the invention of new products and processes but not if their
inventor is able to take advantage of his monopoly position by abuse of it'139. The
OECD in its 2004 report, 'Patents and Innovation: Trends and Policy Challenges'
summarised the basic patent balance as follows:
The positive effect of patents on innovation as incentive mechanisms has
been traditionally contrasted with their negative effects on competition and
technology diffusion. Patents have long been considered to represent a
trade-off between incentives to innovate on the one hand, and competition
in the market and diffusion of technology on the other.140
But the report continues that this traditional view has become eroded by the
proliferation of new technology and so the traditional view must be qualified by
understanding that '...patents can hamper innovation under certain conditions...and
that fine tuning of patent design is critical if they are to become an effective policy
instrument'.
139 '
IIolyoak and Torremans Intellectual Property Law \ 41.
140 OECD. "Patents and Innovation: Trends and Policy Challenges', 9.
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Therefore if patent rights are excessively weighted in favour of patent holders
consumers lose benefits, competitors are unfairly prejudiced and the purposes of patent
law frustrated. This 'traditional' balance is one of access because variations in the
balance either restrict access or expand access for the benefit of competitors and the
public.
Situations of imbalance in favour of patent holders are bound to occur from time to
time because they are in the driving seat, they are usually astute and can exploit their
situation. There is evidence that potential exists for the patent system to act against the
public interest. The current patent system developed in the absence of biotechnology141
but it has adjusted in the face of the difficulties presented by new technologies.
Biotechnology patents have faced persistent objections some of which have not yet
been dealt with fully. The Biotechnology Directive has been added to patent law but its
effects have more to do with facilitating biotechnology by attempting to standardise
European patentability in face of definitional difficulties than with improving rights of
access to genetic material. Thus although the Directive confirmed the patentability142
of biotechnological inventions in European Union States and broadened the role of
morality143, which both are assessed at grant stage, it did little to address questions of
access after the grant of patent. It is submitted, and will be discussed in greater detail in
141 '.. .techniques such as recombinant DNA technology have posed problems for a patent system which
was not designed with the specific needs of the biotechnology sector in mind". Cook. 'A Users Guide
to Patentspage 319.
142 Discussed in more detail in the following section
143 See chapter four
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chapter five, that in some cases there should be scope to revisit the grant of a patent
and that in the event that particular circumstances suggest that it is appropriate.
(2) (c) (ii) Ethical Balance
The grant of patent rights, because of the access issues discussed above, inevitably
invokes ethical issues because the 'right' thing to do is to share. Other moral questions
associated with the grant of, in particular biotechnological patent rights, relate more to
details of inventions than to the qualities ofwhat a patent is and what it provides. Such
ethical questions have become more pertinent in relation to biotechnology patents.
European patent law has been armed with a morality clause for many years but it is
now more readily invoked and its interpretation has become more complex as a result
of the diverse issues that have arisen in the race to commercialise biotechnology and
the manner in which the morality clause has been interpreted by the various European
institutions.
Ethically sensitive issues that have been raised through the medium ofEuropean patent
law include protection of the environment144, prevention of cruelty to animals145,
slavery146, right to life147 and consent148 over the use of bodily material, human
dignity149 and euthanasia150. These 'new' issues raise somewhat different
144 PLANT GENETIC SYSTEMS/Glutamine Synthetase Inhibitors [1995] EPOR 4.
145 HARVARD/ONCO-mouse [1991] EPOR 525.
146 HOWARD FLOREY/Relaxin [1995] EPOR 541.
147 See below in relation to stem cell patents, chapter five.
148 See below at chapter five and Recital 26 of the Biotechnology Directive (1998).
149 HOWARD FLOREY/Relaxin
150MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY/Euthanasia Compositions [2005] T 0866/01
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considerations compared to the traditional or access balance which measures what is
awarded on the one hand with what is taken away on the other. The 'new' or ethical
balance is about the benefit of inventions as against the harm or perceived harm arising
as a consequence of inventions. An example is the potential of human embryonic stem
cell research to provide treatment for debilitating diseases against the destruction of
embryos. It will be seen that these 'new' ethical issues raise difficult questions for
patent law when trying to find appropriate answers and also when attempting to
discover how answers are obtained. Indeed it is open to question whether this attempt
to strike a new balance is appropriate.
In order to understand these recent attempts to strike a new balance within patent law,
and indeed to assess whether it is appropriate, we need to return to basics and consider
the foundational aims and justifications of patent law.
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(2) (d) Aims and Justifications of Patent Law
(2) (d) (i) Function of a Patent
Patent law has evolved from rewards by rulers dispensing patronage151 into a complex
international system supervised legally and politically which is aimed at encouraging
inventors to create new and useful inventions and to inform the public properly at all
material times. Patents are for the general good of the public and not specifically for
advancing the prosperity of any individual manufacturer or inventor:
The primary purpose of the modern patent system is to promote technical
innovation as the major factor of economic growth by encouraging
inventive activity through rewarding inventors for their creative efforts. The
patent system thus secures costly investment in research and development
and industrial exploitation of research results. Simultaneously, the patent
system encourages an early and beneficial dissemination of knowledge in
the field of activity involved which, without such protection, might be kept
secret.152
Patents must be awarded and this occurs only on satisfying strict criteria applied
through the patent application process. The patent process produces a simple equation;
the exchange of a monopoly for invention and publication. Inventions may have
potential and their patents may hold substantial value, but their journey begins with a
151 'The patent system has come into being as a system to grant privileges to specific classes of people,
especially the guilds.. .The privilege starts from the ruler granting a privilege to a subject, under which
everything more or less to a matter of grace exercised by a ruler.' (Bostyn, 'Enabling Biotechnological
Inventions in Europe and the United States').
152 COM (88) 496 final SYN 159. 17 October 1988; [19891 OJ C10/3.
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single step; in this case a carefully-worded patent application. The aims and
justifications of patent law, '...concentrate upon their role [i.e. patents] as a 'public'
instrument of economic policy. Patents are looked upon to provide two kinds of aid
towards the technical efficiency, and hence the growing wealth, of the community as a
whole'153.
The patent system has an anomalous existence in that the provision of a monopoly to
one person does not immediately lend itself to a shining example of a springboard for
public benefit. It is a complex system which interacts with many parties, inventors,
investors, competitors, researchers, consumers and the public. The complexity of
patent law substantiates the many justifications for the monopoly right which have
arisen and which have been given greater relative weight at different periods of the
development of patent law154. It is suggested herein that part of the reason for the
diversity of justifications for patent law is that the effects of patent grant are felt over a
long period of time as illustrated by the innovation time line155.
A patent has been described as a "social contract"156 between the inventor/patentee and
the public whereby the inventor is rewarded for ingenuity and disclosure in the
153 Comish and Llewelyn, 'Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks and Allied Rights',
6tli Edition 2007, page 134.
154 See "it is probably the case that each has held sway at one time or another in the development of
patent law policy." MacQueen H, Waelde C & Laurie G, 'Contemporary Intellectual Property',
Oxford University Press. 2007, at page 365 para 10.16 and Bostyn S J R, 'Enabling biotechnological
inventions in Europe and the United States. A study of the patentability of Proteins and DNA
sequences with special emphasis on the Disclosure Requirement' (European Patent Office, Maastricht,
December 2001). page 33, "The grounds upon which this justification was based varied considerably."
See chapter two generally
155 See above page 57
156 See Bostyn J R, ibid note 155 at page 15
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specification with a monopoly.157 Inventions are expensive to make and exploit but
once the technical knowledge of how to reproduce them is known they can be cheap to
reproduce and without some form of protection through an exclusive right either
inventors will keep the knowledge secret or will not take the risk of researching and
innovating in the first place. For economists who may in general be reticent about
arguments supporting the existence of monopolies in a market economy this solution
to the "appropriability problem" is justification for the negative repercussion of
restrictions within the market place. Overall the question arises whether the public
benefits by the grant ofmonopoly to the inventor.1"8
The patent system is far from perfect and patents have attracted criticism but given the
contradictions that are part of patent law this is not surprising.
"Since it is rooted in contradiction, there can be no such thing as an
ideally beneficial patent system, and it is bound to produce negative
results in particular instances, impeding progress unnecessarily even if its
general effect is favourable on balance"159
157 See Boulton v Bull 126 Eng.Rep., 656 - "...the specification is the price which the patentee is to pay
for the monopoly". The requirement for a specification as part of patent reputedly first arose in the
case of Liardet v Johnson (K.B. 1778), 1 WPC 53 in which Judge Mansfield instructed the jury the
"The third point is whether the specification is such as instructs others to make it"
158 "The main problem with the patent system is to try to reconcile stimulation of competition, which
creates social welfare for all. and allowing the inventor to reap the fruits of his invention, which will
create social welfare for the inventor. The question is then of course whether the social welfare
provided to the inventor by granting him a patent can have a positive effect for society at large."
Bostyn. ibid note 155. page 25
159 Robinson J, "The Accumulation ofCapital'. Homewood. Illinois, Irwin. 1956. 87
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This quote hints at general or macro increase in benefit despite specific or micro
decrease in benefit in relation to specific patents. It also suggests long term
benefit of patents rather than short term160:
It is meant to encourage over the long period the widest possible
use of knowledge, but it starts out by conferring upon the inventor
the power to restrict himself to the use of that knowledge.161
The picture painted above is one that could be criticised for hiding the arguments
against patents as a short term and necessary evil towards the overall long term good.
However it should be realised that many arguments are made against the patent
system in its entirety and that the negative points outlined above are sufficient to
remove any justification for the system at all. Other arguments may be in the form of
an imbalance of bargaining positions in that only the wealthy have the ability to
enforce their patents and defend their position. It may also be argued that the patent
system is open to abuse because the nature of the language of patent specifications
requires particular talents to draft and understand.162 Patents can be criticised because
the reward does not reflect the contribution and that they are increasingly slowing the
availability of information and access to medicines.
160 See also Schumpeter JA, 'Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy', London. George Allen & Unwin
Ltd. 1976, 87-106. page 103 - The main value to a concern of a single seller position....is...in the
protection it affords against temporary disorganization of the market and the space it secures for long-
range planning."
161
Bostyn ibid page 25
162 See Drahos P and Mayne R. 'Global Intellectual Property Rights: Knowledge Access and
Development', Oxfam. 2002 in particular Macdonald S, 'Exploring the Hidden costs of patents', page
13
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This work takes the view that there are pros and cons of patent grants, that these are
reflected at different stages within innovation and that the nature of patents is that the
system needs to be organised in such a way that any detriment is balanced against the
benefits. It does not take issue with the argument that patents in general are beneficial
163
although it recognises that alternatives exist which could answer some of the
objections raised against the system. Instead the work takes issue with the ability for
patent law to control the particular form of exploitation in particular instances. It is
not therefore intended to review the arguments against the patent system in detail but
readers should be aware that strong arguments exist the proponents of which would
see an end to the system altogether.
(2) (d) (ii) Separation of patent and Invention
Patent law is an economic instrument that uses rules to govern the exploitation and
publication of inventions that a patent protects. An invention may for example be
objectionable, hazardous or environmentally unfriendly but:
Patent law traditionally has not been applied as a means to inhibit
technological development that poses safety or other risks to society. And
the only thing that has been excluded by legislation was patenting of nuclear
weapons technology in 1954.164
163 Such as open source - see below
164 R Dresser. 'Ethical and legal issues in patenting new animal life' [1998] Jurimetrics Journal. 399-
435. regarding the position in the United States.
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A patent is a form of property165 right166, separate from the invention it protects167, and
it can therefore be sold and licensed168 independently, and is subject to separate laws
and regulations. Indeed a legal prohibition on an invention need not affect the validity
of the patent covering its exploitation169. There are qualifications on the extent that a
patent can be seen as a full property right, in particular '...because it does not last as
long as the good that it protects. Its validity is limited to 20 years whereas the
170
information it protects will never disappear.'
It is necessary to discuss the separation of rules that govern the use and grants of
patents from those rules that relate to the use of the invention. The clear distinction
between patents and inventions necessitates differences between their respective rules.
These two different forms of rules can converge because of the incentives that are at
the heart of the patent system. The question is whether the removal or weakening of
the patent incentive is a justified and appropriate method of reacting to moral concern
regarding particular inventions? If reasons exist to support such action then at what
165
'Any patent or application for a patent is personal property (without being a thing in action), and any
patent or any such application and rights in or under it may be transferred created or granted in
accordance with subsection (2) to (7) below' (s. 30 (1) Patents Act 1977).
166 Whether a patent is property is to a certain extent a moot point. Certainly there are limitations upon a
valid patent that would not be pertinent to other forms of property, compulsory licences, crown rights,
20-year validity period for example. A patent can also be revoked or declared invalid. On the other
hand a patent can be sold, licensed and have an independent value. Just like patents other forms of
property have restrictions on their use. Thus it is reasonable to look on patent law as a form of
property, but one that is subject to particular restrictions.
167 'A patent has little or nothing to do with the ownership of the physical material as such...' (Crespi.
'Patents on Genes: Can the Issues be Clarified?' (1999/2000) 5 (3) Bio-Science Law Review 199. at
199-200.
168
'Subject to section 36 (3) below, any patent or such application, or any right in it, may be assigned or
mortgaged' (s. 30 (2) Patents Act 1977). Similar provisions also apply within the European Patent
Convention.
169 'For the purposes of subsection 3 above exploitation shall not be regarded as contrary to public policy
or morality only because it is prohibited by any law in force in the United Kingdom or any part of it'
(s. 1(4) Patents Act 1977). This is discussed in detail below but similar provisions are contained also
in Article 53 (a) European Patent Convention. Article 6 Biotechnology Directive and Article 27 (2)
TRIPS.
1711
Levcque & Meniere. 'The Economics ofPatents and Copyright', 83.
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stage in the innovation process is it appropriate to interfere and what mechanisms
ought to be used?
With this in mind it will be beneficial to examine the rationale behind patent law and
the influences upon it. Justifications for granting patent rights include the rights of
inventors to protect their inventions and the encouragement of further developments
through the provision of awards and publication. This results in individual and public
justification171 or natural rights and utilitarian justification172.
(2) (d) (hi) A Patent as aNatural Right
Natural Law theory173 justifies awards of patents on the basis that everyone has the
natural right to ownership of their own products of labour. This theory, '...famously
propounded by Locke, holds that there is a 'natural right' to that with which one has
'mixed one's Labour"174. Bostyn argues that the natural law theory '...plays no role
anymore in any thinking about the patent system'175. This is true to the point that it is
not used to justify the existence of the patent system which still reflects inventors'
entitlements to protection on the basis of their inventive contributions. Furthermore
seeing the grant of a '...patent as an instrument of justice to the inventor has proved
attractive and the power of this sort of argument is by no means exhausted.'176 'Yet
rewarding inventive activity may seem little more than an incidental consequence of
11 Cornish and Llewelyn. 'Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks and Allied Rights,''
130.
172 Nuffield Council on Biocthics. 'The Ethics of Patenting DNA' 12.
' 3
Bostyn, 'Enabling Biotechnological Inventions in Europe and the United States', 33.
174 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, ibid note 172. page 12.
' 5
Bostyn. ibid note 173. page 33.
176 Cornish and Llewelyn, ibid note 171, at page 130. The Patents Act 1977 also allows for
employee/inventor compensation which reflects this natural law approach.
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modern patent systems.'177 In other words the inventor's monopoly is the basis for the
workings of the patent system but is not justification for it:
The goal of the patent system is to serve the public good, here by not only
encouraging biomedical research but also providing access to the results
of that research. Giving exclusive rights to inventors is simply the means
through which the system reaches this goal but is not the goal itself.178
Awards ofmonopolies are vital to ensure realisation of the advantages that the modern
patent system offers but awards should never be at the expense of public interest nor
contrary to the utilitarian justification.
(2) (d) (iv) Utilitarian Justification
The modern patent system has a strong utilitarian perspective which justifies
'... property rights as a system of public rules which provide security and incentives for
investment by individual owners of property, but which can and should be adapted
whenever the public interest is thereby served'179. Patent law, from this perspective,
provides incentives, not because of inventor's rights, but to further the public interest
through increased investment and proliferation of information. It is clear from this
standpoint that public interest is, or should be, overriding, therefore if the patent
system fails the interests of the public it will surrender advantage to the private sector
at the expense of the public and dilute the raison d'etre of the patent system.
177 Cornish and Llewelyn, ibid note 171, page 130.
178 'Gene Patents and the Public Good' (2003) 423 Nature, 207.
179 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, ibid note 172, page 12
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(2) (d) (v) Incentive
A widely used justification180 for the existence of patents is that inventors and
entrepreneurs will not take the time nor risk the investment in the absence of
opportunity to develop the invention and profit from it with greater prospects than
under contemporaneous market conditions. Patent grants enable patent holders to
recoup costs of development and to make allowances for future growth and associated
profits. These opportunities are the mainstay of patent law, the reason being that the
greater the incentives the better the prospects for beneficial development to improve
the comfort, wellbeing and prosperity of society at large.
Patents, once granted, are great levellers in their early stages because they do not
recognise the quantity of effort and the quality of ingenuity contributed to any
inventive concept which made the invention patentable in the first place. Returns, if
any, from patented inventions are determined by factors such as market size, market
demand and how essential an invention is perceived to be to the market. Bostyn181
refers to the 'reward by monopoly theory' which equates monopolies provided by
grant of patents as commensurate with the contributions made by the inventions. Risk
has always been a factor in that contribution and potential reward are not linked to
potential risk so enormous effort could fail, and vice versa, thus any correlation
between amount of effort, inventive activity, cost of creation of an invention and patent
1811
Bostyn, 'Biotechnological Inventions in Europe and the United States', 2001; Nuffield Council on
Bioethics, ibid note 172. July 2002, 12. 'The justification for the patent system is that it provides an
incentive for investments in new ideas, without which technological development would be much
slower and more difficult' (Grubb, Patents for Chemicals. Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology, 14).
181
Bostyn. ibid note 180
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and the likely gains from exploitation will be hostages to fortune. Patent law is
essentially seen as blind to the effects of its grants as it is to the circumstances giving
rise to inventions. Mechanisms do not exist to rebalance the position where
circumstances permit an award grossly in excess of the contribution and vice versa.
These discrepancies may be accepted as part of commercial reality and because all the
participants are aware of the risks. If situations arise which create instances where
access is restricted so that further development is hampered or they are against the
public interest then objections to patent law are more justifiable. It is argued that patent
law should be in a position to interfere in the event that such situations arise and will
discuss how that will occur and why in chapters five and six.
(2) (d) (vi)Disclosure
Patent applicants are obliged to disclose their inventions as stated in Section 14 (3) of
the United Kingdom Patents Act:
For the specification of an application shall disclose the invention in a
manner which is clear enough and complete enough for the invention to be
performed by a person skilled in the art.182
Inventions must be properly described and be full enough to be performed by those
skilled in the art in question. This allows others to recreate it or to improve upon the
work. Therefore publication enables proof that the invention does what the inventor
claims and allows for generic copying at the expiry of the patent term and for others to
research the invention further with the aim of either 'inventing around' the patent or
182 Section 14(3) Patents Act 1977.
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improving upon it with the possibility of obtaining a separate patent for the
improvements. Granting of patents helps to achieve the spread of inventive activity
through dissemination of the workings of each invention.
By way of enablement, patent law in Europe permits for research on patented
inventions without fear of actions from patent owners. Distinguishing between
research and commercialisation is open to interpretation but the position should be
clarified183. Disclosure therefore plays an important part in the ethos of patent law at
all stages of innovation.
(2) (d) (vii) A Source of Funds
The Nuffield Council on Bioethics subscribes to the view of justifying the patent
system through both utilitarian and natural law theories: '...combination of the two
approaches [utilitarian and natural right] to the justification of intellectual property
rights'184. This is a reasonable view which helps to illustrate the separate interests of
inventors and the public and that the patent system should always be alert to achieving
a balance of those interests.
Another way of looking upon the utilitarian aspect of the patent theory is to view the
grant of a patent as a method of finance185 or of democratic taxation. This suggestion is
1X3 See Gowers Review, 'Recommendation 1: Amend section 60 (5) of the Patents Act 1977 to clarify
the research exemption to facilitate experimentation, innovation and education'. See also above page
66 experimental use exemption
184 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 'The Ethics ofPatenting DNA', 12.
185 See, for example, the Commission on Intellectual Property Report: Over lime, the emphasis has
shifted towards viewing the patent system as a means of generating the resources required to finance
R&D and to protect investments'. CIPR Report 2002.
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based on the often-quoted justification for the granting of patent rights, that if a
business has no hope of recovering the additional costs of researching and
manufacturing an invention, which is made possible by a patent, then there would be
much less innovation. Thus a patent provides the opportunity to raise finance for
research, the recognition of investment being that those willing to pay higher prices
during period of grant will finance their profit and so it is arguably a fair method of
raising funds.
Put simply, patents' monetary values reflect patent owners' abilities to extract high
profits arising out of the advantageous monopolies gained by virtue of having patents.
Purchasers of patented products at high prices pay indirectly for the research and
development of inventions and so subsidise later generic copies that evolve subsequent
to the end of the period of exclusivity. So those who pay high prices for, say, a
patented drug, help those who follow to enjoy the benefits of cheaper generic drugs.
Indeed society benefits eventually from the higher prices paid for inventions created
comparatively recently186.
The justifications can be seen in different sectors of the innovation time line Table
Five - Patent Time Line - Patent Theory overleaf:
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The justifications for patent law are expressed at different stages of the innovation time
line and different ethical questions arise during each stage in relation to each
justification. For example, inventions that have arisen out of unethical research may
still benefit from the patent incentive, thereby rewarding unethical researchers.
Rewarding an unethical researcher is a different question from enabling immoral
exploitation of an invention. Both examples are important issues but the extent that
patent law is a relevant or practical instrument with which to address them is a moot
point. The first example could envisage patent law as part of wider regulatory
mechanisms which could utilise the incentive (or rather the disincentive of not
granting) as a method of reflecting society's moral stance and it is questionable
whether this is an appropriate mechanism for this. The second example relates more to
regulation of exploitation, for which, although aided through the grant of patents, has a
separate body of law to regulate economic issues. So arguably neither is directly
relevant for questions relating to the grant of patents. On the other hand there is a clear
connection between them; the first connected through incentive and the second
through patent law enabling monopolistic exploitation. A significant difference is that
the grant of patents cannot create immoral inventions but the grant of patent rights can
create immoral exploitation. Perhaps more importantly refusal of patent grants does
not eliminate immoral inventions but exploitation can be changed through alteration of
the conditions of patent monopoly. I suggest that these differences in effect should be
an important basis for deciding what steps should be open to patent law to address
some the criticisms levied upon grants of patents. The attainment and expression or
realisation of the justifications for the grant of patent rights has a negative side. The
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following chapter examines some of the difficulties that may occur through
exploitation of patented inventions.
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(2) (e) Negative Patent Effects
These last few points outline some of the negative effects of patents which may arise in
certain circumstances. Patent law exerts influence at different stages of innovation.
During each stage competing interests arise, each of which can be influenced or
affected by patent grants or refusal to grant. Competing interests can be ethical or
related to access, i.e. the extent of restrictions that may arise as a result of the grant of
patents. The restrictions are justified by a number of patent theories and these also
illustrate the patent effect over time. Although patent requirements remain the same
regardless of the type of innovation, the characteristics of innovation processes within
individual industries can differ.187 Some of which can give rise to specific problems
and which are, as we shall see, more prevalent, or are more likely to give rise to issues
within biotechnology and so they will be revisited in the following chapter. The
following sub-sections outline some negative consequences of patenting that can arise
after a patent is granted.
(2) (e) (i) Wastage, Cherry-picking, Racing and fishing
Patents are granted, in Europe and in most patent systems, to the first to file a patent:
Today more than ever, those engaged in research may be competing to
solve a scientific or technical problem. The 'first to file' basis ofmost patent
187 'But whereas the patent system has unifonn criteria to judge patent applications, the pattern of
technical progress may vary significantly in different fields.' (CIPR Report. 2002, 112).
93
systems exacerbates the pressure to reach the patent office as soon as
feasible.188
It is natural that firms will concentrate their efforts upon developing and producing
inventions that create the best prospects for returns. If more than one aspirant in the
field emerges, rivalries will be created but there can be only one eventual winner.
Losers in the race to patent will have spent effort for which there is no reimbursement
and this seems to create inefficiencies conflicting with the general good. This 'race to
patent'189, wastage or 'fishing'190 plays a negative role so far as 'appropriability'191 is
concerned and is brought about because a patent is a 'true monopoly'192. The larger the
potential profit, the more entrants there are likely to be, resulting in wasted time, effort
and resources used up by chasing the patent and which otherwise could have been put
to better use elsewhere. It is arguable that these apparent wasted efforts could be offset
by greater efficiencies brought about by being involved in the competition between
rival firms, and that sometimes there is no rivalry because there is only one applicant.
In the cases of Genentech193 and Amgen194 much time and many resources were
188 Cornish and Llewelyn , 'Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks andAlliedRights'.
189 "The third kind of disadvantage is that, paradoxically, the potential availability of patent protection
may serve to make meritorious research more, not less, risky. This is because the reward goes to he
who arrives first', Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria, 'The Modern Law ofCopyright and Designs', 852.
190 Y Barzel. 'Optimal Timing of Innovations' (1968) 50 Review of Economics and Statistics. 248.
191 'It is then also said that patent protection provides a monopoly to solve the appropriability problem: if
a firm cannot recover the costs of invention because the necessary information is available to all at no
cost, it can be expected that the level of information will be much lower." (Bostyn, 'Patenting DNA
Sequences (polynucleotides) and Scope ofProtection in the European Union').
192 Laddie. Prescott and Vitoria. 'The Modern Law ofCopyright and Designs'. 852.
193 Genentech Inc's Patent (Human Growth Hormone) [1989] RPC 147. CA.
194
Amgen Inc. v Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. and Transkaryotic Therapies Inc. Civil action No 97-
10814-WGY United States District Court District ofMassachusetts. 19 January 2001.
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wasted in costly global legal disputes. Some economic waste is unavoidable in these
sorts of competitive situations where there is only one winner but this is acceptable
because the competition of itself creates its own benefits. The Biotechnology Directive
at least indicates that there is an issue195 but it fails to address it in any meaningful
way.
(2) (E) (II) EXCLUSIONS
The previous chapter illustrated that it stands to reason that if there is insufficient
incentive innovation be discouraged leaving areas of important progress outside the
patent system altogether. There are also problems for potential consumers excluded
from the benefits of patents because only those who can afford the cost of patented
inventions can benefit. But to some extent this is a disingenuous suggestion so it
should be put into context. It is true that in the realms of health care, economic
exclusions brought about by higher costs of patented drugs raise justifiable arguments
against patenting; because patenting can exclude those who need remedies the most.
Patenting, and all that it means for encouraging preventative, curative, sedative
medicines, focuses upon research and development of medication that is initially
expensive and that potentially returns the highest revenue rather than that which allows
comprehensive access. But the proponents of patenting can argue that funding has to
come from somewhere and that patenting is the most efficient method in the long run
in the absence of any better alternatives. Everyone benefits from improvements in the
195 Recital 18 of the Biotechnology Directive states: 'Whereas, since the patent system provides
insufficient incentive for encouraging research into and production of biotechnological medicines
which are needed to combat rare or "orphan" diseases, tire Community and the Member States have a
duty to respond adequately to this problem', and Recital 11 indicates a similar attitude to developing
countries'.
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end, because generics come on the market or alternatives are developed, which may
not have been available in the absence of patents.
So the arguments persist and whilst there are merits of each side they reflect the
balance that patent law is supposed to achieve. One ensures so far as possible that the
strength of patents does not become too great and the other strengthening private
interests to ensure appropriate incentives exist for innovation. On occasions there may
be concerns that private or commercial interests are too strong. It may be an acceptable
side-effect of patent law and economics that there are casualties along the way196
because of the overall benefits, but is that justification acceptable in all cases? If many
are excluded or progress restricted for the sake of commercial gain then the
justification for the grant of patents or their relative strength should be questioned.
(2) (e) (hi) Bottlenecking - Stacks, Pools and Reach-through
Patents
The patent system allows for improvements to inventions to be patented separately.
Some inventions are constructed by using several components, each ofwhich has been
separately patented. This could happen horizontally where the invention is created by
using several other patented inventions; as in the case of the Indian manufactured drug,
Duovir-N'197 which is used in connection with AIDS and is manufactured from a
combination of zidovudine (AZT), lamivudine (3TC) and nevirapine (NVR). Two are
patented by GlaxoSmithKline and the third is patented by Boehringer Ingelheim. The
combination drug is manufactured in India to overcome patenting hurdles elsewhere.
196 "In the short tenn future, there are bound to be instances of personal injustice, but resourcing
medicine is lull of such occasions and in the long-tenn. reality must take effect", Warren-Jones,
'Patenting DNA: A lot of controversy over a little intangibility'. 124.
197 Medecins Sans Frontieres. 'Drug patents under the spotlight", 6.
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Vertical examples occur where the original invention is used as a basis for further
research and leads to a new but separate invention. In each of these examples
inventions have been created and then developed using other patents which may or
may not be held by the same inventor.
This characteristic is more prevalent in some industries than in others. In industries
which are characterised by a '...linear research...'198 model the problems posed by
multiple patents may be minimal. On the other hand in knowledge-based industries,
like pharmaceuticals or biotechnology: '...the process of innovation may be
cumulative, and iterative, drawing on a range of prior inventions invented
independently, and feeding into further independent research processes by others'199.
The pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries have the propensity to become
involved in these sorts of situations resulting from the increase of complex research
and development that characterise their activities. 'In the Pharmaceutical sector, such
an invention may for example relate to a product (e.g. a specific molecule), a process
(e.g. the process to manufacture this molecule), a medical indication (e.g. a fixed dose
combination of two molecules)'200.
The difficulty that this characteristic creates is that there can be a reduction in
availability of material for further research because of patents over earlier work. The
198 CIPR Report, 2002. 112.
199 Ibid., see also IPI Report. 'Patents For Genetic Sequences: The Competitiveness of Current UK Law
and Practice', 92
200 Mcdecins Sans Frontieres, 'Drug Patents Under the Spotlight'.
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negative effects of the above were first discussed in Science magazine201 but have been
repeated in other observations202 about the patenting of biotechnology. The reality of
the effect of this is looked at later but the following is a summary of the consequences.
'The extent of the protection conferred by a European Patent or a European Patent
Application shall be determined by the terms of the claims.'203 The result is that
patentees can word their claims as broadly as they like provided that they come within
the patent qualifications and are warranted as justified by the supporting
documentation204. A patent over an early stage invention such as DNA will cover all
uses. Therefore should further innovation occur the second inventor will require either
a licence or permission otherwise they will be in breach of the first. This could give
rise to what have become known as patent pyramids. Patent holders at the first stage of
development, or top of the pyramid, charge licences to second stages and further to the
extent that the development continues. The risk is that 'thickets' develop which slow
the progress of innovation in cases where 'the vast number of patents currently being
201 M Heller & R Eisenberg, "Can patents deter innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research',
(1998) Science 698.
202 For example, CIPR Report (2002); Bostyn. 'Patenting DNA Sequences (polynucleotides) and Scope
of Protection in the European Union'; Gowers Review; IPI, Patents for Genetic Sequences: The
Competitiveness of Current UK Law and Practice'; Nuffield Council on Bioethics. The ethics of
patenting DNA'.
21,3 Article 69 (1) European Patent Convention 1973, adopted into UK law by s. 125 Patents Act 1977.
204 The crucial documentation for a patent application is tire patent specification (see Cornish page 152
"...the crucial document in the whole process of securing and relying upon a patent is the
specification."). The specification is in two parts; the description and the claims. These must disclose
the invention sufficiently so that it can be performed by a person "... skilled in the art" to avoid claims
of insufficiency (See Patents Act 1977 s 72 (c) and (d)). The claims will also lay out the scope of the
claimed monopoly.
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issued creates a very real danger that a single product or service will infringe on many
patents.'205
(2) (E) (IV) PATENT POOLS
A patent pool occurs when two or more patent owners agree to license a grouping of
their patents to others or to themselves206. Patent Pools have been used in particular in
the electronics industry207.The negative effects of patent stacks or pyramids have been
anticipated in certain areas by researchers who in an attempt to mitigate the difficulties
have resorted208 to patent pools209. This reaction may appear to be benign and in some
instances it may well be especially if the aim or justification for setting up patent pools
is to increase access and lower licence fees. After all research groups are to some
extent reliant upon each other and require access to available material in order to
survive and prosper. The negative side is that pools are traditionally seen as anti¬
competitive. Pooling resources with which to license is in effect the same thing as
forming a cartel and can give rise to particular anti-competitive behaviour such as price
fixing.
205 Shapiro C, 'Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting,
Chapter Four. Jaffe A. Lerner J and Scott S, Innovation Policy and the Economy' National Bureau of
Economic Research, London page 121
206 A patent pool is an agreement between two or more patent owners to license one or more of their
patents as a package to one another or to third parties willing to pay the royalties associated, either
directly by patentees to licensees or, indirectly, through a new entity specifically set up for
administering the pool" Somsen H. ' The Regulatory Challenge ofBiotechnology: Human Genetics,
Food and Patents' (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2007) at page 251.
2" Grubb P.W., 'Patents for Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology, Fourth EditionOxford University
Press. 2004. at page 417
208 "Patent pools have been suggested as an alternative solution for the emergence of patent thickets"
Grubb ibid page 147
209 Research has been carried by Innogen project as part of the ESRC Genomics network including the
"Co-operative Management of Intellectual Property Rights" which looked at the use of patent pools




This chapter has examined patent law at different stages of a hypothetical innovation
time line. Importantly it has illustrated that the influence or effect of patents changes
throughout the time line and that the aims and justifications of patent law are expressed
differently within each stage. Thus an incentive at grant stage is created through
rewarding inventors at post-grant or exploitation stage. The incentive/reward is
balanced against subsequent restrictions of access or higher prices that may result from
patent grants but this is justified on the basis that more innovation overall occurs as a
result of patents. If the balance between incentive and subsequent restriction in access
is weighted too much in favour of the patentee then this could have a negative effect
upon innovation. Arguably this is an issue that is directly relevant to patent grants and
when considered in the context of biotechnology where restrictions upon access can
mean restrictions in further research and access to important treatments it becomes a
moral question. The moral questions that have emerged from patent decisions have
however revolved around quite different subject material than exploitation and access
but because of biotechnology have centred more upon effects or possible effects of
inventions. Chapter four will look at morality and patent law in greater detail and the
following chapter will examine the ways in which new technology has nuanced
traditional views of patent law.
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(3) Chapter Three - Biotechnology Patents
210
Basic patent requirements are virtually the same for all inventions. Particular
characteristics of biotechnological inventions have resulted in a number of specific
rules relating to bio-patenting211 along with stricter procedures in respect of basic
patent hurdles212. Furthermore the Biotechnology Directive, although merely intent on
clarifying and repeating previous practice, contains rules which are specific to
biotechnology and which have profound implications213 in respect of what can and
cannot be protected. The debate surrounding protection for biotechnology continues.
This chapter outlines the characteristics of biotechnology that give rise to this
contradiction, discusses their implications and the effects that this has had on patent
rules.
(3) (a) Biological Material
Biological material is defined by the Biotechnology Directive, as 'any material
containing genetic information and capable of reproducing itself or being reproduced
210 There are some specific rules that apply to particular types of invention. For example, some rules
relating to inventions stemming from infonuation technology and to biotechnology have been adopted
in order to cope with the particular characteristics involved in those particular industries but the same
basic principles apply all the same. Furthermore there are possible differences in treatment of biotech
inventions as suggested by the OECD, in relation to biotech inventions, in its report in 2004 that
"patent offices may choose or be asked to apply stricter guidelines when interpreting whether an
invention is novel, useful or represents an inventive step.' (OECD. 'Patents and Innovation: Trends
and Policy Challenges').
211 As with those within Directive 98/44 of the Biotechnology Directive.
212 See Genentech Inc. 's Patent (Human Growth Hormone) 11989] RPC 147, CA, for example and
although this case rested much upon its own facts. There have been some suggestions that patent grant
hurdles should be raised, see OECD, 'Patents and Innovation: Trends and Policy Challenges', which
suggests applying stricter rules for biotech than other inventions, as does the Nuffield Council on
Bioethics report, 'The ethics of patenting DNA'.
213
Including an increase in specific exclusions from patentability - see below.
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in a biological system'214. This is not a new phenomenon215 and neither is the patenting
of biotechnological inventions. A variety of inventions can come under this definition
and it is important to understand when an invention becomes patentable and when
inventions are not classed as patentable.
There is a sliding scale of what is acceptable to patent and what is not216. For example
cells in the body are not patentable, whilst those that have been isolated217 are
potentially (i.e. they still have to qualify) patentable. Simple isolation of DNA may
only be useful for further research which may lead ultimately to treatment or
treatments. Thus there is a chain of biological material that may ultimately lead to
some public benefit. Each stage relies upon its predecessor and so must take any
previous patents into account. This chain is important because of the reliance of later
inventions upon earlier ones and the earlier they are the broader they are likely to be.
Subsequent inventions may therefore be blocked, subject to licence agreement or
infringe patents.
214 Article 2 (1) (a) Biotechnology Directive.
215 Biotechnology has its early origins thousands of years ago with beer brewing and bread making in
Mesopotamia. Hence it is by a long stretch not a new phenomenon although the term biotechnology
was first noted to have been coined in the 1920s (Grubb, 'Patentsfor Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals and
Biotechnology').
216 The development of the law in Europe as to what is patentable has generally favoured a sympathetic
approach for patent applicants. For example CIBA GEIGT/Propagating Material [1984] OJEPO 112
held that no "general exclusion of inventions in the sphere of animate nature could be inferred from
the EPC" and LUBRJZOL/Hybridplants T 320/87 [1990] O.J. EPO 59 followed a similar approach.
Both cases related to hybrid seed production but the "effect of these decisions was to place a narrow
construction on the Article 53(b) exclusion as applied to plants" (Cook "a users guide to patents"
Butterworths 2002, at paragraph 812). The decisions were followed in HARVARD/Onco-mouse
T19/90. see chapter Four
21 Article 3 (1) (2) Biotechnology Directive.
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(3) (b) Biotechnology - The Characteristics
The features of biotechnology patents that give rise to concerns regarding their use and
exploitation are emotive and complex. DNA is personal in that everyone is unique;
nevertheless we have much in common. 'We are all alike on the inside'218 so DNA is
sometimes described as a form of 'common heritage of mankind'219. This arouses
arguments that its special status should not result in commercial gain or if there is to be
profit it should be for the public benefit rather than private advantage220.
Biotechnology has a long history but 'modern biotechnology' is relatively new and its
potential is not yet fully known.
It can easily be argued that the public must be the main beneficiary, even though it is
not jointly or severally, except through its legal and political representatives, a party in
relevant patent processes. No doubt the patent system creates benefits for commercial
21x Mark Twain. Astute literary comments aside, human DNA varies to a minute degree between people.
219 Nuffield Council on Bioethics. 'The ethics of patenting DNA', 21. Ownership of human tissue and
genes was also described as common heritage of mankind by the Council of Europe's Committee in
Legal Affairs and Human Rights, and common heritage has been referred to in UNESCO's Universal
Declaration on the Hmnan Genome and Human Rights (1977).
220 There are examples of the use of benefit sharing mechanisms to address the objection of lack of
openness. See in particular UK Biobank which "...is building a national treasure trove of health
information, of an impressive scale, to be used by scientists in the future.' UK Biobank website
http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/assessment/takepart.php See also conference 'Governing Biobanks-
What are the Challenges'. Cambridge International Conference June 2008. This included discussions
on global systems for governance of biobanks and benefit sharing and how to balance this with
protection of the relevant interests involved. A vital balance within biobanks is between privacy,
family rights and 'public interest' more details from
http://www. ggd.org.uk/index.cfm?fuseaction=events.content&cmid=28 last accessed 23rd July 2008
See also http://www.genomicsnetwork.ac.uk/innogen/ which includes studies into the effects of patent
pools and open licenses. Guadamuz A. of Edinburgh School of Law researches, inter alia, open source
licensing, see: 'Open Science: Open source licenses in scientific research' (2006) North Carolina
Journal of Law & Technology Vol. 7 No. 2. pp.321-366 and 'GNU General Public License v3: A
Legal Analysis' (2006) SCRlPT-ed Vol 3 Issue 2, pp. 130-139
See also Joly Y. Open Source Approaches in Biotechnology: Utopia Revisited. Maine law Review, Vol.
59. No.2p.386. 2007 and Sulston. Staking claims in the biotechnology Klondike. Bull World Health
Organ. Vol.84 no 5 Genebra May 2006
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interests but those interests drive innovation so the public should always benefit;
eventually.
Watchfulness is the key to the success or otherwise of the patent system and it is clear
that it is difficult for any system to maintain balance even if, as in this case, the
interests of commerce and of the public are to a certain extent mutual. This requires
examination, especially as the thrust of this paper is towards maintaining balance;
allowing commercial advantage whilst at the same time protecting the public interest.
(3) (c) Reaction to the Characteristics
The reaction to biotechnology in patent law has been felt in the way that patent law has
been interpreted and through questions being raised about the purpose of patent law in
the innovation process, with emphasis being upon the ethical role of patent law rather
than on the access effects of patent grants.
Opposition to biotechnology has been organised and promoted with emotive and often
justifiable arguments so that the patent system has been compelled to address issues for
which it is not fully equipped. It is important that the biotech industry should progress
financially and morally, therefore the role of patent law with respect to both needs to
be examined.
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(3) (c) (i) The methodology used to protect
biotechnological inventions
The controversy surrounding biotechnology and the patenting of biotech inventions is
however relatively new221 in comparison with the technology. There are few
differences between the patent rules that govern other types of inventions and those
that relate to biotechnology: 'in general, biotechnology is to be treated no differently
from any other inventive science that comes forward with patent claims'222. Further as
the '.. .legal protection of biotechnological inventions does not necessitate the creation
of a separate body of law... '223 much of the following could be applicable to any form
of technology. It may seem that 'The legitimacy of biotechnology patents' is 'beyond
doubt'224. Years of debate and a short lived contemplation of alternative methods225 of
221 The development of biotechnology can be separated into three stages: stage one being the early
traditional fermentation technologies, with the second stage emanating from the discoveries of Louis
Pasteur (whose patent for 'yeast, free from organic germs of disease, as an article of manufacture',
was the first patent for living technology. Stage three, or modem biotechnology, covers the areas
relevant to this work, namely work such as recombinant DNA technology, cloning and stem cell
therapy, in particular in relation to human tissue. It is this latter stage where the difficulties and
questions have arisen into whether biotechnology is acceptable and in particular whether it should be
patentable. See Dutficld. Intellectual Property Rights and the Life Science Industries, and Grubb,
Patents for Chemicals. Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology, for a detailed and interesting account of
the history of biotechnology related inventions.
:::: D Beyleveld. R Brownsword and M Llewelyn, 'The Morality Clauses of the Directive on the Legal
Protection of Biotechnological Inventions: Conflict, compromise and the patent community', in R
Goldberg and J Lonbay (eds) 'PharmaceuticalMedicine and European Law' (CUP 2000) 157.
223 Recital (8) Biotechnology Directive.
224 UK Patent Office "Guidelines for patent applications relating to Biotechnological Inventions in the
UK Patent Office' (November 2003), clause 5 available from <
www.patent.TOV.uk/Datcnt/reference/biotcchguide/background.htm >. 'Patenting such cultured cells is
now so well established a practice that it would be almost impossible to turn back', Professor Peter J
Wliittaker, 'Stem Cells, Patents and Ethics'. Centre for Economic and Social Aspects of Genomics
(2002), Institute for Environment, Philosophy and Public Policy, Lancaster University. 'It now looks
increasingly unlikely that a sui generis approach will be developed". Holyoak and Torrcmans
Intellectual Property Law, 89). The Biotechnology Directive also states at Recital 8: "Whereas legal
protection of biotechnological inventions does not necessitate the creation of a separate body of
law...'. See also Cornish et al., 'Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) and Genetics'. 12: 'In recent years
there have been projects to create a new fonn of right in genomic information which typically aims to
procure a return from users to discoverers without stopping actual use of the information. These have
not so far made significant political headway.'
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providing incentive for biotechnological invention, have led to the Biotechnology
Directive and patenting of genetic material continues unabated. The controversy226
over the patentability of human genetic material is not going away and the amount of
official, academic and commercial discussion227 grows and expands.
Biotechnology raises particular issues and in Europe steps have been taken in the form
of the Biotechnology Directive to 'clarify' the law and consequently prevent
'differences.. .offered by the laws and practices of the different member states...' from
creating '...barriers to trade and hence impede the proper functioning of the internal
market.'228 Saying that the Biotechnology Directive added little to existing law, '.. .one
can only conclude that the Directive did not really cover a lot of new ground'229
although it reaffirmed much existing law and practice. That is not to detract from the
harmonising effect that the Directive intended and achieved, indeed it provided a
framework for biotechnological inventions for some countries which had hitherto not
achieved a developed case law on the matter. There are features of biotechnology,
though, that have caused patent law to be interpreted in a particular way and unique
225 For example copyright - Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria, 'The Modern Law ofCopyright and Designs
Volume 1, Chapter 21, "DNA and Protein Sequences', 853: "could copyright be a solution?'.
226 The Biotechnology Directive was eventually adopted after 10 years of negotiations. A previous draft
had failed through disagreement and even seven years since it was first agreed eight signatory states
have failed to implement it despite referral to the European Court of Justice. Before it was adopted
opposition was strong within the parliament and continued afterwards, both by opposition from
environmental pressure groups and from member states. The Dutch government with support from
Italy and Norway brought an action before the Court of Justice against the European Parliament and
Council of the European Union which was dismissed in October 2001. There will be a fuller
discussion on the ramifications of this action later.
227 See generally, G Kamstra, M Doring. N Scott-Ram, A Shcard and H Wixon, 'Special Report -
Patents on Biotechnological Inventions: The EC Directive' (Sweet & Maxwell. London 2002); Cook.
A User's Guide to Patents; Grubb, Patents for Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology; R
Goldberg and J Lonbay (eds), Pharmaceutical Medicine, Biotechnology and European Law (CUP
2000); Bostyn, 'Enabling Biotechnological Inventions in Europe and the United States':
22x
Biotechnology Directive, Recital (5)
229
'Holyoak and Torremans Intellectual Property Law', 90.
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objections have arisen to biotechnology and patenting of biotech inventions that are
unlikely to be raised against other forms of inventions. The nature of biotechnology is
such that it may appear to relate to natural products which are not new whilst patent
law provides protection for inventions which are new. This, admittedly, is a rather
sweeping statement but it serves as a simple illustration of the initial difficulties that
faced biotech patentees, namely that their inventions had to be distinguished from
discoveries and their natural origins. As a result the patent rules were cleverly
interpreted so as to adapt to biotechnology. A separate regime, similar, for example, to
that chosen for the patenting of plant life, was not created for biotechnology possibly
because it was considered unnecessary or wasteful to create further sets of regulations
every time a new technology emerges. One consequence of this approach is that the
method used to patent becomes entrenched before the policy makers fully understand
the particular difficulties that the industry may offer.230 The result for patent law has
been that the rules have been interpreted using an intelligent approach, allowing
patents to be granted, but what differences are there between biotech inventions and
other inventions that have created problems?
(3) (c) (ii) Nature of Biotech Inventions
Patent law provides protection for inventions that are new and it excludes discoveries.
Biotechnology inventions relate to natural material which gives the twin difficulty of
230
'Unfortunately policymakers usually do not have sufficient understanding of the path of such
technology and the implications for an appropriate intellectual property regime during this nascent
stage of development. Policy makers thus are left in the awkward position of either creating a regime
before they adequately understand the problem or w aiting until the contours of the problem emerge, at
which point economic interests have vested, and reform of it if possible at all. is severely constrained.'
Menell P S, University of California. Berkeley, 1994.
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being a discovery and already in existence. The US Supreme Court231, by a majority of
five to four, set the tone for the future of patents for life sciences in the United States
by allowing a patent over artificially produced bacteria. By holding that in the US,
'...anything under the sun that is made by man' is patentable, the court decided the
issue that because something was alive that did not mean that it was unpatentable. The
crucial issue was whether an invention had been made by man. Although this applied
only to the US, and indeed the British version of the patent had already been
granted , the same distinction, namely made by man , forms the essence of the
patentability of biotechnological inventions as can be seen in the European
Biotechnology Directive:
Article 3
1. For the purposes of this Directive, inventions which are new, which
involve inventive step and which are susceptible of industrial
application shall be patentable even if they concern a product
consisting of or containing biological material or a process by
means ofwhich biological material is produced, processed or used.
231 Diamond v Chakrabarty, 447 US 303 (1980),
232 Grubb. 'Patentsfor Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology', 248.
233 See also T 320/87, LUBRIZOL/Hybrid plants, "...where the TBA held that a determination of
whether a nonmicrobiological process is essentially biological depends on the extent of human
intervention, the result achieved thereby, and the essence of the invention. Human intervention is not
enough per se\ such intervention has to be more than trivial" Campbell P @Patentable Subject Matter




2. Biological Material which is isolated from its natural environment
or produced by means of a technical process may be the subject of
an invention even if it previously occurred in nature.
Article 5
1. The human body, at the various stages of its formation and
development and the simple discovery of one of its elements,
including the sequence or partial sequence of a gene, cannot
constitute patentable inventions.
2. An element isolated from the human body or otherwise produced
by means of a technical process, including the sequence or partial
sequence of a gene, may constitute a patentable invention, even if
the structure of that element is identical to that of a natural element.
Thus naturally occurring substances and elements of the human body may be
patentable so long as there has been some technical intervention, isolation or
production which creates a new substance. This 'application of human endeavour to
produce a technical solution to a previously unresolved technical problem'234 is the
definitive remedy to the hurdle of'patenting life' and the exclusion of discoveries from
patentability.
234 G Laurie, 'Genetic Privacy. A challenge to Medico-Legal Norms '(CUP 2002), 305.
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There have been similar prevarications in relation to industrial applicability (or in the
United States 'utility') of biotechnology patents. In the United States patent
applications were rejected over fragments of gene sequences without known utility and
in Europe the Biotechnology Directive states that gene sequences without known
function cannot be patentable235. The point was the subject of a report by the Trilateral
Project in their 2003 comparative study on Examination Relating to Nucleotide
Polymorphisms (SNPs) and Haplotypes236237. A "specific, substantial and credible
utility that could be practiced without undue experimentation" was the USPO approach
whilst the EPO's view was that SNPs were likely to fail because of lack of inventive
step. The Japanese Patent Office queried the link between claimed function and SNPs.
Biotechnology has gradually fitted into the patent system, albeit with some semantic
hurdles. 'Given the commercial importance of the products of biotechnology and the
politicized nature of the patent literature, it is not surprising that the problems of
interpretation posed by biotechnology have been treated, on the whole, as mere
obstacles to be avoided, rather than stumbling blocks to patentability.'238 The result is a
partnership of sorts but not one blessed with harmony.
235 Article 5 (3) "The Industrial application of a sequence or a partial sequence of a gene must be
disclosed in the patent application" This was confirmed by tire ECJ in Kingdom of the Netherlands v
European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, Case C-377/98, [2001] ECR 1-7079,
the United Kingdom Intellectual Property Office and EPO agree that know n function is essential
236 i.e. combinations of SNPs
237 Trilateral Project WM4. Comparative Studies in new technologies, "Report on comparative study on
Examination Practice Relating to Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms (SNPs) and Haplotypes, June 10-
12, 2003, available from
http://www.trilateral.net/proiects/biotechnology/examination snp/examination on snps haplotvpes.p
df. last accessed 27th June 2008. Part of the aims of the Trilateral Project is to harmonise practice of
the patent offices of EPO. Japan and United States
238 B Sherman, 'Patent law in a Time of Change: Non-Obviousness and Biotechnology' (1990) 10
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 278-287, at 286.
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The case of Genentech Inc.'s patent239 illustrates the reining in of patents over
biotechnology. The lengthy judgement covers many points, two ofwhich will be noted
here. The first is the adaptation of the notional skilled worker to correspond to new
perspectives and the second raises comments that question the suitability of patent law
for the protection of biotechnological inventions.
The traditional test to define whether a step taken by a patent applicant is sufficiently
inventive is whether that step was obvious to a person skilled in the art in question and
that person '...is supposed to have an unlimited capacity to assimilate the contents of,
it may be, scores of specifications but to be incapable of a scintilla of invention' 40.
This fictional character has been the subject of criticism241 but the situation remained
that the question of obviousness was to be assessed through the mind of someone who
could not invent but was aware of the entire prior art. Genentech changed the situation
because it was felt by the Court of Appeal that in an industry which was characterised
by intelligent people242 whose job it was to be inventive it would be unrealistic to
characterise the notional man as uninventive. Genentech failed to obtain patent
protection for their production of human plasminogen activator243 for a variety of
239 Genentech Inc. 's Patent [1989] RPC 147.
240 Technograph Printed Circuits Ltd vMills andRockley (Electronics) Ltd [ 1972] RPC 346.
241 This notional character has been described as 'unrealistic' (Holyoak & Torremans Intellectual
Property Law. 67), that he may lead to confusion (Windsurfing International Inc v Tabur Marine
(Great Britain) Limited [1985] RPC 59) and as being a 'folksy way of explaining the law to a jury'
{Societe Technique de Pulverisation Step v Emson Europe Ltd [1993] RPC 513 at 519).
242 '...one cannot treat them as dull plodders...some substantial measure of ingenuity is an essential
qualification for being engaged in the enterprise.' (Genentech Inc. 's Patent [1989] RPC 147. 279-280
perMustill LJ).
243 Genentech's patent related to a new method of synthesising t-PA used for preventing blood clotting
and as the method allowed substantial quantities to be produced, the value to Gencntech in terms of
revenue was enormous and to thrombosis patients it was vital.
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reasons244 including non-obviousness, but the important point to note for this work is
the new hurdle that was presented to the biotechnology industry by this new test.
It is an oxymoron for a system that provides patent for inventiveness to refuse patents
because the industry in question is inventive. Admittedly this is not a bar to
patentability, because showing a level of inventiveness above the norm in the industry
should suffice to surmount that particular hurdle24 , but nevertheless this change
creates an advance in difficulties for the biotech industry. One wonders whether other
factors influenced the decision which leads to the second point of underlying concern
regarding suitability of patents for biotechnology, and indeed it is clear that Mustill LJ
had this consideration in mind when giving judgement:
If a sufficient reward is not given in those instances where the research
bears fruit, the industry will not attract the venture capital which it needs for
survival, the research will cease, and humanity will continue to suffer...it
may well be that the work done by Genentech seems worthy of a reward
greater than a few months' start on the road to a marketable product. Yet I
am driven to conclude both that the monopoly claim exceeds any legitimate
award and also that for want of inventive step Genentech are not entitled to
any reward through the patent system...
244 The court found that some of the claims related to discoveries without the necessary application to
define them as inventions and because of obviousness.
245 It is worth noting that Purchase LJ in the Genetech case discussed the artificiality of the ordinary
skilled man test. See page Genentech [1989] RPC at page 280 - "I believe that this question is
incapable of being answered in vacuo. Not only will the standard differ from case to case, but there
may well also be differences between the individual members of the teams... There is no single
standard...obviousness is a jury question. This question mustbe in tire light of a highly artificial test
which, although compressed into a few words in the Act, is impossible to elaborate with any degree of
precision."
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Mustill LJ is pointing to the fundamental issue regarding the patenting of
biotechnology; that protection is needed but patent law fails to provide it. 'I believe
that the prime reason why these questions are so hard to formulate is that the structure
and philosophy of the Act are not appropriate to an enterprise of the kind undertaken
by Genentech.'246
We can say that things have moved on and that Genentech is an unusual case that rests
on its own particular facts but the point is made nevertheless that there is judicial
concern about the potential monopoly over certain patent applications and the
contribution made. Indeed evidence was presented at the Genentech hearing pointing
to the enormous value of their invention247. In the United States, in the case ofAmgen
Inc248, District Judge Young C.J. commented in order to indicate the potential value of
what was at stake, on how 'publicly traded stocks of the litigants would bob or dip in
response to some random comment by the court, the trial lawyers, or a particular
witness'.
Thus the grant of patents over biotechnology has raised a number of important and
new consequences for research, investment and morality issues. The biotech industry
would appear to be more reliant upon patents than other industries, the questions of
what is being created versus the moral questions of what is trying to be achieved are
very different and significantly broader than questions raised for 'traditional' patents
246 Genentech Inc's Patent 11989] RPC at 274 per Mustill LJ.
24' The estimates were in excess of US$ 1 billion per annum.
248
Amgen Inc v HoechstMarion Roussel Inc and Transkaryotic Therapies Inc January 19th 2001, No. 97
- 10814- WGY.
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and importantly the answers are not black and white. Furthermore the rewards are also
potentially greater and the consequences of success are likely to have a greater effect
on society than other inventions. If patent law is to try to achieve a balance then the
issues raised need to reflect both the important changes in the manner that patent
research is carried out and the difficult ethical questions that are being asked.
(3) (d) Consequences of the Characteristics
The consequences that have arisen out of the quality and potential of biotechnology
inventions, the status ofDNA and the youth of the 'new' biotechnology industry have
given rise to three categories of concern for its promotion and development. The first
relates to the expense of completing research in an industry especially when it is
always difficult to forecast what the outcome is going to be. But the rewards can be
enormous and in certain circumstances arguably at the expense of public interest and
possibly to the detriment of further research. The second area of concern relates to
possible restrictions to access to further research and the third has to do with the
morality of the use and exploitation of biotechnology.
(3) (d) (i) Patent reliance and potential
Evidence suggests249 that the biotech industry relies more heavily and at an earlier
stage upon the grant of patent rights than other industries:
249 See below for a brief discussion of some features of the development of the biotech industry. For a
fuller discussion, see Grubb, Patents for chemicals, pharmaceuticals and biotechnology, or The Danish
Council of Ethics. Patenting Human Genes and Stem Cells (2004). For a critical view of drug
development see M Goozner, ' The $800 Million Pill: The True Cost ofNew Drugs' (University of
California Press 2004).
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Achieving uniformity and clarity in this area of the law has been regarded as
a major factor in influencing the climate for innovation and competitiveness
for the bioscience sector, which is generally research intensive and strongly
dependent upon intellectual property protection.250
Two main consequences stem from reliance upon patents. The first consequence is that
the distance between basic research and commercialisation has lessened. The second,
which has occurred in part because of the first, is an increase in patenting by public
• • 251
sector organisations including universities " . Such research may have previously been
more likely have been published open for access by any user. One could look on this as
a sensible collaboration between universities and business, or a reasonable method to
allow universities to raise contributions towards research which would otherwise have
had to come from grants or government funding. Alternatively it could be seen as a
sinister development that results in tighter information controls and higher end prices.
Whatever side of the fence one sits on, there are ramifications for patent law that must
be considered. 'But in Europe, too, the trend towards early patenting and concealment
of knowledge is posing an obstacle to collaboration and openness in research'252. Early
stage patents feed through into later work, further research may require licensing and
there are cost and access issues that work against the original purpose of the patent
250 IPI. 'Patents for Genetic Sequences: The Competitiveness ofCurrent UK Law and Practice'.
251 'The prohibition on patenting discoveries is similarly contained within both the UK and European
legislation and its social utility is ensuring that a distinction is made between pure and applied
research. This is a distinction which was far easier to distinguish before it became apparent that public
research was generating patentable inventions, but is still a divide identifiable in most cases by the
difference between making an observation and effecting a creation.' Warren-Jones, 'Patenting DNA:
A lot of controversy over a little intangibility'. Page 110
252 The Danish Council of Ethics. Patenting Human Genes and Stem Cells (2004).
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system. Are the benefits obtained through the patent system greater than the negative
impact and if so what choices does patent law have to counter the problem?
Biotechnological research involves great costs and if the results of research are
developed into a new treatment this requires enormous investment. The Nuffield
• • 253Council on Bioethics in 2002 estimated that on average the cost of each
development is about £110 million and other estimates have been higher than this254.
It follows that on these sorts of scales the potential profit for creating a new technical
medical breakthrough must be sufficient to justify the risk and expense of
development. The market for the enzyme involved in the case of Genentech Inc. 's
255 •
patent (Human Growth Hormone) was estimated to be worth in excess of US$1
billion per year256. Yet despite the expense of developing from origins, the ability to
copy or reproduce work is relatively cheap.
These characteristics result in an understandable need to protect valuable research as
early as possible:
253 Nuffield Council on Bioethics. 'The ethics of patenting DNA\
254 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 'The ethics of patenting DNA', page 14. The Nuffield Council on
Biocthics gave two estimates of the cost of drug development. The first from the Tufts centre for the
study of drug development estimated that the cost for developing a new prescription drug was $802
million whilst US national consumer group. Public Citizen, estimated $110 million. These figures are
open to question as a study by Public Citizen argued: 'A new study claiming that the average cost of
developing a new prescription dmg is $802 million once again significantly overstates real research
and development (R&D) costs, according to an analysis by the national consumer group Public
Citizen.'
255 Genentech Inc's Patent (Human Growth Hormone) [1989] RPC 147, CA.
256 Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria. 'TheModern Law ofCopyright and Designs) 852.
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This suggests that without patent protection, some novel medicines might
never be invented. It is often conceded that, while patents may not always
increase innovation, when they do, it is usually in the pharmaceutical and
257
biotechnology sectors.
Although there is a debate about whether patents actually hinder scientific
development and economic growth it is clear that patents have had, and continue to
have, a central and established role to play in the biotech industry. This is recognised
in Recital 1 of the Biotechnology Directive which states, inter alia: . .the protection of
biotechnological inventions will certainly be of fundamental importance for the
258
Community's industrial development' " . Although one could perhaps argue that
developments may possibly have occurred without the need for patents, success in the
biotech industry has evolved through the use of patents and the industry is, as a result,
in its present form, largely reliant upon them. This too is recognised in the
Biotechnology Directive in Recital 2: '...research and development require a
considerable amount of high-risk investment and therefore only adequate legal
protection can make them profitable'. The biotech industry developed through small
research companies, most of which needed finance and were without internal reserves
to draw upon or established capital base to borrow against. They therefore had to
257 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, The ethics of patenting DNA a discussion paper'.. 14
258 Recital (1) Biotechnology Directive: 'Whereas biotechnology and genetic engineering arc playing an
increasingly important role in a broad range of industries and the protection of biotechnological
inventions will certainly be of fundamental importance for the Community's industrial development.'
See also the subsequent reports on the workings of the biotechnology industry. European
Commission: 'Development and Implications of patent law in the field of biotechnology and genetic




attract venture capital by utilising the patent system . In turn venture capitalists have
recognised the value of patents as a method of securing their investment and have
come to regard a strong patent portfolio is an essential ingredient to attracting
investment260 'and the larger the portfolio (usually measured by the quantity of patents
rather than their quality), the greater the interest from investors'261. It may be
appropriate to go as far as to say that a patent is the most important link in the chain of
development: 'For many companies the patent becomes the product...' 262, and it
seems that the relative strength of a patent can be as important as the feasibility of the
end product263.
Several studies bear out the essential role of patents for biotech. The 1986 Mansfield
Study264 found that 17% ofmachinery-based products would not have been introduced
without patent protection but the same study found that 60% of pharmaceutical
(including biotech) inventions would have been absent if patent protection was
259 There are many discussions on the background of the growth of biotechnology industry. Generally
they describe a system of smaller companies with only a few making it into the big league. These
would include Genentech and Amgen Inc., both of which are now organised on the scale of
phannaceutical companies. They also illustrate how the patent system has been vital in encouraging
these small companies to grow. These include; Dutfield, 'Intellectual Property Rights and the Life
Science Industries'. See also OECD. 'Patents and Innovation: Trends and Policy Challenges', Report
2002.
260 'In many cases, patents are a start-up company's most valuable assets. As such, patents are essential
to securing additional capital from investors as these companies and their science grows and
develops." Ernst & Young, 'Beyond Borders: Global Biotechnology Report 2007'.
261 Dutfield. 'Intellectual PropertyRights and the Life Science Industries', 153
262 C Fowler, 'Unnatural Selection: Technology, Politics and Plant Evolution' (Yverdon, Gordon and
Breach 1994), 173.
263 '...the biotech firm Genetics Institute decides which version of a drug to develop partly based on
which iteration shows the best results in clinical trials but also according to which version can
command the strongest patent protection'. KG Rivette and D Kline, 'Discovering New Value in
Intellectual Property' [2000] Harvard Business Review, 54.
264 E Mansfield. 'Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study'.(1986) 32 Management Science, Vol. 32.
No.2 (Feb. 1986) pp 173-181.
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unavailable. A previous study in 198 1265 claimed that 90% of pharmaceutical
innovation was introduced only because of the ability to obtain a patent. A separate
survey266 in the US produced similar results. 'The patents that a firm holds are seen by
investors as the most important factor in deciding whether or not to invest in a
company'267. A more recent study presented evidence268 to suggest that the regulation
regime and the availability of intellectual property protection269 are the two most
important variables in the biotech innovation process. This dependency has developed
due to a number of characteristics of the industry. First the biotech industry is
extremely risky. Most projects never make it to market. The work is costly and time-
consuming. The small size of the typical biotech company has encouraged a reliance
on patents to attract investment. Indeed it could be that the existence of patents has
encouraged this proliferation of small firms, in place of larger established
companies270. The results of the work are easily copied in comparison to production
from first principles, thus the need for protection. In the event that a success story is
made from a research project the potential returns can be enormous and without patent
protection those returns would be reduced substantially due to the ease and low cost of
265 Mansfield, Schwartz & Wagner. 'Imitation costs and patents: An empirical study' (1981) 91
Economics Journal 907.
266 F M Scherer. 'The Economics of Human Gene Patents', 17 Academic Medicine, 1348, 1351; Yale-
Levin Study 1987 Carnegie-Mellon University survey 2000
267 Black, 'Regulation as Facilitation: Negotiating the genetic revolution', 53.
268 Ernst & Young 'Total Value of Information' 2004 available from
<www.ev.com/global/content.nsf/US/Health sciences - Articles - WEF 2004 -
Innovation Divide>. Ernst & Young rated innovation variable in accordance to percentages and
Intellectual property counted towards 32 % and regulatory environment counted for 29%.
269 In the case ofbiotechnology patents.
270 See. inter alia. Ernst & Young. 'Beyond Borders: Global Biotechnology Report 2007' on the
continuing reliance of small biotech companies on patents for investment. 'In many cases patents are a
start up company's most valuable assets. As such, patents are essential to securing additional capital
from investors as these companies grow and develop.' (ibid, page 6).
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copying. The result is an industry that is to a certain extent reliant upon the
patentability of its inventions.
There are a number of consequences of this, including more patents which at least is
evidence that there is much research taking place271 and since a patent is only granted
for something that is novel, there are more inventions. The negative side to the increase
in patenting activity is that as more patents emerge they protect more material because
of the protection that patent law affords and the protected products are not necessarily
available as an open resource. A balance has to be struck between what must be
protected and what ought not to be allowed to become unnecessarily restricted. The
biotech industry is reliant upon patenting so changes to the general rules of patent law
will have a greater effect on that particular industry than upon other industries. The
consequences of these two points will now be examined in more detail.
(3) (d) (ii) Access - Research Structure
There are new consequences for biotechnology research due to the granting of patent
rights over biotech inventions. This is caused by a number of factors which have
ramifications for future research and access to patented material. First there has been
an increase in academic patenting272 which has had the effect of helping to increase the
amount of patenting activity as well as augmenting patents over early stage
interventions273. 'Certainly IP has a rising significance that hovers around universities.
271 It may also be evidence ofmore commercial awareness and increase in public sector patenting. The
CIPR report. 'Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy', (September 2002),
suggests: 'This increase appears to reflect growth in the intensity of patenting ...rather than a 50%
increase in the number of inventions'.
272 See OECD. 'Patents and Innovation: Trends and Policy Challenges'.
273 Universities are encouraged to form patent links with business and take out early patents that often
form the basis for further research - i.e. research tools. In other words, patents are encroaching further
into the research exemption - one result is the formation of middle companies that promote research
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Scientific colleagues, for example, no longer have research results; they have their
TPRs.'274
As well as the increase in academic patents, patenting over early stage interventions
has been increasing because modern biotechnology27" is a new science which is still in
its relative infancy276. 'The corresponding distinctions between basic or academic
research on the one hand, and applied or commercial research on the other have been
somewhat obscured as a result.'277
One consequence of this is that patents may be granted which cover uses not envisaged
at the time of grant. This can mean that improvements are prevented or hindered due to
licence fees payable down the line to holders of early patents. These patent pyramids
or stacks have become a feature278 ofbiotech patent law and have caused access issues
even in cases where the subsequent use was never envisaged279 by the original patent
holder.
between stages. Danish Council of Ethics, 'Patenting Human Genes and Stem Cells: A report to the
Danish Council ofEthics' 2004, at page 55
274 W Cornish, 'Intellectual Property, Omnipresent, Distracting, Irrelevant' (OUP 2004).
275 As discussed earlier biotechnology developed in stages and has a long history, modem biotechnology
is still envisaging its potential
276 'Patents confer broader protection, especially in new areas. Patent claims in new areas often cover far
more than what the inventor actually discovered or invented', OECD, 'Patents and Innovation: Trends
and Policy Challenges', 18)
27 Herder M. Proliferating Problems with Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research, Journal of Bioethical
Inquiry. Springer (Netherlands), Volume 3, Numbers 1-2/August 2006 pages 69-79
278 See below and also Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 'The ethics of patenting DNA' for a further
discussion, and IPI, 'Patents for Genetic Sequences: The Competitiveness of Current UK Law and
Practice', and OECD. 'Patents and Innovation: Trends and Policy Challenges'.
279 See discussion below and OECD, 'Patents and Innovation: Trends and Policy Challenges', 18: 'Some
of the current patenting practices in new areas may extend protection to a broad range of applications
unknown at the time of patenting (e.g. uses of genes)'.
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Another consequence for patent law that arises out of the increase in academic
patenting is that difficulties occur when deciding what amounts to research, thereby
raising a defence to the infringement of a patent, and what falls outside the research
exemption. There are advantages in this trend such as creating revenue for further
research and universities may adopt a defensive patenting strategy so as to prevent
commercial exploitation. Furthermore not every case throws up an aggressive and
opportunistic patent holder bent on preventing further research. However great
potential for abuse remains so in the absence of some form of check and balance then
the potential for abuse, purposeful or otherwise, will continue and probably increase
which could have the effect of stagnating research and innovation rather than
encouraging it as is intended by the patent system.
In summary the biotech industry is characterised by reliance upon patents, in particular
early stage patents that are required to enable further research, a high potential value in
the event of success and a likelihood of companies having patent banks. However
access to material required for further research is potentially restricted due to the
existence of patents thus increasing the research costs and slowing the process down.
This rather pessimistic picture must however be put into perspective. Although there
are examples of the detrimental effects ofblocking, which are discussed below, there is
also evidence that in many instances the biotech industry has worked around such
problems either through negotiating licence agreements, inventing around patents,
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multiple patenting or pooling arrangements . Research carried out on behalf of the
European Commission282 to study 'potential negative consequences of intensive
intellectual property protection surrounding the human genome...' including
'...inhibitory effects on research innovation and access...' suggests that '...it may be
too soon to expect such negative effects to be apparent'. On the one hand the report
indicated that granted patents were '...primarily on research tools...' and there was
evidence of wide protective patenting which would indicate a potential latent danger
building up. On the other hand there was also the intimation that there would be a
reduction in the numbers of DNA patent applications due to difficulty of finding novel
sequences. The report concluded a number of points:
(1) number ofDNA patent applications declining;
(2) US has considerably more patents and pending applications due to size of their
market, ease of obtaining a patent in the US and lower cost. Concern was
expressed that uncertainty surrounding IP protection in different states may
have a negative effect on European biotech companies looking to secure
investment to expand abroad;283
(3) That there had been a tightening of patent requirements and restriction on
scope of patents;
280 'A large minority of private sector assignees held a significant number of patents to ensure freedom to
operate', PATGEN Project. 'The Patenting of Human DNA: Global Trends in Public and Private
Sector Activity', November 2006, Final Project Report, vii.
281 See above.
282 PATGEN Project.
283 PATGEN Project. 43.
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(4) That the negative impact of DNA patenting may not be as bad as was first
thought.
Thus potential remains for early-stage patents to cause blocking effects but the full
extent of that is not yet tested and this would appear to be the conclusion from other
reports284. The effect is uncertain but a situation where '... every potential inventor is
also a potential infringer...'285 is not a suitable atmosphere for maximising creativity.
Case study three in chapter five contains some examples of how situations can arise
whereby the characteristics described above have led to situations which question
whether patent protection is a suitable medium in its present form to protect early stage
biotechnology inventions. The difficulty is how such situations can be remedied within
patent law but without causing other problems as a result.
(3) (d) (hi) Ethics - Moral dilemmas - The 'Could be
equations'
The issue of the morality of biotechnology is a continuing and controversial one within
patent law. The provisions within European Patent Law for excluding inventions from
patent protection on moral grounds has attracted attention partly because there are few
other methods for opponents286 to debate the ethical merits of inventions and also
because such opposition is a convenient way of opposing the biotech industry. As
284 'This report concludes that IP restrictions rarely impose significant burdens on biomedical research,
but there are reasons to be apprehensive about their future impact on scientific advances in this area.'
('Reaping the Benefits of Genomic and Proteomic Research: Intellectual Property Rights. Innovation,
and Public Health' committee on Intellectual Property Rights in Genomic and Protein Research and
Innovation. National Research Council 2006 ).
285 R MERGES and R. Nelson 'On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope', (1990) 90 Columbia Law
Review, 839.
286 'It is ironic that these ethical questions have not been faced head on. but rather, and then only in an
indirect way. by proxy through the patent system, which has had the misfortune to provide the only
forum in which such objections can be advanced', Cook, 'A User's Guide to Patents' page 341 para.
8.14.
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patents protect and encourage the industry it may be seen by opposition groups, such
as Greenpeace or the Green Party, as an effective tool to promote their cause. A
number of issues arise with morality in patent law which are discussed in detail in
section three below, but these are in brief:
(1) The morality clause was not intended to cater for ethical views that are split nor
is it capable of being used in its present form to properly interpret such
views287.
(2) Moral issues that arise often pit the immorality of not patenting (or the benefit
of patenting, e.g. the potential for a new medical treatment) against the
immorality of patenting (e.g. objections to research of invention). This may be
an important issue but I will argue that288 it is not one for patent authorities to
interpret using the current morality clause.
(3) If it is felt that there is a requirement for moral interpretation within patent law,
a clear explanation must be provided to whoever has to interpret it, as to what
exactly has to be considered to be immoral before a patent is excluded. Another
way of examining the morality question is to enquire at what stages in the
creation and exploitation of inventions does immorality have to occur in order
for a particular invention to be excluded from patentability - because if
research is the pertinent issue then that occurs pre grant and raises very
different issues to those regarding inventions per se. Equally the use of patents
287 See chapter four
288 See chapter four
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to exploit inventions can also raise important and difficult moral issues but one
which are unconnected to specific inventions.
As I have discussed previously in chapter two, just as the patent system can be divided
into different periods where issues of patentability and/or exploitation must be
considered separately, so we have seen that different moral considerations arise at
different periods and must also be treated accordingly. These points will be considered
in the next chapter.
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(4) Chapter Four - Moral Exclusions to Patentability
This chapter considers the application of morality within European Patent Law as a
means to exclude inventions from patent protection. Historically European patent law
has enabled inventions to be excluded from patent protection for moral reasons. The
scope of the exclusions, and thus the potential for removing particular inventions from
the ambit of patent protection has changed gradually over time but has noticeably
altered in scope in recent years because of opposition to biotechnology. Holding patent
law complicit in the perceived wrongs of science causes interaction and conflict
between two different systems of regulation289, raising the question of where the
boundary lies between the two systems.
Much has been said about whether and if so to what extent morality should be a matter
for patent offices and patent law. Traditionally the view is, as expressed by Armitage
and Davies290, is that patent offices are ill-equipped to answer complex moral
questions and would be overburdened with additional administration and delay if such
a role was to burden it. Indeed both Armitage and Davies were involved in the
preparation for the Strasbourg Convention and point out that morality was not part of
the early drafts of the Convention291. On the other hand the advent of biotechnology
has meant that new moral issues are already facing patent law within the rules of the
European Patent Convention and Biotechnology Directive and arguably these must be
289 i.e. between patent law and rules that relate to science
290 Armitage E and Davies I, 'Patents and Morality in PerspectiveCommon Law: Institute of
Intellectual Property, London, 1994
291 Ibid note 281
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faced head. Such a view was advocated by D Beyleveld and Brownsword292 who
argued that the European Convention on Human Rights provides appropriate standards
with which to follow when assessing morality within patent decisions. Morality
standards would be, in this view, rights based rather than a utilitarian equation of
relative benefits. The relative arguments for and against morality expression within
patent law are examined shortly.
The tension between regimes which regulate science and the patent system, which
encourages innovation, has been heightened as a result of the Biotechnology Directive,
the stated aims of which are harmonisation293 and encouragement of biotechnology294
295
through the provision of necessary " incentives of legal protection. However
disharmony has arisen because the Directive expressly expands the extent of the
morality clause through the addition of four categories296 of specific examples of
inventions which are '...in particular.. considered unpatentable' and because
292 See Beyleveld and Brownsword. 'Mice Morality and Patents', London: Common Law institute of
Intellectual Property. 1993. See also Beyleveld D, 'Why Recital 26 of the E.C. Directive on the Legal
Protection of Biotechnological Inventions should be implemented in National Law' [2001] IPQ Nol,
ppl-26
293 Recital (3): 'Whereas effective and harmonised protection throughout the Member States is essential
in order to maintain and encourage investment in the field of biotechnology...'.
294 Recital (1) '...protection of biotechnology will certainly be of fundamental importance for the
Community's industrial development'.
295 Recital (2):, 'Whereas, in particular in the field of genetic engineering, research and development
require a considerable amount of high-risk investment and therefore only adequate legal protection can
make them profitable...'
296 Article 6 (2) Biotechnology Directive - Processes for cloning human beings, processes for modifying
the genu line identity of human beings, uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes,
processes for modifying the genetic identity of animals which are likely to cause them suffering
without any substantial benefit to man or animal and also animals resulting from such processes'.
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subsequent European Patent Office interpretation has come into conflict with the
practices of signatory states.
The position of moral exclusion is complicated within Europe because of the multiple
legal systems and cultural differences that exist there. At the international level each
state is a signatory to the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
(TRIPS), Article 27 (2) of which provides, inter alia, for a minimum standard of patent
protection but allows the option for individual states to refuse patents on moral
grounds. The aim is to allow for specific national objections to be taken into account.
At the European level, the European Patent Convention (EPC) is an international treaty
which has a broader signatory base than the European Union and is subject to
interpretation according to Law of Treaties. The EPC contains a morality clause
preventing the grant of patents if contrary to ordre public or morality and this is
interpreted at the time of grant by the European Patent Office (EPO). The
Biotechnology Directive2 , on the other hand, is a directive of the European
parliament and is interpreted by the European Court of Justice but has been included as
part ofthe EPC.
297 See inter alia: Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation Case T 1374/04; Edinburgh Patent (EP
0695351) (November 2005); O Mills. Biotechnological Inventions: Moral restraints and Patent Law
'(Ashgate 2005) and A Plomer, 'Stem Cell Patents: European Patent Law and Ethics Report', FP6
'Life Sciences, genomics and biotechnology for health'. SSA LSSB-CT-2004-005251.
29!< Directive 98/44 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the Legal Protection
of Biotechnological Inventions ('Biotechnology Directive').
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On a national level, EPC states agree to recognise patents that have been granted by
the EPO299 and the enforcement of patents granted by the EPO remains the
responsibility of each state. Each separate country can also grant patents through its
own national patent office, valid within that specific jurisdiction, and is able to exclude
inventions for moral reasons pertinent to their beliefs. Those reasons may or may not
be in sync with morality as interpreted by the EPO. Clearly there are different national
laws in relation to research, use and exploitation of inventions and these rules may not
necessarily300 be parallel with the interpretations of morality by the EPO or national
patent offices.
The following illustrates that the EPO interpretation of morality is sometimes at odds
with national interpretation and that the EPO's interpretation has become broader in
scope. This expansive interpretation of morality raises a number questions, two of
which will be discussed in this section. What should be the role of the European Patent
Office in relation to morality in patent law and what should the role of morality in
patent law be?
299 Article 2 of the EPC: 'The European patent shall, in each of the Contracting States for which it is
granted, have the effect of and be subject to the same conditions as a national patent granted by that
state...'.
300
Exploitation under tire various morality clauses is not to be deemed immoral merely because it is
illegal.
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(4) (a) The Morality Clause(s)
This section is not concerned with entities that by definition are not inventions such as
discoveries, scientific theories, mathematical methods and so on301 but with those that
are inventions (i.e. they are novel, involve inventive step and have utility or industrial
application) but are not patentable because they are excluded from patentability as a
result ofmoral objections. Many countries' patent systems contain a 'morality clause'
enabling exclusions from patentability for moral reasons and the World Trade
Organisation Agreement of Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS)
permits signatory states to accommodate moral objections.
• 302
It is more accurate to say morality clauses because within European patent law there
are several slightly different versions303. The morality clause contained in Article 6 of
the Biotechnology Directive states as follows:
301 Section 1(2) of the Patents Act 1977 (UK) lists non-inventions.
302 There are slight differences between morality clauses within Europe as follows. Under Art. 53 of the
EPC. European patents should not be granted in respect of:
(a) inventions the PUBLICATION OR EXPLOITATION of which would be contrary to 'ordre public'
or morality, provided that exploitation shall not be deemed so contrary merely because it is prohibited
by law or regulation in some or all of the contracting states
Under Section 1 (3) of the Patents Act (UK): A patent shall not be granted for an invention the
commercial exploitation of which would be contrary to PUBLIC POLICY OR MORALITY; and
Section 1 (4) For the purposes of subsection (3) above the exploitation shall not be regarded as
contrary to public policy or morality only because it is prohibited by any law in force in the United
Kingdom or any part of it.
TRIPS - Members MAY exclude inventions which the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to
protect ordre public or morality, provided that such exclusion is not made merely because the
exploitation is prohibited by domestic law
303 There are continuing moves towards harmonising European Patent Law and the EPC 2000. which
came into force at the end of 2007, brings the wording of EPC 1973 into line with TRIPS and the
Biotechnology Directive by changing the wording "publication and exploitation' to "commercial
exploitation'.
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(1) Inventions shall be considered unpatentable where their commercial
exploitation would be contrary to ordre public or morality, however,
exploitation shall not be deemed so contrary merely because it is prohibited by
law or regulation.
(2) On the basis of paragraph 1, the following in particular, shall be considered
unpatentable:
(a) processes for cloning human beings
(b) processes for modifying the germ line identity of human beings
(c) uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes
(d) processes for modifying the genetic identity of animals which are likely
to cause them suffering without any substantial benefit to man or
animal and also animals resulting from such processes.
It is worth noting that Article 6 (2) (a)-(b) are a non-exhaustive list of exclusions, and
two further examples were added to the recitals of the directive; processes to produce
chimeras from germs cells or totipotent cells of humans and animals304.
Interpretation ofmorality within European Patent Law is made more difficult because
of European institutional complexity which allows for a variety of conflicting sources
at the same time. Inventors can apply for a patent either through national patent offices
or through the European Patent Office. The European Patent Convention is an
international treaty that includes signatory states which are not European Members,
304 The legal position of recitals within the Biotechnology Directive has been analysed at length in
Beyleveld D. 'Why Recital 26 of the E.C. Directive on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological
Inventions should be implemented in National Law' [2001] IPQ Nol. ppl-26 and is discussed below
at pages 208 - 209
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whilst the Biotechnology Directive is a European Commission Directive. The
European Parliament has adopted a resolution305 attempting to restrict the EPO in
interpretation of morality relating to the patentability of human embryonic stem cells.
There are thus two frameworks306 in which the interpretation of morality can take
place within Europe, the European Union and the European Patent Convention307.
In the case ofKingdom of the Netherlands v European Parliament and Council of the
European Union30*, the ECJ stated that the provision in Article 6 of the Directive
'...allows the administrative authorities and courts of member states a wide scope for
manoeuvre in applying this exclusion.'309 The discretion however is limited by the
proviso that '... commercial exploitation is not to be deemed to be contrary to ordre
public or morality merely because it is prohibited by law or regulation...' and because
of the four examples of processes which are not patentable. Although described as a
305 P6 TA (2005) 0407 European Parliament Resolution on Biotechnological Inventions, although
supporting biotechnology and stem-cell research, rejected research on human embryos which resulted
in the destruction of embryos (resolution point 3) and to limit patents on DNA to 'purpose bound
protection' (resolution point 4). The resolution (points 11 and 12) calls on the Commission to file a
notice of opposition under Article 99 (1) of the European Patent Convention, to EP 1257168. This
patent was awarded to XY Inc. of Colorado in February 2005, and relates to a 'Method of
cryopreserving selected sperm cells'. The Commission opposed the patent on the grounds that the
patent covered 'non-patentable human germ cells'.
306
Attempts are ongoing to harmonise patent law throughout Europe and the London Agreement relating
to languages and EPC 2000 are evidence of progress. The experts attending the EPO Conference on
Patenting Biotechnology, in Brussels in November 2007, felt that harmonisation had not been
achieved as intended by the Biotechnology Directive. See Patenting biotechnology inventions: Little
harmony in Europe' available from < www.et3O.org/topics/news/2007/20071121.html > for more
information.




'...general guide...'310 by Recital 38 of the Directive, the exclusions amount to a
patentability test in their own right. Courts are required to assess whether an invention
is invalid under each exclusion311 and if not then the general morality test is to be
considered312.
The Patents Act (UK), as amended by Regulation l(3)(a) of the Patents Regulations
2000 in response to the Biotechnology Directive, contains the following morality
clause with slightly different wording, replacing 'ordrepublic' with 'public policy'313:
Section 1 (3) A patent shall not be granted for an invention the commercial
exploitation ofwhich would be contrary to public policy or morality:
Section 1 (4) For The purposes of subsection (3) above the exploitation shall
not be regarded as contrary to public policy or morality only because it is
prohibited by any law in force in the United Kingdom or any part of it.
Three relevant questions arise from the issue of morality in European Patent Law for
discussion here. How should morality be interpreted? How should diverging moral
views be accommodated within Europe? In what way can the impact of moral issues in
patent law upon regulatory systems be addressed? Much depends upon the purpose of
310 The four specific examples are described in Recital 38 of the Directive as providing '...national
courts and patent offices with a general guide to interpreting the reference to ordre public and
morality...'.
311 Whether this amounts to a two-stage test or a one-stage test with two questions is irrelevant (Case
Number T 0315/03).
312 HARVARD/TransgenicAnimals, Case Number T 0315/03 - 3.3.8.
313 There is no equivalent wording for ordre public in United Kingdom law.
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morality provisions and whether they are to be interpreted broadly or narrowly; the
wider the interpretation the greater the impact upon other systems and the greater the
conflict between EPO and national interpretations. Clearly it would be of benefit to
find greater reconciliation but is it possible, on the one hand, to have a central
determination ofmorality whilst on the other to have a system that encourages national
moral choices?
(4) (b) Historical Perspective
The relationship between law and morality has provided much philosophical
discussion314 that is beyond the scope of this work, but there are few examples where
morality is expressly incorporated into the legal decision process315. 'Morality is an old
legal concept [and is] ...one of the fundamentals of our legal system and at the same
time forms the basis for the inclusion of extra-legal principles of ethics in the law'316.
The choice between providing one person with rights of exploitation over an invention
to the exclusion of others, or refusing their application, involves a moral balance but
the addition of a specific morality clause has not been employed to address the unique
monopoly situation that a patent provides. Instead morality has been adopted to
314 For example: Natural Law theory which proposes that if the law is not morally correct then it is not
law. legal positivism where morality enters the legal arena if the law expressly states so. and moral
utility where morality is implicit when interpreting the law. For a further discussion, see R
Brownsword. 'The Ethics ofPatenting: A Legal Perspective', Sheffield University, Bioethics Today, 7
October 2003.
315 The TRIPS Agreement provided that such exclusion is not made merely because the exploitation is
prohibited by domestic law. Article 27 (2) of TRIPS pennits a state to include a morality provision but
does not make it compulsory. The United States is one country that has not included a morality clause
within its patent law. Although the United States patent rules make no provision for exclusion on
morality grounds, courts have interpreted the Utility requirement to enable exclusion of some
inventions that were morally controversial on the grounds that they were not useful. However the
Supreme Court in the case of Diamond v Chakrabarty in 1980 amended this "moral utility doctrine'
and declared that anything under the sun is patentable as long as it is 'made by man'.
316MICHIGANSTATE UNIVERSITY/Euthanasia Compositions [2005] T 0866/01, paragraph 6.12
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question inventions per se, which has created tensions between patent law and other
regulatory systems.
The origins of morality in patent law give no hint of the functions that are being
created for it at present. An exception for patents on the basis of morality has long
been a part of European Patent Law but its original conception is quite different from
the position today. Certainly it never played a major role within the patent decision
process and was originally aimed at publication of patent claims which may be
obscene or contain instructions to make articles that could be used against public order.
The narrow role within Europe:
...was to recognise two legitimate government concerns. One was that
governments should not have to publish obscene documents, and the other
was that they should not have to publish instructions on how to perform acts
leading to a breach of the peace or breakdown ofmorals.317
In the UK exclusions from patentability for reasons of morality originated in The
Statute of Monopolies (inventions must not be '... contrary to law or mischievous to
the State'318) and the 1883 Patents and Designs Act provided the Comptroller-General
with the ability to refuse a patent if its use would be '...contrary to law or morality'.
Two cases319 arose under this power, both relating to the patenting of improved
contraceptive devices and in both cases the patents were disallowed not because their
3,7 Mills. 'Biotechnological Inventions'.
31 s Section 6 of the Statute ofMonopolies.
319 In the Matter ofan Application for a Patent byA and II (1927) 44 RPC 298 and In the matter ofan
application for a patent by Rufus Riddlesbarger (1935) 53 RPC 57
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use would be contrary to public policy or morality (under the above power) but
because publication could be prevented by royal prerogative320.
Interestingly, morality was later differentiated from law so illegality of an invention is
not of itself sufficient to cause it to fall foul of the morality clause. Illegality may be a
factor to consider but an invention must not be declared immoral '... merely because it
is prohibited by law or regulation in some or all of the contracting states.'321 It would
seem absurd that '... one law may grant patents that serve as a reward to persons for
providing the means of violating any other law'322, but that is possible under current
patent law.
This qualification makes clear that the assessment of whether or not a
particular subject-matter is to be considered contrary to either 'ordre public'
or morality is not dependant upon any national laws or regulations.
Conversely and by the same token, the board is of the opinion that a
particular subject-matter shall not automatically be regarded as complying
with the requirements of Article 53 (a) EPC merely because its exploitation
is permitted in some or all of the contracting states.323
The reasons for accepting the possibility of illegal inventions were outlined by the
Advocate General thus:
320 As was enabled under section 102 of the Patents Act 1949. A more detailed historical analysis can be
found in Mills. 'Biotechnological Inventions'.
321 Article 53 (a) EPC.
322 S. Thambisetty. 'Understanding Morality as a ground for exclusion from Patentability under
European Patent Law' (2002) 12 Eubios Journal of Asian and International Bioethics, 48-53.
323 PLANT GENETIC SYSTEMS/Glutamine Synthetase Inhibitors [1995] EPOR 4. at paragraph 7.
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.. that the reason for that provision is that restrictions or limitations may be
temporary in nature so that the patent will acquire value once they have
been removed. Moreover the patented invention so restricted may be the
basis for further patents which do not fall within the restrictions: there is in
that case no reason to deprive the holder of the first patent of licence-fees
etc to which the link between the two inventions might entitle him.324
The Advocate General used the example of genetically modified organisms to indicate
that a further reason for the distinction between morality and illegality is that a
manufacturer may wish to make the prohibited invention in a country which prohibits
its exploitation but not its manufacture for export to a country where the exploitation is
acceptable. Interestingly this distinguishes law regarding the physical invention and the
law that governs patents. It also highlights different legal attitudes towards inventions
per se and their exploitation. The separation of patents from the inventions they protect
is emphasised by Article 14 of the Biotechnology Directive which reiterates that it is
for '...national, European or International law...' to regulate '...the monitoring of
research or the use or commercialisation of its results'.
European governments had been under commercial pressure325 to standardise patent
law for the sake of consistency and this led to the Strasbourg Convention 1963 which
formed the basis of the European Patent Convention of 1973. The question of morality
324
Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, 'Kingdom ofNetherlands' case, 14 June 2001.
325 See Mills. 'Biotechnological Inventions', for a detailed discussion of the background to the
development ofEuropean Patent Law.
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barely featured in the discussions leading up to the Strasbourg Convention326 but was
added to reflect views of individual states regarding obscene documents and to prevent
the publication of instructions relating to acts that were morally offensive. The
European Patent Convention discussions '...recognised that there was no European
definition of morality and unanimously agreed that interpretation of the concept of
morality should be a matter for European institutions'327 The Nuffield Council on
Bioethics described the status of the morality clause prior to the growth in the
biotechnology industry as follows:
In June 1978, when the Patents Act 1977 came into force, biotechnology
was in its infancy. Thus the 'immoral' inventions which the legislation
contemplated at that time included such things as instruments of torture and
letter bombs - which were so clearly immoral as to require little detailed
consideration of the meaning of the exclusion.328
The increased exercise of the morality clause in European Patent law has arisen from
two different sources. First there is wider public awareness of science and methods of
economic protection. This fuels groups such as the Green Party or Greenpeace to
campaign against forms of progress that they feel are objectionable or immoral.
Secondly technology has taken great leaps forward with enormous potential
326 '...the morality provision did not feature in the early drafts of the Convention', Mills,
'Biotechnological Inventions', 26.
32 Mills, 'Biotechnological Inventions', 32. See also Ladas S P. 'Patents Trademarks and Related
Rights, National and International protection, Har\'ard University press' (1990). pp. 1685 - 1686,
Morality "... reflects customs and habits anchored in the spirit of a particular community."
328 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 'Human Tissue: Ethical and Legal Issues'. 1 April 1995. chapter 11
paragraph 11.16 page 89.
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accompanied by possible latent dangers. To a certain extent the fear of the unknown
can be misinterpreted as immorality, but '... very often fear of the unknown is couched
in moral terms...'329. There are also clear moral concerns regarding biotechnology of
such a significant nature to bring governments into the patent debate through
opposition procedures and the European Court of Justice330.
Nevertheless, historically the morality clause had a narrow interpretation and role.
'From the historical documentation relating to the EPC it appears that the view was
that 'the concept of patentability in the European patent law must be as wide as
possible'331. Accordingly the exceptions to patentability were narrowly construed:
'...In the Board's view, this approach applies equally in respect of the provisions of
Article 53 (a) EPC.'332' Conversely and as the discussion below indicates case law of
the European Patent Office including the Edinburgh Patent and the pending appeal
WARE cases as well as the comments from the former President of the European
Patent Office Alain Pompadour the morality clause is to be used to question events
which have occurred prior to patent application such as research leading to the
invention and thus also question the wider industry rather than just the specific
invention.
The lack of case law until the advent of biotechnology inventions would support this.
This absence of judicial interpretation though could be '...explained by the very
329
Thambisetty. 'Understanding Morality as a Ground for Exclusion'.
330 Relevant examples include: Kingdom of the Netherlands case; Wisconsin Alumni Research
Foundation case; Edinburgh Patent (EP 0695351) and notice of opposition under Article 99 (1) of the
European Patent Convention to EP 1257168.
331
(see document IV/2071/61-E. page 5. point 2. first paragraph)
332 PLANTGENETICSYSTEMS/Glutamine Synthetase Inhibitors [ 1995 ] EPOR 4.
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existence of an express statutory prohibition. This may mean that inventions likely to
be hit by it were not presented as deserving of patent protection in the first place...' 33.
It is more likely that the increase of public awareness coupled with the contentious
nature of biotechnology and mixed with fear of the unknown and/or misunderstanding
of the technology has given rise to the increase in use of the morality clause. Thus
although morality has been a part of patent law for many years it was never designed
for nor was it originally intended that it should be used as a vehicle through which it
should interpret complex moral questions regarding biotechnology. That does not
mean that it is not capable of being introduced to cope with a broader role, only that
such a role was not envisaged. Before considering how the role has been interpreted
and extended it is of interest to examine the arguments for and against the use of a
morality clause in patent law, in part because the arguments expose the strengths and
weaknesses of a morality clause as an instrument of regulation.
333 Thambisetty, 'Understanding Morality as a Ground for Exclusion".
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(4) (c) Should Patent Law account specifically for moral concerns?
The following are some of the major arguments for and against the inclusion of
morality within patent grant procedure. Two general comments are pertinent to make
before this analysis starts. First, arguments relating to the suitability ofmorality within
patent law are usually presented simply as for and against, rather than exploring how
morality should be expressed within patent law or whether the criticisms against the
inclusion of a morality clause can be answered through changes in interpretation of
morality rather than by ignoring morality altogether. Secondly, as the cases below
indicate, there is ambiguity surrounding the objective of the morality clause and what
should be immoral in order to achieve that aim. This work takes the view that there are
justifications for retaining morality within patent law but that there should be changes
to the way and method in which it is interpreted at present. In some respects morality is
too narrow and in others too broad. Further the morality clause does not take into
account, and therefore does not make use of, the time frame within which innovation
occurs.
There are three main categories in which arguments have been presented for and
against patent morality; the efficacy of using morality within patent law, the symbolic
nature of the patent grant and the difficulty in defining what is morality.
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(4) (c) (i) Purpose and effect of patent grants
Attempts to prohibit inventive behaviour by prohibiting patents are unlikely to be
effective. Patents provide patentees with the power to prevent others from making
selling and distributing patented inventions and do not grant rights to manufacture,
research, distribute or use inventions which could be prohibited by law334. The refusal
of a patent cannot stop particular activities and so if society is opposed to something
then it should be made illegal and not attacked indirectly through the patent system
which is '...is not the appropriate vehicle for regulating the use of particular
335
technologies on ethical grounds' .
On the other hand patents clearly provide incentives and rewards, so grants of patents
must be complicit in the immorality of each invention in the sense that we could say it
is wrong to create incentives for activities that may be considered immoral even if they
are not illegal or controlled by legislation.
These points illustrate a recurring problem within morality interpretation for patent
authorities and those who seek to question innovation for moral reasons; what is it that
the morality clause is intended to do and what should be immoral in order to achieve
334 This point is made in the Biotechnology Directive in Recital 14 which states: 'Whereas a patent for
invention does not authorise tire holder to implement that invention, but entitles him to prohibit third
parties from exploiting it for industrial and commercial purposes, whereas, consequently substantive
patent law cannot serve to replace or render superfluous national. European or international law which
may impose restrictions or prohibitions or which concern the monitoring of research...'. See also
Kingdom of the Netherlands case: 'The conditions of exploitation or use of patented inventions are. as
discussed above, outside the scope of patent legislation, falling to be controlled by other means'
(paragraph 214).
335 House ofRepresentatives Standing Committee on Industry. Science and Technology Report, "Genetic
Manipulation: The Threat or the Glory', February 1992, paragraph 7.99.
143
that aim? The assumption behind these arguments is that morality is aimed at immoral
inventions and the object is to prevent or hinder proliferation of such innovation.
Clearly patent law is a weak instrument to achieve that. The European Patent Office336
has had difficulty with this point. It is true that the morality clause specifically links
morality with 'exploitation' but is that because the exploitation is immoral or because
the invention itself is immoral and therefore so is exploitation? Whether or not a patent
is granted does not necessarily affect exploitation, as we have seen, so the charge of
inefficacy can arise. Thus the validity of the efficacy argument depends upon the
ultimate aim of exclusion and when that is felt within the innovation time line.
(4) (C) (II) SYMBOLISM
The provision of a patent over a particular invention can be interpreted as being a
badge denoting general approval for wider technology relating to the invention337. The
patent office is a government body and given that a patent can be used to attract
finance its symbol is important and raises possible concerns in that it equates
inventions per se with the monopoly given by a patent. Patent law clearly
distinguishes338 inventions from patent monopoly so general regulation should address
issues relating to the former. By the time that inventors patent their inventions the
relevant research will most likely have been completed and the inventions created so it
will be too late to make attempts to halt them by using the patent system: 'The genie
336 See the case studies in chapter five relating to The Edinburgh Patent and IVARF patents regarding die
patentability of stem cells.
337 "...the symbolism in the grant of a patent is not an insignificant one..." Thambisetty S,
'Understanding Morality as a ground for exclusion from patentability1 under European Patent Law'
(2002) 12 Eubios Journal of Asian and International Bioethics 48.
338 Article 14 of the Biotechnology Directive, see also above.
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cannot be put back in the bottle'339. Yet patents because they are granted by a
government organisation, can be seen as a form of government approval even though
the grant of a patent does not authorise the holder to implement that
invention...'340
The validity of the argument against a specific moral exclusion within patent law based
upon patent grant amounting to a symbol of approval depends upon the regulatory
position relating to the area of technology in question, within national law; i.e. whether
that is prohibitive, permissive or silent. Within Europe there are varying degrees of
what is acceptable to research, develop and exploit and therefore the reasonableness of
refusing patents based upon such arguments will meet with varying degrees of success.
Regulation does not have to be black and white i.e. prohibiting or encouraging; there
are other forms of regulation that can be effective. For example a particular line of
science may be tolerated but not encouraged by being excluded from patentability.
Thus it may be true to say that using exclusion from patentability for moral reasons as
a method of objecting to particular activities is limited in scope but that does not mean
that it should be ignored altogether. The possible scope of the interaction of patent
laws with regulation is discussed below but the limits of the interaction should also be
appreciated. The only influence patent law has is to remove incentive (which applies
not to the applicant but to other inventors and potential patentees) and deprive the
applicant of reward. The effects of refusal of patent grants are thus felt in different
areas of the innovation time line: disincentive for others at innovation stage and no
339 Laurie, 'Genetic Privacy307.
340 Recital 14 Biotechnology Directive
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monopoly for the applicant in exploitation stage. Another result of patent refusal is that
material that would otherwise be subject to the grant of a patent is available for open
research, which for many is the real reason for opposing patent grants - that is, it might
result in more research not less.
(4) (c) (hi) Moral Purpose
(4) (c) (iii) (a) changing views
Every societies views change through time341 sometimes very quickly, so that which is
accepted as abhorrent now may not be deemed to be so a few years hence. The change
of attitude towards patents for contraception342 is one example of this, so it is not
considered to be either helpful or constructive to refuse patents on moral grounds,
because applicants could be prejudiced in later years as moral perceptions change.
Historical attitudes to advances in science have impacted upon earlier law and there
may be examples of this again, but patent law is not designed to address changes in
legal issues that relate to sensitive moral questions and its independence should be
defended. On the other hand law should reflect as best as possible morality at a given
341 The Reports from The European Commission's Directorate-General for Research - the latest one
being, 'Eurobarometer 64.3 Europeans and Biotechnology in 2006: Patterns and Trends', May 2006 -
provide an insight into the changing views among Europeans regarding biotechnology and the
variances within Europe.
342 'To show how standards of "morality' change a similar principle was implied by common law in the
UK and was once the basis for rejecting patents for contraceptives', Cook, VI User's Guide to
Patents', Page 340 para. 8.14. The reasons for refusal however related not to opposition to
contraception per se but because of concern about possible side effects such as insanity, tuberculosis
and diabetes, to name a few. See also Riddlesbarger's Application (1936) 53 RPC 57 and A Wells,
'Patenting New Life Forms: An Ecological Perspective' [1994] 3 EIPR 111 at 113.
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time and, as has happened in the past, the law has been changed to reflect moral
attitudes.
(4) (C) (III) (B) DIFFERING EUROPEAN MORALS
Views about what is acceptable and what is not vary across Europe. This may be an
obvious comment and it relates to a complication that European legislation has had to
deal with for many years. However diverging views on controversial innovation cause
unnecessary complications and uncertainty in patent applications within Europe.
Decisions taken on morality of patent applications within the European Patent Office
will naturally be based upon the interpretation by the examiners, at the time creating a
Europe-wide imposition ofwhat is morally patentable but one that does not necessarily
reflect a Europe-wide consensus. The different views of what is acceptable across
Europe are shown by the European Commission on Patterns and Trends and it is
accepted by Recital 39 of the Biotechnology Directive that the morality clause in the
Biotechnology Directive is intended to provide for these diverse views343. It '...is
therefore inevitable that article 6 will be interpreted and applied divergently.'344 Here
lies the problem; there cannot realistically be, on the one hand a Directive reflecting
divergence of views when at the same time the European Patent Office can dictate
what the views should be. It is accepted that enforcement occurs at national level so
interpretation can eventually be determined within the national arena but that still
leaves two problems. First, when a patent is granted by the EPO it is valid in all
343 Recital 39 of Directive 98/44: 'Whereas ordre public and morality correspond to a particular ethical
or moral principle recognised in a member state, respect for which is particularly important in the field
of biotechnology in view of the potential scope of inventions in this field and their inherent
relationship to living matter whereas such ethical or moral principles supplement the standard legal
examinations under patent law regardless of the technical field of the invention.'
341
Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs. Kingdom ofthe Netherlands case, 14 June 2001, paragraph 94.
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applicable countries, so if there are valid national objections they are not reflected in
the initial grant. Secondly if the EPO refuses a patent for moral reasons then that
decision also applies throughout applicable countries regardless of whether the
invention is considered immoral within each one. Those countries that wish to push
ahead with research considered immoral in other countries are thus held back.
Research companies that would otherwise base themselves within Europe may be
discouraged from doing so on the basis of the uncertainty that this situation creates.
The problem arises through applying morality at the time of grant through the EPO,
giving a blanket moral policy that may not reflect the morality of individual states.
Separate applications could be made within individual countries. One of the aims of
the European Patent Convention and the Biotechnology Directive was to simplify the
patent application process so encouraging patentees to go the national patent office
route is self-defeating. Tension between moral positions of each country can only be
addressed (in absence of ignoring moral views altogether in patent law) through
adoption of a mechanism or facility that enables cultural differences to be taken into
account at the time of grant of patent or through the life of each patent. Such a
mechanism will be considered in due course but difficulties are posed by any option
and a perfect answer to reflecting moral concerns within patent law is unlikely to exist.
Ignoring morality altogether also disregards the fact that the grant of patents carries
moral consequences at each stage of innovation. Trying to address these at the time of
grant through the European Patent Office raises the conflict, discussed above, between
moral attitudes and leaving moral questions until after grant leaves open the
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symbolism of patent grant to be taken as acceptance of the practice of the science
within the patent in particular within countries which are regulatory silent345 but
morally against the practice in question. Despite this shortcoming there is much to be
said for the flexibility that such a route presents and this will be discussed in due
course.
(4) (C) (III) (C) MORALITY IS INDEFINABLE
Another argument that provides support to the view that the patent system should
avoid moral judgements is the difficulty of assessing moral standards. There are many
different standards and opinion. Patent offices are already overstretched because of the
volume of new research and they are ill-equipped and inappropriate to deal with
contentious ethical issues. Given the views of patent examiners, expressed in an open
letter dated 13 April 2007, any further increase in complexity it not likely to be
welcome:
Consequently, we, the undersigned representatives of patent examiners, join
together in declaring that the combined pressures of higher productivity
demands, increasingly complex patent applications and an ever expanding
body of relevant patent and non-patent literature have reached such a level that,
unless serious measures are taken, meaningful protection of intellectual
property throughout the world may, itself, become history.346
345 I.e. where a country has strong moral views against particular research or innovation but has not
regulated against it. See further discussion below in Chapter five
346
"Open letter from a coalition of Patent Examiner Representatives' including USA. Germany, Canada.
EPO and Austria, dated 13 April 2007 to Directors of USPTO. EPO. and the German. Canadian and
Austrian patent offices.
149
It has been said that patent offices need only to recruit more examiners in order to deal
with difficult moral problems: 'If patent examiners lack moral expertise, they should
be replaced by persons who have it...'.347 But given what the examiners have said
above this makes little sense, indeed it is arguably unjustifiable to employ staff to
assess ethical issues with the additional cost in time and finance necessary especially
as most relevant cases should be regulated by law. It is suggested that attempting to
predict whether commercial exploitation of an invention is going to be immoral or not
involves a certain amount of supposition at the time of grant. This implies that the
current morality clause is deficient in that it is interpreted in absence of pertinent facts.
(4) (C) (III) (D) MORALITY AND ECONOMIC DISADVANTAGE
Arguments against moral interference in patent decisions can348 also be based upon
disincentive caused if patents are unavailable so tempting inventors into jurisdictions
which are more encouraging. Patents are tools to encourage economic investment and
we have seen that they have important roles to play in the way in which the biotech
industry develops. Refusals of patents for inventions on moral grounds could place any
authority at an economic disadvantage as compared to other countries not constrained
by such issues.
347 Beylcveld. Brownsword and Llewelyn. The Morality Clauses of the Directive on the Legal
Protection of Biotechnological Inventions', 157.
348 See Thambisetty 'Understanding Morality as a Ground for Exclusion' and Beyleveld, Brownsword
and Llewelyn 'The Morality Clauses of the Directive on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological
Inventions'
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On the other hand economic factors should not presumptively eclipse moral views or
positions. It will be suggested that the relative strength of such arguments depends
upon how morality is expressed within the patent system and the ethical rules of
science in general and that we should strive for consistency between what is permitted
and what is promoted.
(4) (C) (III) (E) UTILITARIAN APPROACH TO MORALITY
The grant of a patent involves moral issues. It is in the nature of patents that they
favour some parties over others, so choices involve at least issues of fairness and thus
morals are never far away from all patent processes. There may be moral arguments
that support the grant of patents as well as those that suggest patents should not be
granted; for example, supporting development of life enhancing treatments could
outweigh the moral difficulties of allowing a perceived offensive patent. In the
'Oncomouse' case, for example, the applicants argued that the benefits of the
invention, in the form of research for treatment for cancer, outweighed the animals'
suffering349. In any event they suggested that although mice, the subject of the
invention, suffered, there would be fewer mice required for the purposes of other
research as a result350. The balance is arguably unfair in that the invention used as
outlined in the patent claims will cause harm to animals but it may only lead to the
opportunity for a cure for some forms of cancer.
349 HARVARD/ONCO-mouse v 0006/92 03 April 1992 page 3
350 ibid page 3
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(4) (d) European Patent Morality
Given the weaknesses and strengths of the arguments for and against a morality clause
in patent law it can be seen that a morality clause can be beneficial, but this depends
upon its purpose and upon the effects of exclusion of particular inventions. Arguing
that inventions should be refused patent protection because of objection to specific
characteristics of inventions may be an ineffective method of addressing those
concerns. On the other hand if objections are raised against the granting of monopoly
rights to particular inventions, then refusal of patent grant will be effective as against
the objection in question. Proponents of open source material would argue that the real
moral issue for patent law is that patents restrict innovation both through blocking of
research and restricting availability of inventions. In the realm of health care351 there
352
are strong arguments to support" a more open environment. The changes in wording
of the moral provisions in Europe towards linking morality with 'commercial
exploitation' of inventions would suggest that morality of how inventions are exploited
is the central issue. This has not been how commercial exploitation has been
interpreted and economic effects of patent grants are not considered to be a matter for
the EPO353. It is suggested that such a focus may make the above criticisms more
difficult to justify. In order to obtain such focus it is suggested here that the important
targets are the direct consequences of patent grant.
351 The restrictions on patents on medical treatments have been justified on the basis that patent grant
should not hinder treatment but this exception has narrowed over time.
352 The discussion in chapter five below outlines these and provides working examples where patents
have been used as methods of encouraging openness.
353 NOVARTIS/Transgenic Plant Gl/98 [2000] EPOR 303; [2000] 3 OJEPO 111, and see below
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The expansion of patentable subject matter (in effect the granting of patents over
biotechnological inventions) has also extended the basis for excluding inventions from
patentability for moral reasons. This development ofmoral provisions has occurred on
several levels. First it relates to the subject matter, biotechnological inventions, which
continue to challenge patent mechanisms. Historically the purpose of the moral
provisions was to exclude inventions whose sole purpose was immoral. This is
intrinsically different from recent cases which concern inventions that are beneficial
but may also have an immoral consequence. The second is in respect of the timing of
objections or period in which they arise whether that is pre-grant or post-grant, for
example. Third, moral provisions are gradually being utilised for wider purposes such
as influencing research.
The reasons for the expansion are understandable but perhaps some objections are
misdirected so there are arguments that the basis for expansion has been motivated by
attempts to regulate particular aspects of the biotechnology industry rather than for
reasons connected to the grant of a patent.
It is clear that the EU Biotechnology Directive wants to take action in view
of 'ordre public' and morality. It is not clear, however what exactly is
envisaged in article 6. Should only inventions of which the commercial
exploitation (= commercialisation? = application) is considered. Or should
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inventions which are believed to be contrary to 'ordre public' and morality
be denied patent protection?354
These different views of whether the grant of a patent involves a moral issue or not
may have arisen in part because there has not as yet been a decisive parameter placed
around that moral question nor what it should be focused upon. Part of the difficulty in
assessing moral questions within patent law is that they arise within different periods
of innovation and relate to widely diverse areas and this thesis suggest that ifmorality
is to play a role within patent law then patent law must reflect this situation through
taking account of when moral issues arise and the effect of addressing them through
patent law.
(4) (d) (i) Commercial Exploitation and publication of
Invention
The moral provisions within Article 6 (1) of the Biotechnology directive, Article 53 of
the European Patent Convention, the UK Patent Act 1977 and TRIPS all relate
exclusion from patentability for moral reasons to 'commercial exploitation'355 of
inventions. Commercial exploitation is therefore the key issue in determination of
ordre public and morality and case law confirms this.
354
European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies, 'Study on the patenting of inventions
related to human stem cell research'. Report to the European Commission (Office for Official
Publications of the European Communities, 2002), 71.
355 The EPC 1973 referred to: 'inventions the publication or exploitation of which would be contrary to
ordre public or morality'.
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For example in the case ofHARVARD/ONCO-mouse356, sixteen different groups filed
opposition proceedings against the patenting of a 'method for producing a transgenic
eucaryotic animal having an increased probability of developing neoplasms'. The
evidence was clear that the genetically engineered rodent would be of benefit to
research and that fewer animals would be required for research purposes as a result.
The initial decision357 in the Examining Division of the EPO refused to grant the patent
application but on appeal to the Technical Board of Appeal the matter was referred
back to the Examining Division and the patent subsequently granted.
Among the questions for consideration was the interpretation of Article 53 (a) of the
European Patent Convention which states: 'European patents shall not be granted in
respect of: (a) inventions the publication or exploitation ofwhich would be contrary to
'ordre public' or morality...'. In the board's opinion it was '...only possible to read the
words 'contrary to ordre public or morality' as qualifying 'publication or exploitation'.
Accordingly, the Article raises no question of the morality of patenting a particular
358
invention or of the morality of that invention' " .
Equating exploitation with morality was the interpretation of Article 53 of the EPC by
the Technical Board of Appeal in MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY/Euthanasia
compositions359 which refers to 'publication or exploitation' 360 rather than
356 T 0315/03 Decision 6 July 2004; [1991] EPOR 525.
357
[1990] EPOR 4.
358 T 0315/03 para. 4.2.
359 MICHIGAN STATE UNIlTiRSlTY/Euthanasia compositions T 0866/01 3.3.02 decision of the
Technical Board of Appeal. 11 May 2005.
360 The EPC 1973 has been amended by EPC 2000 to include, inter alia, a different reference for
morality so as to bring it into line with TRIPS, thus the new EPC morality clause will refer also to
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'commercial exploitation': 'It is, in the Board's opinion, only possible to read the
words 'contrary to ordre public or morality' in Article 53 (a) EPC as qualifying the
objective facts, namely 'publication or exploitation' of the invention.'361
The text of Article 53 (a) of the European Patent Convention 1973 prevents patents in
the event that the '... publication or exploitation ... is likely to be contrary to ordre
public or morality...'One of the original purposes of the moral provisions was to
prevent patents publicising obscene material or material that may give rise to public
order offences.
The term 'commercial exploitation' is pertinent to the aims and purpose of the patent
system and relevant to the monopoly power that a patent provides. But enquiries into
the economic repercussions are not part of the remit of the European Patent Office.
According to the Enlarged Board of Appeal in the case of the NOVARTIS II patent
grant:362
The EPO has not been vested with the task of taking into account the
economic effects of the grant of patents in specific areas of technology and
of restricting the field of patentable subject matter accordingly... ,363
commercial exploitation rather than publication or exploitation. The EPC 2000 will enter into force
on 13 December 2007 at the latest.
361 MICHIGAN STA TE UNHERSITY/Euthanasia compositions.
362 NOVARTIS/Transgenic Plant Gl/98 [2000] EPOR 303; See also Guidelines for Examination in the
European Patent Office December 2007, 4.4 Economic effects. The EPO has not been vested with the
task of taking into account the economic effects of the grant of patents in specific areas of technology
and of restricting the field of patentable subject-matter accordingly (see G 1/98, OJ 3/2000, 111,
reasons 3.9). The standard to apply for an exception under Art. 53(a) is whether the commercial
exploitation of the invention is contrary to "ordre public" or morality.
36312000] EPOR 303 page 318 note 3.9.
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Although the positions adopted in society on genetic engineering are
controversial... there is no consensus in the Contracting States condemning
genetic engineering in the development of plants under the above criteria.364
The lack of European consensus is critical in the interpretation of morality. A
European consensus clearly exists against the typical examples of immoral inventions
such as letter bombs and anti-personnel mines but in relation to the particular areas of
biotechnology discussed above no such consensus exists. This illustrates that a
consensus exists that particular inventions should not be patentable but exclusion of
particular inventions from patentability is only one moral issue at stake; how they are
exploited, for example, is another.
(4) (d) (ii) Use of invention
An invention may have several uses, some of which could be moral whilst other uses
may be immoral. The Advocate General in the Kingdom of the Netherlands case365
used the example of a complex copying machine that could be adapted to produce
counterfeit bank notes which would be contrary to ordre public or morality. Use of the
copier for other printing purposes would not be immoral. Patent law cannot distinguish
between, immoral use and use that does not offend. Separate legislation may outlaw
the former but patent law can only grant or refuse a patent.
361 Ibid. 318 note 3.9.
365 Case C - 377/98 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs. Kingdom of Netherlands V European
Parliament and Council ofthe European Union
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(4) (d) (hi) Invention
On a narrow reading of Article 6 (2), the word 'commercialisation' would suggest that
inventions per se are not the intended target of the morality clauses, but there is
sufficient indication elsewhere that could impute a broader interpretation. Article 6 (2)
of the Biotechnology Directive includes a list of inventions which, '... in particular
shall be considered unpatentable...' and Recital 38, to which Article 6 relates, speaks
of an '... illustrative list of inventions excluded from patentability...'. This implies that
in order to interpret Article 6 (1) one must look to the invention and not the
commercialisation of the invention. The Article 6 (2) exceptions are not exhaustive and
several other examples of excluded inventions are provided within Recital 38. A
further issue relates to what form of invention is to be covered by the specific
exclusions within Article 6 (2). The reading itself refers to processes but does not
include the products. Is it to be taken by the absence of reference to products that they
are not excluded? Unfortunately there does not appear to be any satisfactory answer to
these questions and rather than making the interpretation of morality easier the specific
examples have had the opposite effect.
(4) (d) (iv) Patent Grant
It was, inter alia, argued in the case ofMICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY/Euthanasia
compositions366 that the act of granting a patent may be considered immoral on the
basis that there is a risk of infringement of Article 2 of the European Convention of
Human Rights. The Technical Board of Appeal rejected these assertions as follows:
' T 0866/01 3.3.02 decision Technical Board of Appeal 11 May 2005.
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'Neither the invention per se nor the act or conditions of patenting the claimed
invention fulfil the condition of being part of the exploitation of the present
invention'367. Yet the act ofgranting a patent carries moral issues, such as the symbolic
effect discussed above, and the MICHIGAN STATE case suggests this is irrelevant
and that morality attaches to the broader effect of the grant of patents rather than the
act of granting per se. But the broader effect is not defined in a way that makes it clear
what immoral act will fall foul of Article 6.
(4) (d) (v) Research leading to Invention
Patent law aims to promote and encourage research and development. It is not
surprising, therefore, that objections have been raised by opponents in relation to the
morality of the research lying behind particular inventions. There are difficulties with
equating the perceived wrongs of research with the granting of patent rights; not least
that patent law is a completely different form of regulation to the rules that govern
scientific exploration, as we have seen:
Patent law and biomedical research regulations largely legislate the same
issues, but from a different angle. Biomedical research regulations try to
outline the type of research which is considered legitimate.. .Patent law
deals with the same subject matter, but mainly focuses on the research
applications and the ethical implications the exploitation might entail.368
367 T 0866/01 3.3.02 decision Technical Board of Appeal 11 May 2005. 66.
368
European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies to the European Commission. Study on
the Patenting of inventions related to human stem cell research. 2002. pp 66-67
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In MICHIGAN STA TE UNIVERSITY/Euthanasia compositions^69, the Board agreed
and answered the opponents' suggestion that animal experiments were used in the
research that led to the invention in question as follows: 'These experiments were
carried out during the making or development of the invention and as such do not fulfil
the condition of being part of the exploitation of the present invention'370.This clearly
separates the interpretation ofmorality within Article 6 from research. Clearly research
can be moral or immoral but according to MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY Case
the morality of research is not relevant for the question of patent law.
The relevance of research in respect of patent grants, however, takes on a different
importance under the Biotechnology Directive and the four specific exclusions. Two
cases relating to the patentability of human embryonic stem cells have opted for a
broad interpretation ofmorality exclusion.
In the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation case, the Examining Division371 based
their judgment upon looking behind the patent and the invention and held that the
patent was invalid because human embryos had been used as starting material.
Although the patent did not cover human embryos or methods of obtaining stem cells
from embryos, the Examining Division held that the invention as claimed was
equivalent to using embryos for industrial and commercial purposes for the purposes
of Rule 23 D (c) of the European Patent Convention and therefore prohibited. The
actual patent claimed related to cell cultures372, no claim was made in respect of the
369 T 0866/01 3.3.02 decision Technical Board of Appeal 11 May 2005.
370 T 0866/01 3.3.02 decision Technical Board of appeal 11 May 2005. at page 65
371 18th Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation. CaseT 1374/04. November 2005.
372 'A cell culture comprising primate embryonic stem cells which (i) are capable of proliferation in vitro
culture...' (EP0770125).
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process for the production of the cells, but this was considered to be irrelevant because
there was only one method of originating cells and that was through the use - and
destruction - of human embryos, which equated with industrial and commercial use of
embryos.
The main consideration was the way in which the morality clause set out in Article 23
(d) in particular the specific exclusion to patentability in Article 23 (d) (c) should be
interpreted? If a narrow interpretation was to be used then this would correspond with
previous decisions within the European Patent Office. A narrow interpretation would
not extend further than what is stated in the claims and so would not exclude the patent
because the only source was human embryos, whereas a broad interpretation would
include looking behind the product to the process, in effect equating the invention with
the research. Similar reasoning was applied in the Edinburgh Patent case373 and both
cases are under appeal. This current approach is at odds with all previous case law on
the morality clause where the '...boards of appeal have repeatedly found that such
exceptions are to be narrowly construed'374.
These two cases raise important issues relating to the research of inventions, and the
borderline between patent law and the regulatory bodies that govern science. In
particular the views of A Pompidou, the ex-president of the European Patent Office,
suggest that morality will play a greater role in relation to controversial areas of
research.375 They also raise issues relating to the relationship between EPO and
373 EP 0695351.
374 HOWARD FLOREY/Relaxin, V 0008/94 OD at para. 6.2.2, [1995] EPOR 541. 547.
375 See case study one below
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national patent authorities. Their importance is of sufficient weight to be discussed in a
separate case study in the following section.
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(4) (e) Moral Definition
The previous paragraphs indicate that there are different interpretations of what
morality in patent law actually refers to. Equally important and debatable is the
question what amounts to immorality in European Patent Law. This has not been
entirely straightforward, although it is fair to say that the trend, until recently, is that a
narrow interpretation should prevail. The way in which morality, couched in narrow
terms, was interpreted varied. 'There was no European definition of morality'376. The
EPO Guidelines state the purpose of the morality clause is to:
... deny protection to inventions likely to induce riot or public disorder, or to
lead to criminal or other generally offensive behaviour... .This provision is
likely to be involved only in rare and extreme cases. A fair test to apply is to
consider whether it is probable that the public in general would regard the
invention as so abhorrent that the grant of patent rights would be
inconceivable.377
A difference in interpretation of morality is apparent and the case law of the European
Patent Office reveals various approaches. It is possible that the importance of
investment in biotechnology may have influenced the approach taken by the EPO and
it looked at one stage as though the morality clause was going to be interpreted so
narrowly that the clause became meaningless. Some examples of the approach of the
EPO are outlined below:
376 EPC Working Party. Document IV/2767/61-E, page 7.
3 EPO Guidelines. December 2007. paragraph 4.1
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The European Patent Office, in the HARVARD/ONCO-mouse378 objection dealt with
under Article 53 of the European Patent Convention, came to the conclusion that the
applicant's cancerous rodent was patentable and not contrary to ordre public and
morality on the basis of a balance between the achievement of the invention against the
harm that it may cause. The Technical Board of Appeal accepted that although the
animal would be harmed that fact was to be offset against the potential benefit that
may result towards research for treatment for cancer. The test resulting from this
decision was:
The decision as to whether or not Article 53 (a) is a bar to patenting the
present invention would seem to depend mainly on a careful weighing up of
the suffering of animals and possible risks to the environment on the one
hand, and the invention's usefulness to mankind on the other.379
A narrower test was inserted into Article 6 (2) (d) of the Biotechnology Directive,
which renders inventions unpatentable in the event that they involve: '...processes for
modifying the genetic identity of animals which are likely to cause them suffering
without any substantial medical benefit to man or animal, and also animals resulting
from such processes'.
378 T 19/90.
379 T 19/90. paragraph 5.
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In the PLANT GENETIC SYSTEMS/Glutamine synthesase inhibitors case 380 in 1995,
the Technical Board of Appeal rejected a claim by Greenpeace that a patent should not
be granted in respect of transgenic plants resistant to the applicant's weed killer,
'Roundup'. Although it was alleged that harm to the environment could be caused, the
Board held that this had not been proven and so the balance of harm test in the Onco-
mouse case was inappropriate. Instead the question ofmorality came down to what the
public would find acceptable:
Accordingly, under Article 53 (a) EPC, inventions the exploitation ofwhich
is not in conformity with the conventionally-accepted standards of conduct
pertaining to this culture are to be excluded from patentability as being
381
contrary to morality.
A further alternative to the 'public acceptability' test came in the case of HOWARD
FLOREY INSTITUTE/Relaxin382 which further narrowed the scope of the morality
clause by imposing a test where the grant of a patent had to be so 'abhorrent' to the
public that 'the grant of patent rights would be inconceivable'.383
The above cases were heard under the EPC 1973 and related to morality in the general
sense, rather than to dealing with particular examples of morally unpatentable
inventions that were added by virtue of Article 6 of the Biotechnology Directive. A
380 1 995 WL 1081384. 11995] EPOR 357.
381




sec also Lubrizol Genetics Inc [1992] EP - B1-122 791 (opposition Division) unreported and Human
Stem Cell/BIOCYTE also unreported regarding patent number EP 03432317
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number of important issues have arisen from the way in which the specific exclusions
have been interpreted because the EPO has applied a broad interpretation to the
exclusion, thus clearly distinguishing these from the approach adopted in relation to
the general exclusion. The justification for the change in direction by the EPO may be
due to the nature of the technology, human embryonic stem cells, or because specific
exclusions were felt necessary. So if the European Parliament and the Council
considered these to be appropriate, at the time of drafting, it is reasonable that they
should give a broad interpretation to them. Whatever the justification, the result has
been to illustrate that tensions exist between rules that regulate science and those that
encourage innovation. This highlights the lack of European consensus in relation to
those products and processes that are acceptable and the way in which morality should
be interpreted.
The European Court of Justice confirmed in the Kingdom of the Netherlands case that
the four Article 6 (2) exceptions were not discretionary384. This was reiterated by the
Technical Board of Appeal in MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY/Euthanasia
38^
Compositions stating: '... if a case falls within one of the four categories of
exceptions set out in Rule 23d EPC...then it must ipso facto be denied a patent under
Article 53 (a) EPC'.
That is not the end of the matter, though, because an invention '... not falling within the
limited exclusions of Rule 23d EPC...must then be considered under Article 53(a)
3X1
Paragraph 38 '...the scope for manoeuvre left to member stales is not discretionary...by giving four




EPC. There are thus in effect two quite different Article 53 (a) objections'386. Each
must be considered separately and it seems from the EPO interpretation that the
specific exclusions are to be interpreted broadly as in the Wisconsin Alumni Research
Foundation case387, and the Edinburgh Patent388 exemplify. Article 6 (2) (c) states that
inventions that use human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes are
unpatentable and in both cases the claims in relation to human embryonic stem cells
were disallowed under this section. The case of California Institute of Technology (T
522/04)389 also followed the broad interpretative approach when considering the
patentability of stem cells:
The relevant question is whether the claimed cells comprise human
embryonic cells since then the invention involves the use of a human
embryo.390
The Examining Division of EPO is currently following this interpretation thus
'applications are currently being refused if the invention inevitably involves the use of
a human embryo, even if such uses are not specifically claimed'391
386
[2005] T 0866/01
387 Case T 1374/04. November 2005
388 EP 0695351.
389
California Institute ofTechnology Case T 522/04 CIT [2003] ED EP 93921175.1
390 Ibid at para 2.3.3
391 Webber P. Patentability of human embryonic cells under the EPC. Pharmalicensing. Bioscience Law
Review. 2008. page 5. available from
http://pharmalicensing.eom/public/articles/view/l 119630334 42bc33fel4906 last accessed 8th July
2008
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Appeals are pending although the Edinburgh Patent has been withdrawn . In
neither of the cases did the patent claim '...uses of human embryos for commercial
purposes' which would clearly not be patentable under Article 6 (2) (c) but would also
be disallowed by Article 5 (1) which states: 'The human body, at the various stages of
its formation and development, and the simple discovery of one of its elements,
including the sequence or partial sequence of a gene, cannot constitute patentable
inventions'.
Both inventions did, however, use human embryos in the creation of the stem cells
which were the subject of the patent application. Furthermore, in order to recreate the
invention using the same technique, embryos would have to be utilised and destroyed.
Importantly, though, use of the invention did not require human embryos and given the
self-replicating nature of the stem cells further lines could easily be created without use
of embryos, thus giving a ready supply. Therefore human embryos did not form any
part of exploitation of the invention. The EPO felt that because others who may
recreate the invention from first principles would have to use and destroy embryos, and
because use and destruction of embryos was necessary in the initial work of the
applicants, the invention was considered immoral394. The effects of this are discussed
392 The appeal of the WARF case is due to be heard on 24th 25th June 2008 see "Enlarged BoA to review
WARF stem cell case' available from www.epo.org/topics/news/2008/2008Q617.html last accessed
8th July 2008
393
"Edinburgh Patent appeal withdrawn', European Patent Office news release, available from
<www.epo.org/topics/news/2007/20071120a.hlml>.
394 See also comments of Alain Pompidou, former President of EPO. in Open Letter of the President
dated 28 September 2006 at page 3, available from
<www.cipa.org.uk/download files/epo warf,pdf>: 'Ftence, where the skilled person wishing to
perform or reproduce the invention cannot succeed unless he follows the steps of some specific
technical means or methods disclosed in the application which form an integral part of the technical
contribution to the prior art. those technical means or methods are to be taken into consideration for
the purposes of Rule 23 d (c) EPC'
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in the following section but clearly this is a broad interpretation and one which did not
follow the views of the Commission's European Group on Ethics empowered under
Article 7395 of the Biotechnology Directive to evaluate all ethical aspects of
biotechnology. Their report concluded:
As to the patentability of processes involving human stem cells, whatever
their source, there is no specific ethical obstacle, in so far as they fulfil the
requirements of patentability (novelty, inventive step and industrial
application).
The EPO decision was closer to the dissenting opinion of Professor Gunter Virt who
disagreed with the patenting of 'process and products using materials resulting from
destroyed human embryos' because:
This use as material contradicts the dignity of an embryo as a human being
with the derived right to life. If the condition for patentability is the
industrial and commercial use and if the use of human embryos for
industrial and commercial purposes is not patentable, then every exception,
which cannot exclude industrial and commercial purposes, is against the
ethical sense of the directive. 396
Although the appeals are pending, the former President of the EPO, Professor Alain
Pompidou, has responded to an invitation to comment upon the Wisconsin Alumni
395 Under Article 7 of the Biotechnology Directive: "The Commission's European Group on Ethics in
Science and New Technologies evaluates all ethical aspects of biotechnology". Their conclusions are
advisory and are not binding upon the EPO.
396
European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies. "Ethical aspects of patenting inventions
involving human stem cells'. Report to the European Commission, number 16, 7 May 2000, page 19
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Research Foundation case and has underlined the broad interpretation as the
appropriate course to follow. In particular he states:
Article 52 (1) EPC does not enshrine a general principle of narrow
interpretation of exclusions. A presumption in favour of a narrow interpretation
of exceptions to patentability would unduly limit the significance of the moral
jurisdiction under Article 53 (a) EPC and Rule 23 (d) EPC, the purpose of
which is the incorporation of higher ranking legal and moral principles into
European patent law, and would thus be in conflict with the general objectives
of said norms.398
This interpretation of the moral provisions within patent law adds a new dimension to
patent exclusions and creates a conflict with national patent office policy399 and the
policies of the practices of member states400. Linking morality to the research leading
to the invention rather than to the 'commercial exploitation' of the invention is an
attempt to control or influence the direction of research within member states. Given
the reliance of biotechnology companies401 upon the patenting of their inventions
clearly prohibition of patents over particular inventions will affect the direction of
research, or at the very least it will ensure that such research is carried out elsewhere.
397 Case T 1374/04. G 2/06.
398
Pompidou, 28 September 2006, at page 34.
399 The United Kingdom patent office lakes a different approach, see case study one
Some countries, for example, the United Kingdom encourage human embryonic stem cell research
'1I" See Chapter three
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(4) (f) Moral Problems
Patents, the inventions they protect, and public perceptions have changed
immeasurably in recent times. The morality clause was never intended to be
interpreted as widely as the examples outlined above illustrate. There is no accepted,
clear and agreed role, scope or aim for the use of morality in patent law to exclude
inventions which would otherwise enjoy protection. The role of morality is becoming
increasingly invasive as a result of the human embryonic stem cells cases and because
of the direction that the EPO appears to be following.
It is ineffective to continue to try to address pre-grant moral concerns relating to
inventions through the patent system. This gives the impression that patent law is the
bastion of morality; it provides a false picture and could leave a legal vacuum. The
expanding interpretation of morality is also invasive because such a role enables the
European Patent Office to construe its own morality in EPO countries whether or not
the relevant research is acceptable and funded within the affected states.
If regulation is negative, in other words if the relevant invention is illegal, then the
advantages in obtaining the grant of a patent depend upon extraneous circumstances
such as potential future changes to regulation, the regulatory position of other
countries402 and difference between regulations relating to research and those relating
to exploitation403. If regulation is facilitative so that regulation includes specific
provision to make possible an invention then it is obtuse to refuse a patent upon the
402
Subject to the caveat of Article 53 (not deemed immoral merely because prohibited), see the
comments in Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs. Kingdom of the Netherlands case.
403 In the case where research may be disallowed but use of the invention is not.
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invention because of objections to permitted research. On the other hand if regulation
is silent then patent law could be the only method available of attesting to the
acceptability of the work in question. Three variances in regulatory attitude are thus
apparent:
1. Permissive or facilitative Regulation
2. Prohibitive Regulation
3. Absence ofRegulation
(4) (f) (i) Permissive or Facilitative regulation
Most people would agree that human embryonic stem cell research raises controversial
issues. It is wholly appropriate to question the extent, if any, to which such research
should be permitted. Certainly a line should be drawn between what is acceptable and
what must be justified within scientific and ethical principles. In the United Kingdom
the demarcation is in accordance with the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act
which, inter alia, regulates research on human embryos. Lengthy debate404, litigation405
and Parliamentary scrutiny406, have created precedent to enable research within tightly
controlled licences.
404
Including Nuffield Council on Bioctliics, 'Stem Cell Therapy: A Discussion Paper' (2000) and
Department of Health. 'Stem Cell Research: Medical Progress with Responsibility' (2000), Report of
the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology 1984. 'Warnock Report' Cm
9314.
41,5 See for example R (on the application ofOuinta\'alle) v Secretary ofState for Health [2003] 2 AC
687.
406
Report of the Committee of Enquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology (the Warnock Report)
1984 Cmnd.9314 , House of Lords Stem Cell Research (HL Paper 83 (i) 2002) and see current debate
regarding Bill to amend the procedures relating to consent and use of material for human embryonic
stem cell research http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2007-08/humanfeitilisationandembrvology.html
last accessed 25th January' 2008
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It would be at odds with a permissive regime of regulation if patent law were to
interpret morality so that inventions which have been scrutinised in such detail were to
be excluded from patent protection. It is submitted that in such cases patent law should
only take a moral stance if there is some additional factor present that makes granting
of a patent immoral and that additional factor must relate only to the added value that a
patent provides. It follows that in such circumstances it is wholly incorrect to refuse a
patent because of an objection to the technology. Objections to such inventions being
exploited through a monopoly or to the manner of exploitation may be reasonable, but
these are separate matters and are discussed below.
(4) (f) (ii) Prohibitive Regulation
Clearly the way to control specific objections to innovation is by the general legal
system rather than by using alteration of innovation rewards. There may be reasons for
the two, i.e. patent law and regulatory provisions, to diverge as outlined by the
Advocate General407 but, of course legal prohibition must be an indication, if not the
only clear indication408, of what view society adopts. Consistency is important, and is
one of the aims of European Patent Convention, of the ongoing attempts at
harmonisation of European patent provisions and the Biotechnology Directive, but
harmonisation will be impossible without greater congruence between the two.
40
Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs. Kingdom ofthe Netherlands case, see also above page...
408 'Indeed, legal prohibition in a realm such as embryo research is likely to be a much more balanced
and accurate measure of an invention's unacceptability to citizens within a particular jurisdiction than
is the application of the exclusions of Article 6 EC Directive or Article 53 (a) EPC by a patent office.'
G Laurie, 'Patenting Stem Cells ofHuman Origin" [2002] EIPR 59.
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(4) (f) (hi) silent Regulation
Patent law may be looked upon as the last bastion of legal protection when the
regulation system is silent:
Experience has shown, that in cases where appropriate research legislation
is missing, high expectations are raised and many claims are laid on the
patent authorities and on the patent legislator to address controversial issues
and offer guidance in ethically delicate matters, which have not effectively
been treated by bio-ethical research laws.409
Yet this too is problematical. Patent law for several reasons, does not have nor should
it have a mandate to direct what society permits or ought to permit. There may be
particular inventions which a clear consensus exists against them, and examples have
been discussed in cases410, but outside the obvious how far should patent law be
permitted to draw the boundaries of acceptability?
Furthermore patent law merely grants or refuses patents, which has little effect upon
inventions per se. So and if (a) inventions are sufficiently dangerous or objectionable,
and (b) no formal legal action is available to address the concerns, there is a dangerous
vacuum in regulation which ought not to be filled by patent law which is inappropriate
and ineffective for that purpose.
409
European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies Report. 'Study on the patenting of
inventions related to human stem cell research', 67.
410 Nail bombs, land mines, letter bombs etc
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The use of the morality clause in the European context is of greater concern because it
results in moral policy being determined centrally by the European Patent Office
which, however hard it tries, cannot be reflective of the diverse European perceptions
ofmorality in relation to research, the morality ofwhich is subject to divided opinions.
Furthermore, states that do not take it upon themselves to regulate issues that they are
opposed to cannot leave it up to the EPO to fill the gap. The morality clause can be
harmful in certain circumstance because prospects of a morality challenge within
European Patent law will deter innovation411 within Europe and potentially draws
attention away from creation of regulations aimed more directly and, therefore, more
effectively at ethical concerns about innovation.
The reasons behind the concerns which have led to expansion in the scope, but not the
competence, of the morality clause may be justified and the scrutiny welcome, but I
believe that broadening the range of the current morality provisions, in the way
envisaged by the European Patent Office, is excessive and at the same time
insufficient. Different moral issues arise at each stage of an innovation process so the
focus of objections to patents for moral and access reasons at grant stage is ineffectual.
411 For example through encouraging innovation transfer to the United States.
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(4) (g) Moral Options
The above cases suggest that there is a conflict within European Patent Law between
retaining integrity on the one hand and influencing public policy on the other and this
is reflected in the debate between supporters and opponents of biotechnology.
Tensions between the EPO interpretation of morality and the practices and views of
individual EPC states are disharmonious and act against the initial aims of the
Biotechnology Directive and the European Patent Convention. One option open to the
EPO is to keep the current interpretation and leave applicants to apply to individual
states for patents in cases where EPO morality would exclude them but national
interpretation would not. This would fail the aims of harmonisation and simplification
of European Patent Law. Alternatively the moral interpretation of individual states
could be ignored. This too is unsatisfactory because of the uncertainty for potential
patentees who may not appreciate the likely position taken by the EPO and would also
be a failure to take account of strongly felt views ofMember States.
Morality could be removed from patent law altogether, but this is unlikely because
there are particular inventions for which a uniform view on morality exists and
exclusions from patentability of these are unlikely to cause any controversy or
confusion412. The crux of the initial question therefore is what way should morality be
addressed in relation to inventions for which no European consensus exists?
412 Such as letter bombs, landmines etc
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One option is to enable patents for inventions only for those states which do not object
to particular products or processes. But the EPO is unlikely to be able to mount
investigations into every controversial invention within each individual country and
such a scheme is likely to give rise to administrative overburdening. A more
appropriate option is to grant patents and leave objections in relation to morality to be
dealt with by individual patent offices at the time of enforcement as advocated by the
PATGEN Project413.:
Having reviewed the options in circumstances where there is no uniform
European view on morality, the report concludes that the jurisprudence of the
EPO interpreting the EPC, is that in absence of a European wide moral norm
the patent should be granted. Member States may thereafter exercise their right
to invalidate the patent to reflect distinctive national moral considerations
precluding the grant of the patent.
In this way moral objections can be raised during exploitation and the national patent
office can decide upon morality in accordance with the moral principles that apply
therein. Another advantage of assessing the morality of inventions during the
exploitation of patented inventions is that it enables patent offices to appreciate
whether or not the 'commercial exploitation' of inventions has been contrary to ordre
public or morality.
Importantly different moral issues relating to patents and the inventions they protect
arise at each stage of innovation:
413 PATGEN Project, 'The Patenting of Human DNA: Global Trends in Public and Private Sector
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Table Six - Regulation and Morality
The following chapter examines patent law within the stages of innovation with
particular emphasis upon pre and post-grant so as to observe how patent law operates
within each stage so as to achieve the aims of incentive etc as well as how patent law
reacts to or addresses the moral influences discussed in this chapter such as
controversial research. Three case studies will be utilised in the following chapter; two
of which relate to objections to patentability that arose before the grant of patent and
the third of which arose during exploitation. The aim is to appreciate, in greater detail,
the way in which morality is addressed at different stages within an innovation time
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(5) Chapter Five - Patent Law and Regulation
'...the power of science for good and evil has always troubled man's mind'.414
The introduction415 outlined the complexities of regulation and how the operation of
patent law illustrates a variety416 of regulatory attributes417. This chapter examines
these qualities in greater detail in particular the regulatory strategies utilised by patent
law at the various stages of the innovation time line. The first part of the chapter
examines the manner in which patent law 'regulates' what may be considered as
traditional aims of patent law, i.e. creating incentive to innovate. The second section
discusses how patent law responds to pressures outside the traditional picture of patent
law. The third section examines three case studies, two relating to pre-grant issues and
one relating to post-grant concerns:
1. Examples of Specific Exclusions from Patentability - pre-grant
2. Consent to use of human material - pre-grant
3. Defeat of the Patent Paradox - post grant
The relevance of this exercise is to illustrate that patent morality cannot be addressed
with a simple on/off switch at the time of grant. In other words the different moral
414 PLANT GENETIC SYSTEMS/Glutamine Synthetase Inhibitors [ 1995] EPOR 4. page 12 para. 17.1
415 See 'A Regulatory Chameleon' above
416 There is no clear definition of regulation but in its broader sense it relates to any fonn of government
intervention, 'a specific set of commands...deliberate state influence...all forms of social control or
influence...' Baldwin and Cave Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice (OUP 1999)
2. This definition includes patent law within its ambit
417 Incentive based regime, market harnessing, control of information for example
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factors at each stage should be taken into account and patent decisions makers should
be equipped with more flexible options. Morality has provided a gateway through
which patent examiners can respond to wider concerns than the technical questions of
patentability of inventions. Ethical questions, as we have seen, have far greater
ramifications than questioning the patentability of inventions and are no longer limited
to inventions that are clearly and universally abhorrent. Inventions derived from
research using human embryonic stem cells (HESCs), for example, may save lives and
benefit many, and cannot be compared to letter bombs or anti-personnel mines. On the
other hand there are important ethical questions that arise from research into human
embryos, the use and exploitation ofHESCs derived from such research, and there will
be other equally controversial technologies that will challenge the patent system418. So
the question arises: what is the role of patent law in relation to the different ethical
concerns that arise at each stage of innovation?
A letter bomb, for example, is immoral at all stages; it is immoral to research, invent,
use and exploit. HESCs, on the other hand, are created through research which is
considered unethical to some, but HESCs per se do not raise the same ethical concerns
and exploitation of HESCs may raise different issues. The actions of some European
states illustrate these different attitudes to concerns at each stage. For example,
Germany prohibits research relating to human embryos to establish HESC lines but
permits the importation of HESCs created through such processes for research
418 Controversial issues raised by nanotechnology, for example, or the results of cytoplasmic hybrid
research, licences for which were granted by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority
("HFEA") to Newcastle University. Newcastle Upon Tyne. in May 2007, may eventually come to be
considered by EPO.
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purposes419. This section considers the effects of granting patents at each stage of the
innovation process vis-a-vis different ethical questions. The results suggest that it is
doubtful that patent law can address morality on a holistic basis and moral questions
for patent law should be more specific and linked to the effect of excluding inventions
rather than being motivated by reaction.
Regulatory effect can be separated into policy objectives or regulatory target, and the
means of determining them420 or regulatory strategy.421 The objective describes the
question, 'What is regulation aimed at?' (purpose) and the strategy answers, 'How that
is to be achieved' (method).
European patent law can be understood in two planes; traditional patent law, blind to
the wider issues, and new patent law which excludes inventions from patentability for
policy reasons. The objective of traditional patent law is inter alia422 to stimulate
economic growth and it applies regulatory strategies423 to achieve this end. 'New'
patent law on the other hand utilises exclusion of inventions but the purpose and
419 A Plomer. 'Stem Cell Patents: European Patent Law and Ethics' Report, FP6 'Life Sciences,
genomics and biotechnology for health', SSA LSSB-CT-2004-00525: 'Nevertheless, it is prohibited to
extract liESC from embryos, thus making it impossible to establish hESC lines in Germany. It is.
however, possible to research on imported pluripotent hESC in accordance with the German Stem Cell
Act'.
420 See C Scott. "Rethinking regulatory governance for the age of biotechnology', in Somsen, 'The
Regulatory Challenge of Biotechnolog'y. See also Baldwin R and Cave M, 'Understanding
Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice ' (OUP 1999).
421 R Baldwin and M Cave, 'UnderstandingRegulation: Theory, Strategy andPractice' (OUP 1999).
422 Section two indicated that patent law is also intended to increase the availability of information
through publication of patent specifications by inventors. There may be some disagreement as to what
patent law achieves: promotion of private interest against the public interest, rewarding inventors or
stimulating the economy, promoting the knowledge-based economy rather than increasing access to
health care (See B Williams-Jones, 'History of a gene patent: Tracing the development and application
of commercial BRCA Testing', (2002) 10 Health Law Journal. 124). However the ultimate aim of
patent law is to provide incentives to innovate.
423 Such as creation of rights and liabilities and through incentive
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strategy is unclear. The following examines the regulatory strategy of traditional and
new patent law to appreciate the purpose and method of each.
(5) (a) Traditional Picture424 of Patent Regulation
The way patent law achieves its 'traditional' aims illustrates the effects of patent law
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Table Seven - Patent Effect
The following examines in more detail how patent law uses regulation, so as to help
understand whether the refusal of patent grant, to address broader issues, is effective.
424 See also section one which discusses the patent system in greater detail. It is the intention here to
indicate the regulatory forms used in traditional patent application.
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(5) (a) (i) Incentive regulation
The obvious starting point is to recognise patent law as an 'incentive-based regime'.
This form of regulation normally aims to induce relevant persons to '...behave in
accordance with the public interest'42" by incentives or tax relief or provision of public
grants. Incentive regulation is apparent in the first stage of the innovation time line.
Patent law is an unusual illustration of this form of regulation for a number of reasons:
(1) The incentive is not of a defined amount. There is no direct monetary reward
such as a grant or tax deduction. Instead the reward is in the form of a negative
right426; the ability to prevent potential rivals from making, disposing of,
offering to dispose of, using or importing the patent holder's invention427. The
value of this will vary from case to case and will be significantly influenced by
other factors428.
(2) The benefit of a patent once obtained achieves expression through two other
forms of regulatory strategy; self-regulation and creation of rights and
liabilities. Self-regulation is characterised usually by rules that are administered
via industries' own trade organisations. This can be seen in the insurance
industry, some media sectors and advertising in the UK. Patent law in some
425 Baldwin and Cave, 'Understanding Regulation'.
426 Recital 14 Biotechnology Directive describes the right as •Whereas a patent for invention does not
authorise the holder to implement that invention, but merely entitles him to prohibit third parties from
exploiting it for industrial and commercial purposes...'.
427 Section 60 (1) (a) Patents Act 1977.
428 See the sub-section "Interplanetary Alignment' in section one above.
183
respects429 resembles a self-regulatory system but it is different in that there is
no central body that takes the decision to enforce patent rights. It is the
members, i.e. inventors, who apply for and are granted a patent to decide
whether to take any action in the event that they believe their patent is
infringed. There are patent courts and patent offices which constitute the
mechanism of the system, but at the end of the day it is up to the
inventor/patent-holder to take proceedings in the event of perceived
infringement. Patent law functions because the grant of a patent creates an
individual right to litigate for infringement and a consequent liability for
proven infringers. There are parallels in other legislation where regulatory aim
is achieved through creating rights. Health and safety law, for example, enables
injured parties to claim damages through the courts in the event of negligence
as one of a number of strategies430 of encouraging safer working environments.
(3) Financial reward does not come directly from the public purse but from those
who purchase patented inventions. The patent incentive is one step removed
from direct government finance, instead of payment from general taxation the
earnings are generated by those who actually fund patented inventions by
purchasing them. If there are moral concerns regarding particular inventions
then it may argued that the market should decide; the public can express their
views through deciding whether they are happy to purchase the particular
invention or not.
429 I.e. it is in the control of the members (the inventors or patent owners) to take action in respect of
infringement
4311 Fines and criminal penalties may be imposed in relation to serious breaches of health and safety
regulation thus using a more command and control oriented regulation strategy
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If patents are refused over particular inventions for reasons relating to objection to the
invention or for wider concerns relating to research the outcome is difficult to predict.
On the one hand refusal to grant may encourage others to enter the particular market
thus having the opposite effect to that intended by the refusal in the first place. On the
other hand it may signal a removal of incentive to others who may be involved in a
similar area and so removing the incentive for that particular area. Incentive regulation
(and the opposite regulating through disincentive) is therefore not foolproof. The
disincentive from working with a particular invention and a disincentive from working
in a field generally are two entirely different matters and the effect of using the refusal
of a patent to influence either occurs at different stages (invention specific in
exploitation stage and invention general in incentive stage).
(5) (a) (ii) Regulation through creation of rights and
liabilities
Awards of patents create rights to patentees to prevent competitors or anyone else from
infringing their patents. In the event of infringement the holders may obtain damages
and/or an injunction. Thus a patent is a reward that directly affects others, including
inventors who have made the same invention independently but failed to file their
patent application in time431. Once a patent is granted there are strong incentives upon
others not to infringe. This section of the operation of the patent system occurs during
the enforcement or commercialisation stage whereas the incentive element is relevant
431 The first-to-file rule applies in UK patent law whilst in the United States, the patent is granted to the
first to invent.
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mainly at grant or pre-grant stages. Patent law therefore relies upon patentees to police
the system so if a patent is not granted then the relevant invention is no longer part of
the system and is thus open to all comers.
(5) (a) (in) Market harnessing controls
The award of a patent creates interference in the free workings of the market economy.
Market harnessing controls are usually in the form of methods of preventing
monopolistic behaviour or increasing competition. The reward of a patent to an
inventor brings the opposite as it allows him to exploit prices by restricting supply and
preventing competition. The result of refusing a patent over a particular invention is
that anyone can enter the relevant market.
The basic economic rationale for the grant of a patent breaks down in the event that
patent rights are excessive and stifle further innovation or restrict access to such an
extent that society fails to benefit. Such a scenario is perhaps more acute in the case of
medical innovation because the result of restricted access is restrictions on health care.
Patent law is an instrument of public policy and its aim is to benefit the public through
greater innovation, it should not enable innovation to be smothered, yet there are
instances432 where this could be the case. Here patent law is faced with a dilemma;
should the law ignore the minority of cases where this may occur or should steps be
taken to control the extent of the monopoly? There are dangers in either course;
inaction may result in specific restrictions in relation to the patent in question whilst
the proactive approach may reduce the overall incentive for other innovation and thus
have a subsequent deterrent effect for others entering the market. Whether that would
432 Discussed below
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occur and if so to what extent is difficult to tell, but one could envisage circumstances
whereby gross inequality in rights of individual patentees against the public interest
should have a remedy within patent law if the inequity arose as a result of the grant of
a patent433. Clearly this is a moral argument as well as an economic one and one in
which patent law is well placed to have an impact, but strong patent rights are seen as
essential for the proper working of the patent system and any qualification to those
rights is likely to be met with strong opposition, regardless of the merits of individual
cases. It will be suggested434 that this attitude requires revisiting and it is in the area of
market harnessing regulation, which is apparent in the exploitation stage of innovation
where this is likely to be effective, rather than within the incentive stage.
(5) (a) (iv) Information Disclosure
Information control as a form of regulation normally takes the form of compulsory
disclosure as with ingredients of food and drinks435. Part of the patent bargain between
inventors and the patent office is the supply of information. The workings of
inventions must be fully disclosed by defining the invention, and outlining the extent
of the claim enables copying once a patent expires and enables competitors to improve
upon inventions. The level of information should be equivalent to the monopoly
provided, in other words, patent protection only covers what is delineated within the
patent claims and must be disclosed to allow every working of the invention. In this
433 Patent law in certain restricted circumstances may grant a compulsory licence after three years from
grant in the event that there is a need for the particular invention and the patentee is not satisfying that
need. These licenses are discussed further below but the aim with such licenses is to encourage
patented inventions to be commercialised.
434 Sec below chapter six
435 Baldwin and Cave, 'UnderstandingRegulationchapter four
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way it should be clear what others can add to it and to what extent they can invent
around it. In the absence of the requirement of disclosure, it is likely that many
inventions and fundamental information about them would remain outside public
knowledge. In the event of use of refusal of a patent to remove incentive relating to a
particular form of technology one result may be to encourage secrecy as inventors seek
to protect inventions in other ways.
(5) (a) (v) Direct action or public compensation
Patent law can be seen436 as a form of fund raising - it rewards innovation paid for
retrospectively by those who purchase patented products or processes. It is similar to a
voluntary tax but is payment for the specific purpose of funding innovation. Much
innovation arises as a result of venture capital loaned or invested in the belief or hope
that the fruits from finance will be protected through patent rights. It is consumers'
choice whether to pay for particular inventions and if a moral question arises with an
invention per se then whether it is patented or not is irrelevant - if they are offended
they wont buy it and if not they might. Likewise if a patented invention is expensive it
is the consumers' choice whether or not to buy. A mixture of demand and supply
determines price of a product and if supply is reduced to maximise returns, which a
monopolist can influence, then the existence of a patent influences a patentees ability
to control supply in his favour. I am not suggesting here that patent law should take
positive steps to influence such a situation437, but using this as an example to show that
patents can do little to influence inventions per se but can influence the supply.
436 As discussed above in chapter two
43 Indeed the ability for patentees to set supply to maximise return is the reward for innovation
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Each of these types of regulation operates at different stages of innovation and it is
reasonably clear how and why patent law is structured in the way it is. Once excluding
inventions for policy reasons is examined the regulatory strategy is no longer as clear.
(5) (b) Wider Perspectives of Patent Regulation
In relation to traditional aims of patent law the 'why' (economic incentive) and the
'how' (application of regulation strategy) can be understood in terms that illustrate a


















Table Eight - Regulation strategy
Chapter four discussed generally morality issues that have arisen against patenting, in
particular the increase in moral issues because of biotechnology and it illustrated that
different moral issues arose at each stage of innovation. This can be expressed within























Each objection can be reflected within different stages of the hypothetical innovation
time line. The theoretical objections may be of a different nature (ethical or
accessibility, for example) or object (research, physical inventions or exploitation of
inventions). The morality clause does not distinguish between them, but yet the
medium of such objections is through the morality clause. The remainder of this
chapter examines the wider effects of opposition to patents for pre-grant and post-grant
objections so as to obtain some regulatory logic or purpose to the exclusion of specific
inventions. A patent system can only accept or refuse patents438 so the consequence of
a successful opposition to particular patents is to broaden the range of a priori
exclusions. Given the different type of opposition which arises in different stages of
innovation the aim is now to understand the consequences from a regulation
perspective of excluding particular inventions from patentability. Motivation for
excluding inventions may be different for gamekeepers and poachers439.
438
Subject to provisions for compulsory licences in restricted circumstances, see below. It should be
noted that patent systems will allow for amendment of claims. For example the UK Patents Act 1977
allows for amendments before grant (si9), after grant (s 27) and during infringement or revocation
proceedings although amendments shall not include added matter (s76)
439 If gamekeepers are considered as supporters of biotechnology and poachers as those who oppose it on
occasions they may both advocate exclusion from patentability for particular inventions but for very
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Regulatory strategy (in the case of specific patent exclusion) should be seen in the light
of other regulation and whether objections to patents are related to pre- or post-grant
issues. The strategy that is used by patent law interacts with other regulation (which
may relate more directly to the object of objection - for example research or consent).
The interaction has been expressed by Dutfield G as:
One of its440 successes is that international policy making and diplomacy
increasingly treat intellectual property relating to biological and genetic
material and the regulation of biodiversity control, access use and exchange as
interrelated topics for negotiation.441
The above quotation is of interest because it illustrates a new and apparently accepted
relationship between patent law and other regulation. 'The patenting process stands at
the confluence of science and technology, on the one hand, and law, on the other.'442
Clearly regulation out-with the patent system is the appropriate place to deal with
'...regulation of biodiversity control, access use and exchange...', but equally clearly,
intellectual property has established a role also. What that role is or what it should be is
not clear.
different reasons - this apparent paradox has been alluded to in the introduction and is discussed
further below
440 I.e. opposition to biotechnology groups.
441
Dutfield, 'Intellectual Property Rights and the Life Science Industries', 211: 'National intellectual
property offices and politicians are beginning to listen to alternative voices'.
142 Mills. Biotechnological Inventions.
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The three case studies below examine interaction of patent law with different rules that
relate to research, those of consent to use body material and those which relate to the
commercial exploitation of inventions. The first two relate to events that concern pre-
grant issues during innovation stage whilst the third relates to post-grant.
(5) (b) (i) Innovation Stage
This section examines the interaction between patent law and regulation during the
period leading up to the grant of a patent - the innovation stage - with the purpose of
illustrating the effect of using patent invalidity as a means of directing or helping to
direct research within legal or acceptable parameters. Concern has been mentioned
above443 regarding invalidation of patents for this reason including: 'There is a
disturbing trend to consider patents as invalid under Article 53 (a)444 EPC, not for
anything to do with the use of the invention but because of what the inventor did
before filing the application'445.
Such concern is understandable not least because of the uncertainty and unfairness to
inventors who may encounter difficulties that they were not aware of when they
embarked upon the relevant research. Furthermore a regulatory strategy involving the
refusal of patent grant to address events carried out prior to patent applications, would
appear to be ineffective if applied retrospectively - the invention having been created,
443 Sec above. Introduction, "Stimulate or stipulate'.
444 Article 53 (a) is the EPC version of what has become know as the 'morality clause' and states as
follows: 'European Patents should not be granted in respect of (a) inventions the publication or
exploitation of which would be contrary to ordre public or morality provided that the exploitation shall
not be deemed to be so contrary merely because it is prohibited by law or regulation in some or all of
the contracting states'. Annex X lists the different versions of the morality clause as provided for by
the various instruments and the differences will be discussed in due course.
445
Grubb, 'Patentsfor Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals andBiotechnology', 286.
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the horse has bolted, the genie cannot be put back in the bottle446. There is however a
subtle relationship between patent law and regulation, so this section will continue
with this in mind.
Case Study One - Example of a Specific Exclusion:
Article 6 (2) (c) Biotechnology Directive '...uses of human embryos for industrial
or commercial purposes...'
CS (1) Conflict inEurope. ..
The Biotechnology Directive was intended to harmonise biotechnology patent law.
However, there has been a divergence of views between signatory states in relation to
how morality is to be interpreted, in particular with reference to the patentability of
human embryonic stem cells ("HESCs"). This may not be surprising given that the
interpretation of morality is intended to reflect the views pertinent within each state at
the time so as to allow interpretation accordingly. 'It is common ground that...' Article
6 of the Biotechnology Directive '... allows the administrative authorities and courts of
the member states a wide scope for manoeuvre in applying this exclusion'447.
The contradiction between harmonisation and the respect of interstate autonomy is
reflected in practice both in implementation of the Directive and with the
interpretation. The Austrian and Dutch Patent Acts, for example, do not include the
second and arguably limiting section of Article 6 (2) (c) of the Directive and exclude
446
Laurie, Genetic Privacy. A Challenge to Legal Norms.
447
Kingdom ofthe Netherlands case at paragraph 37.
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uses of embryos per se rather than uses of embryos for industrial or commercial
purposes. The specific differences may be invalid448 but may also be aimed at
reflecting the national regulations: 'In, some cases, the legislative measures
implementing the Directive make a direct link to national laws on human embryo
research'449. The United Kingdom translated the wording of Article 6 of the
Biotechnology Directive into the Patent Act 1977450 but changed the wording so as to
exclude "...among others..." from Article 6 giving the impression that the list of
exclusions appears exhaustive. Furthermore as we shall see the UK Intellectual
Property Office interprets the meaning of Article 6 differently to the EPO.
CS(1) ...orPeace inour Time?
There are cases where a standard of morality is accepted451 within all states as
described in the Plant Genetic Systems452 case:
The concept of morality is related to the belief that some behaviour is right
and acceptable whereas other behaviour is wrong, this belief being founded
on the totality of the accepted norms which are deeply rooted in a particular
culture. For the purposes of the EPC, the culture in question is the culture
inherent in European society and civilisation. Accordingly, under Article 53
(a) EPC, inventions the exploitation of which is not in conformity with the
448 Case C-456/03, Commission v Italy [2005] ECR 1 - 5355.
449 Plomer. 'Stem Cell Patents'.
4511 Schedule A2 Section 76 A of Statutory Instrument 2000 No. 2037
451
Examples given in papers and cases include letter bombs and antipersonnel mines.
452
[1995] EPOR 4. Case T-3 56/93
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conventionally-accepted standards of conduct pertaining to this culture are
to be excluded from patentability as being contrary to morality453.
The Biotech Directive presupposes, on the one hand, an allowance for different moral
aspirations and, on the other, for Article 6 to be interpreted in accordance with
common standards. Therefore there must be room for individual interpretation of
morality in the absence of a common standard. Although a common standard is not
defined, the four Article 6 (2) exclusions are taken as reflecting that standard and, as
they have been inserted by the European Parliament, allow no derogations.
The difficulty for European patent law is how wide an interpretation should be applied
to the Article 6 (2) exclusions. The narrow interpretation applied to the morality cases,
outlined in chapter three, would confine interpretation to the specific meaning within
each exclusion, whilst a broader reading would encompass a range of activities
connected to the specific.
The two examples below illustrate this interpretative conflict. Although the examples
relate to patentability of HESCs and Article 6 (2) (c), it is suggested that the same
issues454 apply to any of the Article 6 (2) exclusions. For example Article 6 (2) (a)
excludes '...processes for cloning human beings...' but this does not differentiate
between 'therapeutic cloning' and 'reproductive cloning' the latter is universally
accepted as immoral but the former is lawful and encouraged in some states including
the United Kingdom. Different opinions exist regarding the source of embryos chosen
453 ibid.
454 i.e. that there is no European Consensus as to the interpretation of the specific moral exclusions
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for research; whether they are left over from IVF, donated specifically for research
purposes or created through parthenogenesis455. This creates a separate, but just as
emotionally charged, argument about whether we have the right to create life solely for
the purposes of destruction and will create the similar conflict in interpretation of
morality as under Article 6 (2) (a).
The Article 6 (2) exclusions are limited in quality and scope as they are reflective only
of four elements of specific technology considered immoral at the time the Directive
entered into force. They do not include all immoral inventions456 and they are not
reflective of changes in morality and advances in understanding of the specific
excluded technology. They do not account for advances in science and curiously are
differentiated from other immoral inventions outlined in Recital 38457. Attitudes may
change and the general provision of morality within Article 6 (1) allows moral
interpretation to reflect the situation at the time of elucidation but the specific
exclusions do not. Biotechnology is still in its infancy and as time goes on and
knowledge expands, views on what is acceptable will change.
Perhaps the time will come when the germ line modification of humans to
eradicate genetic disease in entire families will be deemed to be ethical, and
455
Uniparental sexual reproduction: 'Parthenogenesis is defined as the development of an ovule without
there having been any fertilisation by a spermatozoid' (IPI, 'Patents for genetic sequences: The
Competitiveness of Current UK Law and Practice').
456 Recital 38 '....whereas this list obviously cannot presume to be exhaustive...'
457 Such as '...processes to produce chimeras from genu cells or totipotent cells of humans and
animals...'
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maybe even imperative; but that is clearly not yet the view of the legislator
• 45 8
or, according to Recital (40) society...
Given the differences in the views within Europe at present it would not be surprising
if moral views changed within each state at different rates. That said, the example of
the interpretation of Article 6 (2) (c) illustrates the current state of confusion relating to
the Article 6 (2) exclusions.
CS (1) Embryosearning their keep: Equating research with invention
The morality exclusions outlined in Article 6 (2) (c) have come to be interpreted by the
EPO because HESCs, which can only be obtained by using human embryos that are
destroyed in the process, are believed to be vital in order for research to progress into
treatments in respect of serious illness, disease or injury which result in destroyed or
damaged tissue. 'The hope is that ESCs can be turned into specialised cells for
repairing damage in a wide range of tissues'459, so potentially many terrible afflictions
can be treated: multiple sclerosis, diabetes, spinal injuries4 , auto-immune diseases,
degenerative diseases such as Parkinson's disease, and many more 461 Patents which
claim HESCs or which use HESCs will relate to inventions that have been created
through use and destruction of embryos. The secret is to obtain types of cells that will
458 G Kamstra et al., 'Patents on Biotechnological Inventions
459 'Great Expectations - Embiyonic Stem Cells could work wonders if we knew how to get them'. New
Scientist (28 May 2005), 5.
460 A Goho, "Embryonic Hope', New Scientist (5 July 2003), 19: 'The findings add to a growing number
of studies that suggest embryonic stem cells could have a valuable role to play in treating spinal
injuries'.
461
Corrigan et al.. 'Ethical, legal and social issues in stem cell research and therapy'. Briefing Paper
from Cambridge Genetics Knowledge Park. 2nd Edition March 2006.
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grow in accordance with specific instructions, but not all stem cells are capable462 of
doing this.
Stem cells can be classified in groups according to their origins or their elasticity, the
differences mean that they do not all carry the same ethical baggage; some are more
objectionable to opponents of the processes than others. Human stem cells can be
derived from various sources including adults' nasal linings463, umbilical cords, foetal
cells464 and human skin465. It is possible that non-embryonic stem cells, the use of
which is not so contentious, could be as efficient at producing significant medical
breakthroughs, personalised466 for the patient concerned467. This may be from skin
cells468, cells from the nasal linings, or bone marrow or umbilical cord, and thus
experimentation will not raise the same emotive issues. Theoretically any type of adult
cell can be reprogrammed through 'transdifferentiation'469 which means 'transforming
an already specialised or differentiated type of adult cell, such as a skin cell, into a
462 Scientists have reengineered skin cells to act like embryonic stem cells and this may provide an
alternative to the use ofHESCs. Opinion is divided as to whether there is a need for HESC research "It
is important that this breakthrough should not prevent work on therapeutic cloning' according to Dr
Lyle Armstrong. North East England Stem Cell Institute: This is a very exciting advance'. Available
< http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/lii/liealtli/7103787.stm >. Last accessed 3rd January 2008
463 R Nowak, "Do nose cells know how to bridge the spinal gap?' New Scientist (13 July 2002), 18. see
also Goho, 'Embryonic Hope', 19: 'Human trials of some treatments, such as using nose cells, have
already begun'.
464 A Coghlan. "Baby Cells patch up Mother's Brain'. New Scientist (20 August 2005), 8.
465 A Coghlan. "How to turn your Skin into Bone', New Scientist (2 July 2005), 16.
466
Pharmacogenomics, sometimes called 'personal medicine', relates to the tailoring of the intake of
drugs to the particular genetic makeup and disease variant of the individual patient.
Pharmacogenomics also means that clinical trials can be targeted at a specific group of patients whose
genetic make-up responds closely to the drug, which reduces time and cost in trials.
467 For example, "Organs on demand, no embryo needed' New Scientist (7 October 2006). 8. claims that
embryonic stem cells have been created from skin cells of mice, see also 'Human Embryonic stem cell
lines derived from single blastomeres'. Nature, doi: 10.1038/nature05142.
468 See "Development Biology: Field Leaps Forward with New Stem Cell Advances" Science Now (23
November 2007). 1224: Two groups report this week that they have reprogrammcd human skin cells
into so-called induced pluripotent cells...'.
469 S P Westphal. "Transformers', New Scientist (12 October 2002). 39.
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completely different type, such as a nerve cell'. Claims have also been made to derive
stem cells from interspecies cloning470 Such theories are not, so far, supported by
practical results so the most likely sources of obtaining useful stem cells are from
human embryos.
Stem cells can also be classified according to their potential to metamorphose but the
boundaries between categories are not so obvious. Human totipotent cells have the
potential to develop into any human cell and could ultimately reproduce into 'an entire
human body'471. Human pluripotent stem cells arise after a further subdivision of
totipotent cells. The distinguishing factor between pluripotent and totipotent stem cells
is that pluripotent cells are not capable of transforming into an embryo472 and thus are
not capable of forming an entire human body. This characteristic distinguishes their
patentability status in the United Kingdom in that the '... Patent Office is ready to grant
patents for inventions involving such cells provided they satisfy the normal
requirements for patentability'473. Whereas 'the Patent Office will not grant patents for
human totipotent cells'474 because the human body at its various stages of its formation
and development is excluded from patentability by Para 3(a) Schedule 2 of the Patents
Act 1977. Multipotent stem cells are cells which do not have an unlimited capacity for
diversifying into new cells but which can be multiplied and kept in culture475. They are
470 P Cohen, "Rabbit-Human Stem Cell claims provoke controversy and doubt'. New Scientist (23
August 2003), 14.
471 The Patent Office, "Inventions involving human embryonic stem cells' (2003) available at <
www.patent.gov.uk >,
472 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 'Stem Cell Therapy, the Ethical Issues, a discussion paper' (2000) <
www.nuffieldfoundation, org/bioethics >, page 4. Last accessed 3rd January 2008
473 Patent Office, 'Inventions involving human embryonic stem cells'.
474 Ibid.
475 Nuffield Council on Biocthics. 'Stern Cell Therapy, the Ethical Issues'.
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present throughout life but are not ubiquitous in adults. Their capacity for renewal is
limited although research is ongoing.476
The status of cells is not the priority for the EPO as a criterion for the test ofmorality
for patentability; EPO's concern instead is the source of cells. If they originate from
the destruction of human embryos then inventions relating to such cells are
unpatentable for moral reasons, as illustrated by the following cases:
CS (1) The Edinburgh Patent, number EP 0 695 351
The patent titled, 'Isolation, selection and propagation of animal transgenic stem cells'
owned by the University of Edinburgh, originally claimed to include human or animal
embryonic stem cells but was amended in July 2002477 after opposition proceedings
brought by, inter alia478, Greenpeace. The Opposition Division held that the patent
failed to comply with, inter alia479, Rule 23d(c) EPC, which mirrors Article 6(2) (C)
Biotechnology Directive, which states that 'uses of human embryos for industrial or
commercial purposes' are not patentable for moral reasons.
A broad interpretation of Rule 23d(c) EPC is as follows. Article 5 of Biotech Directive
excludes the human body at its various stages of development from patentability, and
476 Ibid.
47 The patent was filed in its original fonn in April 1994 and was granted in December 1999. The EPO
allows a period of nine months for opposition proceedings to be filed by any third party and
oppositions were filed in March 2000. Although there were some initial definitional hurdles which
were resolved, three days of public hearings led to a decision by the Opposition Division.
478 Fourteen different parties lodged fonual oppositions including the German. Dutch and Italian
governments.
479 It also held that the patent failed for want of disclosure in accordance with Article 83 EPC.
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as an embryo is one of the stages of development of the human body it is not
patentable by virtue of Article 5. If Rule 23d(c) EPC was to be construed narrowly
then Article 5 would in effect make Rule 23d(c) redundant as human embryos would
be excluded twice. Therefore Rule 23d(c) had to be interpreted broadly480, excluding
inventions created using human embryos as well as those involving human embryos.
The patent did not claim patent protection for human embryos. However in the process
of obtaining the cells, embryos were destroyed. The Opposition Division's decision
was based upon objections to acts that were not part of the patent claims. Article 69
EPC states that: 'The scope of protection conferred by a European patent or patent
application shall be determined by the terms of the claims'. The decision was appealed
but the appeal was withdrawn prior to hearing.481
The motive behind the above interpretation is unclear and it has been suggested that it
may have been to force interpretation from Enlarged Board ofAppeal ("EBA"):
The above rulings represent such an extreme turnaround from previous EPO
jurisprudence in this area that it leads us to wonder if the issue is not being
forced from within the EPO itself to ensure that a body with standing such as
the EBA brings full and final resolution to the issue482
480 See Edinburgh Patent case
481
'Edinburgh Patent Appeal Withdrawn'. EPO press release (28 November 2007)
482
MacQueen H. Waelde C & Laurie G,'Contemporary IntellectualPropertyOxford University Press,
2007,
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The later comments in relation to this case and the case below from the former
President of the EPO Alain Pompidou4*3 suggest a broader motive and one which it is
submitted herein, that is fundamentally flawed.
CS (1) Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation (WARF) Patent for 'Primate
Embryonic Stem Cells'
A similar patent application by WARF was also refused and the decision has been
referred to the Enlarged Board of Appeal (EBA) to consider, inter alia, whether the
destruction of spare embryos in the preparation of human embryonic stem cells should
invalidate the patent claim to 'primate embryonic stem cells'. Although it cannot be
predicted what the EBA will decide, the indications from EPO are that the applicants
will be disappointed. The Technical Board of Appeal484, in referring the case to the
EBA, commented upon the questions referred and their view supported the broad
interpretation of Rule 23d(c) EPC. The former President of EPO, Professor Alain
Pompidou, answered requests from EBA to comment and he too has favoured
exclusion of the WARF patent. The positions of the various authorities are summarised
below.
CS (!) Technical Board ofAppeal (7 April 2006):
Four questions were referred to the EBA but the second question is pertinent for this
discussion:
483 Sec below
484 T-1374/04 - 3.3.08. Interlocutory Decision of Technical Board of Appeal. 7 April 2006.
202
. 485 •If the answer to question 1 " is yes, does Rule 23d(c) EPC forbid the patenting
of claims directed to products (here: human embryonic stem cell cultures)
which - as described in the application - at the filing date could be prepared
exclusively by a method which necessarily involved the destruction of the
human embryos from which the said products are derived, if the said method is
not part of the claims?
The answer depends upon whether the exclusion within Rule 23d(c) EPC should be
read narrowly or given a broad interpretation. Previous case law suggests that a narrow
interpretation should be adopted486 but the Board has emphasised that the rule that
exceptions to patentability should be interpreted narrowly '... does not apply without
exception.'487 The only EBA case where the narrow interpretation rule was addressed
is the decision in case number Gl/04, on 16 December 2005:
It is true that there are exclusion clauses from patentability provided for in the
EPC. It is also true that the frequently cited principle, according to which
exclusion clauses from patentability laid down in the EPC are to be construed
in a restrictive manner, does not apply without exception.488
485
Question 1 asks 'Does Rule 23d(c) EPC apply to an application filed before the entry into force of the
rule?'.
486 See Section three above, and also Boards of Appeal Cases. PLANT GENETIC SYSTEMS/Glutamine
Synthetase Inhibitors [1995] EPOR 4, Case T 356/93, [1995] OJ EPO. 545; HARVARD/ ONCO-
mouse T 0019/90. [1990] OJ EPO, 476.
487 T 1374/04 at Paragraph 33
488 Gl/04 16 December 2005 at reason 6 page 20. The EBA however applied tire narrow rule to tire case
in question relating to Article 52 (4) 'Diagnostic methods'.
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The EBA did not provide an opinion either way but suggested that all relevant matters
are to be included in interpreting the exclusion and that it should be read according to
Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties489.
CS (1) ProfessorAlain Pompidou EPO (28 September 2006)490:
The opinion of Professor Pompidou likewise suggests that a broader interpretation is
relevant in the circumstances:
Article 52 (1) EPC does not enshrine a general principle of the narrow
interpretation of exclusions. A presumption in favour of a narrow interpretation
of exclusions would unduly limit the significance of the moral jurisdiction
under Article 53 (a) EPC and Rule 23d(c) EPC, the purpose of which is the
489 Article 31, General rules of interpretation:
1: 'A treat}7 shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose'.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text,
including its preamble and annexes: (a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between
all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty; (b) any instrument which was made by
one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as
an instrument related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: (a) any subsequent agreement between
the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; (b) any
subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties
regarding its interpretation; (c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations
between the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.
Article 32, Supplementary means of interpretation:
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the
treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the
application of article 31. or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or
unreasonable.
4911
Open Letter from Professor Alain Pompidou, former President of EPO (28 September 2006) page 34,
available from < www.cipa.org.uk/download files/epo warf.pdf >.last accessed 3rd January 2008
204
incorporation of higher ranking legal and moral principles into European patent
law...
He goes on to say:
...where the skilled person wishing to perform or reproduce the invention
cannot succeed unless he follows the steps of some specific technical means or
methods disclosed in the application which form an integral part of the
technical contribution to the prior art, those technical means or methods are to
be taken into consideration for the purposes ofRule 23d(c) EPC.
If the appeal of the WARF patent follows these principles then the method of creating
the stem cells within the claims of their patent will be included in the consideration of
validity. Whether some states permitted research upon human embryos was irrelevant
for the purposes of interpretation of Article 53 (a).
The result of these two decisions is to remove HESC inventions from patentability in
EPO. Separate patents could be applied for through individual State patent offices but
that involves greater administration for individual patent applicants and would be at
odds with the basis for the Biotechnology Directive which was to harmonise the
situation in Europe. The effect of the decision is unclear and appears to be aimed at
both the specific patentee, hence the invention concerns and other potential patentees
who are in the field of human embryonic stem cells research. The effect upon the
former is in the exploitation stage of their innovation time line and on the latter in their
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incentive stage. The effect is uncertain but would appear to be aimed at steering the
direction of research away from human embryonic stem cells.
CIS' (1) Opinion of the European Group on Ethics in Science andNew Technologies:
The European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies (EGE) (the opinion
of which was effectively ignored by Professor Pompidou and the TBA in the above
cases as being 'strictly advisory and not legally binding491') adopted a classification
relating to how far subject material has been separated from the source, i.e. embryos, to
define the morality of patents relating to HESCs. Its view was that:
...isolated stem cells which have not been modified do not, as a product, fulfil
the legal requirements...to be seen as patentable. In addition, such isolated
cells are so close to the human body, to the foetus or to the embryo they have
been isolated from, that their patenting may be considered as a form of
commercialisation of the human body.492
In addition they said that unmodified stem cells are unpatentable for not having '... a
specific use but a very large number of potential undescribed uses...'493, but that
modified cell lines capable of industrial application could be patentable and that
processes involving human stem cells from any source are patentable if they fulfil the
patent requirements.
491 There was no legal reason for him to follow the EGE opinion nevertheless the EGE as the group
intended to assess ethical questions relating to patenting biotechnology inventions under the
Biotechnology Directive, one would have thought that it may carry some influence
492
European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies, 'Study on the patenting of inventions
related to human stem cell research'. Report to the European Commission (Office for Official
Publications of the European Communities 2002), page 15.
493 Ibid., page 15. paragraph 2.3,
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This is very different from the interpretation presented by the EPO. The EGE opinion
is not binding upon the EPO but it has a mandate for providing advice by virtue of
Article 7 of the Biotechnology Directive494. The EPO interpretation links morality with
the source of the cells, not in relation to their isolation and modification.
CS (1) Dissenting Opinion ofProfessor Gunter Virt EGE:
The dissenting opinion of Professor Gunter Virt was closer to the EPO interpretation
than the EGE in that he argued that patenting products and processes resulting from
destroyed human embryos was unacceptable495.
The real reason for the decisions and Professor Virt's opinion may lie more with
opinion against research rather than interpretation of the Article. Removing the
incentive relating to the creation of human embryonic stem cells may encourage
alternative research:
Patenting is an incentive. Patentability of human embryonic stem cells and
stem cell lines would push research towards embryonic stem cells and thus
undermine the priority of research using non embryonic stem cells.496
494 Article 7 Biotechnology Directive 'The Commission's European Group in Science and Ethics and
New Technologies evaluates all ethical aspects of biotechnology'.
495 See Chapter four
496
European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies, 'Study on the patenting of inventions
related to human stem cell research'. Report to the European Commission. Office for Official
Publications of the European Communities. 7th May 2002. at page 19
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The EGE also discussed concerns regarding access to patented genetic material as 'the
basic ethical dilemma':
... patents can encourage scientific progress which can be used to the benefit of
better health care, and at the same time, patents can also impair access to the
health care due to the need of a licence to use them and to the fees that will
have to be paid to the patent holder.
It is then necessary to secure the right balance between the inventor's interests
and the society's interest.. ,497
Two different views emerge from the EGE opinion regarding the purpose of the patent
system. The first, Professor Virt's, relates to the use of the patent system to direct
research in a particular direction. Setting aside the question of whether or not HESC
research should be acceptable, the issue for patent law should be whether it should be
involved in such a question at all. I submit that it should not be because of uncertainty
with the regulatory method used - i.e. the negative use of incentive against two
different regulatory targets with different aims and applied in different zones of the
innovation time line:
(1) Regulatory Target - or who is the regulation498 aimed at? The justification for
objecting to HESC, from Professor Virt's point, is objections to the research that led to
497
European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies, 'Study on the patenting of inventions
related to human stem cell research'. Report to the European Commission, Office for Official
Publications of the European Communities, 7th May 2002. at pages 14-15
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Regulation being, in this case, the withdrawal of incentive
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creation of HESCs. However there are two effects on two quite different targets. The
first target is the specific inventor and the second is the group of inventors in the field
in general. The specific inventor has already created the invention, the cells, and so
removing incentive because of objections to the research will not affect that research.
The effect upon inventors in the field in general, as we have seen, creates conflict and
uncertainty in result without consistency499 in regulation.
(2) Regulatory Aim - Furthermore the regulatory aim is different as between the
specific and the general inventors. For the specific the aim of excluding the patent is
quasi- punitive - the non-reward for research. The effect is not upon research but to an
invention. The objections to the particular research no longer hold valid as against the
invention which in the case ofHESCs may provide relief and/or life to many.
(3) Innovation Period - The effect of excluding an invention upon the specific inventor
falls in the inventor's exploitation stage whilst the general falls in the incentive stage. It
is submitted that the two regulatory aims are inconsistent. The general aim is towards
research of others whilst the specific is directed at research, which has already taken
place, but effects the invention, which in the case of HESCs is of enormous positive
potential500. Therefore taking a stance against the general research has a resulting
negative effect upon the specific invention regardless of its substantial merit.
499 Vis-a-vis patent law and regulation of science and also, in the case of European Law, between
individual States
500 As mentioned above some States allow importation of HESCs but forbid the production of them.
Indeed the justification for the rider to the morality clause ("...exploitation shall not be deemed to be
so contrary merely because it is prohibited by law or regulation" - Article 6 Biotech Directive) is that
it enables one country to produce an invention for export to another even if illegal to use the invention
in the former
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The second view in the latter quotation from the EGE opinion refers to patent law as a
gateway through which it can either assist better health care or impair access to health
care depending upon the '...right balance' between interests of inventors and society.
This view I submit is more a consistent approach for the aims and justifications of
patent law and the third case study below examines the reasons why in more detail.
The second case study relating to consent is of interest because although consent
relates to a pre-grant issue the Biotechnology Directive treats the relevance of consent
to patenting in a different, and I submit a preferable way, than it addresses research.
Case Study Two - Consent
Human biotechnology patents rely upon basic materials obtained from a human source.
The original material is unpatentable by virtue of Article 5 of the Biotechnology
Directive501 but isolated elements or those produced by a technical process may be
patentable even if identical to the natural element502, provided it qualifies and
industrial application is disclosed in the patent application503. Clearly there is a link
between the source material and the isolated material but the latter must be considered
'new'504 by the Directive in order to be patentable. The link between the original
material and the 'new' material is expressed within the Biotechnology Directive in
Recital 26, as follows:
5111 Article 5 Biotechnology Directive, 'the human body, at the various stages of its formation and
development, and the simple discovery of one of its elements, including the sequence or partial
sequence of a gene, cannot constitute patentable inventions.
5"2 Article 5 (2) Biotechnology Directive.
503 Article 5 (3) Biotechnology Directive.
504 Article 3 Biotechnology Directive.
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Whereas, if an invention is based on biological material of human origin or
if it uses such material, where a patent application is filed, the person from
whose body the material is taken from must have had an opportunity of
expressing free and informed consent thereto, in accordance with national
law.
It is not intended to discuss the complexities of national rules and regulation in relation
to the obtaining of consent, but it is important to indicate that the complexity of
obtaining consent has provided courts in the United Kingdom (and indeed elsewhere)
with a rich case history505, caused public scandals506 and created much debate in
cAH cno t m
parliament" and elsewhere" . It is submitted that similar investigations by the EPO
are unlikely and unwelcome. As stated by the European Court of Justice:
505 There are numerous cases involving refusal of consent, for instance, for religious reasons, such as in
Re T (adult) (refusal ofmedical treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 649, (1992) 9 BMLR 46, CA and Re C
(adult: refusal ofmedical treatment) [1994] 1 All ER 819, (1993) 15 BMLR 77. The law has tended
towards respecting patients' autonomy. On obtaining consent from those without mental capacity, see
for example, Marshall v Curry [1933] 3 DLR 260 Canadian Case (consent considered unnecessary for
removal of diseased testicle without consent for protection of patient's life and unreasonableness to
delay for later date); Williamson v East London and City Health Authority (1998) 41 BMLR 85
(damages awarded for mastectomy performed without consent even though treatment required, as
patient would not have consented). Consent relating to new bom child, see Wyatt (a Child) (medical
treatment: parents' consent) [2004] Fam 866 and for minors, Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech
Area HealthAuthority [1986] AC 112. [1985] 3 All ER402 HL.
506For example, the issue of the unauthorised removal, retention and disposal of human tissue at the
Alder Hey Children's Hospital between 1988 and 1995.
50
Including The United Kingdom Parliament, Select Committee on Science and Technology, Fourth
Report (20 March 2001). Chapter 7, paragraph 7.8. and the UK Government's consultative report.
'Human Bodies. Human Choices' (2002).
508 A good illustration and discussion of the consent debate can be found in JK Mason and GT Laurie,
'Mason andMcCall Smith's Law andMedical Ethics' (7th edition. OUP 2006), chapters 10, 18 & 19.
The requirement for consent arises out of self determination: 'The seriousness with which the law
views any invasion of physical integrity is based on the strong moral conviction that everyone has the
right of self determination with regard to his body...'. See also G Laurie. 'Patents, patients and
consent: Exploring the interface between regulation and innovation regimes' in Somsen (ed.), 'The
Regulatory Challenge ofBiotechnology': 'Consent, therefore, is not an end in itself, but rather a means
to an end - it is a means to respect people" page 216
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Reliance on this fundamental right is, however, clearly misplaced as against
a directive which concerns only the grant of patents and whose scope does
not therefore extend to activities before and after that grant, whether they
involve research or the use of the patented products.509
This raises the question of how Recital 26 is to be addressed if a challenge relating to
failure to obtain proper consent emerges. There is a clear parallel between this question
and research into HESCs in that both are pre-grant issues being questioned by a
Directive after the event and which has no control over either issue.
Cases have not yet arisen that would assist in interpreting Recital 26, but in the United
States the case ofMoore v Regents of the University of California510 is of interest
because the plaintiff511, whose cells were removed and isolated into an essential
element in a patent which was used to develop a multimillion dollar treatment, had no
claim either to the cells as altered or to the patent (which remained valid) that protected
them. His only claim lay in an action for damages in respect of the failure to obtain
appropriate consent. If the same set of circumstances arose in Europe under the
Biotechnology Directive, it is arguable that Recital 26 could invalidate any similar
patent either by virtue ofRecital 26 or through its expression within Article 6512.
509
Kingdom ofthe Netherlands case.
510 793 P 2D 479(1990).
511 John Moore suffered from hairy cell leukaemia and underwent a splenectomy. The surgeon in charge,
Dr Golde. established an immortal cell line from Moore's T-Lymphocytes and obtained a patent. He
later provided exclusive access rights to Genetics Institute in return for shares and an annual contract.
512 See discussion in Beyleveld, 'Wiry Recital 26 of the E.C. Directive...
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There is no requirement within the rules of the EPO or the United Kingdom Patent
Office to furnish proof of consent at the time of patent application and in an effort to
ascertain the effect of Recital 26 I contacted both offices and the following are
• 513 •
responses to my question" regarding the necessity of proof of consent, the first being
from the United Kingdom Patent Office:
In accordance with the 1977 Patents Act, the UK-IPO514 does not require
evidence of consent when dealing with inventions based upon human
origin; this is also consistent with practice under the European Patent
Convention. The Recitals of a Directive set the context for and are referred
to in the interpretation of the Articles of the Directive; they do not form
stand-alone legal requirements. There are other legal provisions in place in
the UK to provide some protection to an individual from whom tissue
samples have been taken, such as the Human Tissue Act 2004, but the
practice of the UK-IPO does not fall within the scope of such provisions515.
Secondly, the following is the EPO's response:
513 "I write to ask whether the Intellectual Property Office UK requires evidence of consent of donor in
relation to inventions based on human origin. If not what is the office policy in relation to consent?'
Dr Rowena Dinham. Senior Patent Examiner (Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals) responded to this
query. A similar query addressed to the European Patent Office received no response.
514 The United Kingdom Patent Office has been reorganised under the umbrella of the UK Intellectual
Property Office
515 Dr Rowena Dinham. Senior Patent Examiner, (Biotechnology and Pharmaccuticals).UK-IPO.
Concept House. Cardiff Road. Newport. NP10 8QQ by email Monday 18th June 2007
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Rule 23b (l)...aims in particular to ensure that the recitals of the Directive
preceding its provisions, although not legally binding, are also taken into
account and to promote a uniform Europe-wide interpretation of the
relevant provisions. [Quotes Recital 26]
There is however nothing in the legally binding Articles of the Directive -
the 'operative part' as Recital 38 calls it - which seeks to give effect to this.
There is thus no general patentability requirement within European patent
law that the donor of the biological material has to be given the opportunity
to give free and informed consent. Recital 26 is rather to be seen as an
encouragement to seek prior informed consent. Legal consequences to the
non-respect of this encouragement therefore lie outside the ambit of
European Patent law, i.e. civil administrative or penal law of the EPO
Contracting States.
As highlighted by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in its judgement in
CASE C-377/98, the Directive concerns only the grant of patents and its
scope does not therefore extend to activities before and after the grant,
whether they involve research or the use of patent products516.
The EPO response is interesting not least because of the treatment of recitals as 'not
legally binding'. In some circumstance recitals may not create legal obligations upon
states but, if subject to other obligations, such as being connected to an Article within
516 Christof Friedrich. EPO. letter and email dated 27th September 2007
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the relevant Directive517 or another Directive or Convention518, then such a recital must
be binding at least to the extent of the related obligation. If it is accepted that Recital
26 does not create a binding obligation upon signatory states, which some would argue
is not correct519, it must still be arguable that the failure to obtain consent is immoral520
and so Recital 26 must be read in conjunction with Article 6 and thus creates a moral
obligation breach ofwhich will result in invalidity of any such patent.
In the event of an application being made before the EPO, or in national patent offices,
regarding failure or inadequacy of consent, the standard of consent is based upon
whether or not consent has been obtained in accordance with national law. It must be
presumed that this relates to the country in which the consent was obtained or where
the opportunity to give consent was made (as opposed to where the case is brought or
where research is carried out). Therefore it is irrelevant if the manner of obtaining
consent is manifestly inadequate according to the rules of the country of patent (or
where the application is brought) or the views of the EPO.
The Biotechnology Directive could have been made conditional upon states adopting
certain standards upon research or obtaining consent or use of particular human
material etc. But it did not, and given the ten years of discussions, drafts and redrafts to
517 For example, Recital 16 (dignity and integrity of the person) and is given expression in Article 5, and
Recitals 36-39 refer specifically to ordre public and morality and reflect the obligations within Article
6 although differing in a number of ways, including the addition of two other inventions which are
'...Obviously also excluded from patentability
518 For example, Recital 43 refers to the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms 1950 (ECHR 1950). And Recital 55 refers to Decision 93/626/EEC (OJ L 309, 31.12.1993,
p. 1) and to the Convention on Biological Diversity (5 June 1992).
519
Beyleveld. 'Why Recital 26 of the E.C. Directive...'.
520 Ibid.
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arrive at the final compromise, it was hardly likely that such issues would be
addressed. As there is no common standard and the EPO is not charged with or capable
of providing a common standard, the approach of interpretation of consent on a
national basis is eminently sensible. In one respect this appears disharmonious, but in
the absence of a common standard throughout the EPO Member States the local
standard must prevail. The previous case illustrated the confusion of adopting the
approach of EPO in attempting to direct individual member states, which operate
research policy in different ways, and it is suggested here that a similar approach to
that of consent should be taken in respect ofmorality.
The first case study illustrates the weakness of, and complications which arise from,
using patent law to address moral issues that occur before the grant of patent. The
complications arises through tensions created between the European Patent Office and
National Policy and between patent law and regulation (in these examples regulation
relating to research) suggest that interventions by patent law into areas of regulation
unconnected to the 'traditional' view of patent law should be avoided, at least in so far
as pre-grant issues are concerned. Tensions that may exist between States relating to
moral differences between what may be immoral to patent and what is acceptable are
difficult to reconcile in a situation where a central body such as the EPO assesses
morality on a uniform basis where in situations where there is no consensus. The
second case study, relating to consent, leaves the interpretation of what amounts to
appropriate consent in the hands of National institutions and National Law and it is
suggested that this is a more appropriate way to look at the issue of morality within
216
European Patent Law. In this way patent practice would coincide with national
regulation.
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(5) (b) (ii) Post-Grant Stage
'You can never plan the future by the past.'521
Subsequent to an award of patent the inventor begins to exploit the invention
commercially. This third stage in the innovation time line also signifies the creation of
a disincentive to others, who cannot then trade or use the invention outlined in the
patent claims. This part of the balance discussed earlier also marks the trade-off
between incentives and restriction, thereby giving rise to the patent paradox. This
section examines cases where the balance is weighted so far in the patentee's favour
that the patent paradox fails. It is not possible to balance the patentee's reward in such
a way that it equates with the contribution but in some cases it is arguable that
interference in the patent monopoly would be justified.
The first case study looked at using patent law as a broader regulatory instrument to
raise objections and to influence inventions per se or research. Instead of asking
whether an immoral invention should be exploited, this section enquires whether
exploitation is immoral. Clearly exploitation can be immoral even if its invention is
moral, if it occurs in a way that is so restrictive that there are few beneficiaries and
further research is inhibited. The European Patent Office has however indicated that
such questions are economic and not moral and that it is not the place for patent law to
decide upon such points: 'The EPO has not been vested with the task of taking into
521 Edmund Burke, "Letter to a member of the National Assembly (1791)', quoted from The Oxford
Dictionary of Quotations (5th edition. OUP 1999). 162.
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account the economic effects of the grant of patents in specific areas and of restricting
the field of patentable subject-matter accordingly'522.
I submit that there are compelling reasons why patent law should consider such a role.
Patent law could manage the monopoly it provides in better ways than by attempting to
control inventions, through appeals to morality, which earlier discussion has shown to
be flawed. Furthermore a patent grants a monopoly so it is reasonable that the granting
mechanism should take some responsibility for that. Indeed the following study
illustrates that there can be negative effects from patent grants which suffocate the
contribution and that patent law can have a direct and effective role in such control.
There may be reluctance to interfere in the patent monopoly in case this results in
weakening the powerful incentive effect of patent grants523. Yet this objection relies
upon the weakening effect of the incentive brought about by the interference in patent
monopoly being much greater than that of the advantages gained from reducing the
scope of particular patents. Whether such a calculation would always be the case is a
moot point.
The next case study examines several cases, including the Myriad Genetics patent over
the BRCA 1 and 2 genes, which raised genuine concerns about the ramifications of
patents in particular cases. The relevant concerns in this section are about the
commercial exploitation of inventions and whether they can be contrary to morality if
a patent grant has been abused, for example, with the result that the patent paradox no
longer applies.
522 NOFARTIS/Transgenic Plant [2000] EPOR 303.
523 Indeed this has been the experience of compulsory licenses
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CS (3) Case Study Three - Defeat of the Patent Paradox: Ethical aspects of
exploitation
This case study examines the exploitation stage of innovation and the potential of
patents to hinder the aim of promoting access and instead discourages innovation. It
examines the effects of several patents upon areas of innovation of the field in
question. The possibility of patents hindering further progress is, as discussed, likely to
be more prevalent in biotechnology patenting because of the 'cumulative innovation
paradigm'"24 caused by 'upstream' gene patents blocking research further along the
innovation process. To address this within the context of the morality clause it is
necessary to raise the question of whether commercial exploitation has been contrary
to morality. It is impossible to guess whether exploitation will be contrary to morality
at the time of grant and it would seem that if commercial exploitation is to be a
criterion for refusal of patent grant it would be required to be a continuing process.
The difficulty is to assess how morality is to be decided in this context. We have seen
how morality can be interpreted in different ways at different times by different people.
The basic tenet, it is suggested, is that it is immoral for the grant of a patent to be used
in such a way that there is an overall reduction in access to resources. For example a
patentee can argue quite validly that was it not for his contribution the world would not
have access to his new invention. Thus by virtue of inventing the world is enriched and
whatever way he exploits the invention is irrelevant because there will still be an
increase in what was available. This argument does not always hold true. For example
524 S. Basheer, 'Block Me Not: Are Patented Genes "Essential Facilities"?', University of Oxford,
Berkeley Electronic Press, 2005, available from < http://law.bepress.coin/cxpresso/cps/577 > at page
2.
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if the particular invention is exploited in a way that prevents further innovation or
access to the invention is restricted by other terms which affect access to other
resources then that is arguably immoral. If such a situation arises by virtue of the grant
of a patent then it is submitted that it is immoral for the patent to be continued to be
used in such a way. The following cases reveal a number of circumstances whereby
similar situations have arisen and thus reveal a danger that at present patent law has no
effective control of.
Several studies525 have examined the effects of patent grants for biotechnology related
inventions upon further research and a number of common conclusions emerge. The
potential blocking effects of biotechnological patents still gives cause for concern that
they '... can cause a tension between private profit and public good. Not least, they can
hinder the free exchange of ideas and information on which science thrives' 526. Despite
this there does appear to be, in many cases, evidence of cooperation which has resulted
in avoiding blocking effects through working practices and licence agreements
although this is not seen as occurring in every case. 'However difficulties arose in
527
agreeing licences in many cases'
525
Including. Intellectual Property Institute, 'Patents for Genetic Sequences: The Competitiveness of
Current UK Law and Practice, A study by the Intellectual Property Institute (IPI) on behalf of the
DTI' (May 2004). available from <www.dti.gov.uk>; The Royal Society, 'Keeping Science open":,
and the Gowers Review.
526 The Royal Society, 'Keeping Science open'.
52 IPI. 'Patents for Genetic Sequences: The Competitiveness of Current UK Law and Practice'.
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A number of submissions to the Australian Law Reform Commission formed a
similar conclusion528. One stated that although gene patents do not appear to have
an adverse impact on research currently, 'this appears to be because patents are not
being enforced rather than because they either encourage or inhibit biotechnology
research'529.
Problems of access created by early-stage patents were discussed in the 2004 report by
the Intellectual Property Institute (IPI) on behalf of the Department of Trade and
Industry550. IPI carried out empirical research into the negative research consequences
of patenting, specifically related to genetic sequences. Although it seemed that reach-
through licensing was accepted as 'reasonable business practice where appropriate
contribution has been made to the end product'531 a number of issues arose including:
(1) Discovering who owns a key patent
(2) US practices being more restrictive
(3) Royalty stacking resulting in multiple negotiations with
different parties and uncertain outcomes
(4) Lack of universally accepted confidentiality clause
(5) Avoiding certain areas where there is a thicket of patents.
528 The quote pertains to Australia, where similar issues have arisen to those in Europe, and relates to the
potential for aggressive IP practices to reduce innovation in the absence of control enabling research in
the face of protected material.
529 C Dent. P Jensen. S Walker and B Webster, 'Research Use of Patented Knowledge: A Review', STI
Working Paper 2006/2 (OECD 2006). 25.
53° jpi -patents for Genetic Sequences: The Competitiveness of Current UK Law and Practice'.
531 Ibid. 126.
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Not all the respondents have faced difficulties and some had only minor problems but
foresaw greater hurdles ahead.
Cases in which such concern arises tend to relate to early stage innovation where
results provide a base or vector for further research. If the results are patented then
further research requires a licence. The consequence is that knowledge is disseminated
through licence agreements532 rather than publication, which gives rise to deliberate or
incidental blocking effects or 'patent thickets'. 'The ideal IP system creates incentives
for innovation, without unduly limiting access for consumers and follow-on
innovators'533. The following examples illustrate that particular circumstances can give
rise to the situation where access becomes unduly limited and that the patent system is
restricted in its ability to react and remove the resulting restraints.
532 It has generally been the case that licenses were used to disseminate knowledge but as licenses come
at a cost then an increase in patenting prior to publication means that there is additional cost and
because licenses relate to signatory parties the dissemination is significantly narrower than through
publication
533 Gowers Review, foreword.
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CS (3) Myriad Genetics patents on genes BRCA 1 and BRCA 2
The four Myriad patents534 over two genes linked to the susceptibility to breast and
ovarian cancer535 caused 'unparalleled legal challenge in the European Union'536 and
although the patents were amended after opposition proceedings, the issues raised
continue to be significant for patent law. Curiously the grounds of opposition537 and
the basis for invalidating (or at least amending) the patents conceal the true motivation
behind the numerous538 objections to the patents. The opposition proceedings were
founded upon principles of technical patent law, that the claimed invention lacked
inventive step, novelty and industrial application and was insufficiently disclosed,
rather than moral grounds. The patents were amended as a result of the technical
opposition and, in the case of EP 699754, were revoked on the basis of novelty and
failure to disclose the invention fully. The motivation for raising the objections was
quite different and related more to the manner in which the patents enabled Myriad to
exploit the inventions:
534 EPO granted three patents to Myriad in relation to BRCA1 (EP 0699754, EP705902 and EP
0705903) and one over BRCA2 (EP 0785216).
535 In October 1990 Mary-Claire King discovered that breast cancer was hereditary and she progressed to
finding the location of the breast cancer gene. Sensing the commercial potential, rival groups
competed to isolate the gene with the aim of using it to test for the predisposition to develop breast
cancer. Commercially, for the first to isolate the gene it would be significant to obtain patents in order
to prevent others from offering the same tests and. in 1994, Dr M Skolnick of Myriad Genetics
isolated BCRA 1 & 2 and obtained patents on the 'composition of matter' over the isolated gene and a
"method of use' patent for diagnosis and treatment. See M Rimmer, 'Myriad Genetics: Patent law and
Genetic Testing' [2003] EIPR 20.
536 J Paradise. 'European opposition to exclusive control over predictive Breast Cancer Testing and the
inherent implications for U.S. Patent Law and Public Policy: A Case Study of the Myriad Genetics'
BRCA Patent Controversy' (2004) 59 Food and Drug Law Journal. 59.
537 The opposition proceedings are not the main point of interest for this work but more the motivation
behind them and that the opponents had really only that route to take against the patents in question.
The thesis suggests that a alternative procedure could be used in such cases which would be lied more
to the real reasons for such opposition. This is discussed in chapter six .
53x
Opposition proceedings were filed against BRCA1 by several organisations including, Switzerland's
Social Democratic Party. German Greenpeace, the Netherlands Ministry of Health, Institut Curie
(France). The Belgium Society of Human Genetics and the Austrian Federal Ministry of Social
Security.
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Underlying the technical grounds for opposition were deeper ethical and
policy concerns. In addition to the continuing questions about patenting
inventions derived from the human genome, the Myriad case raised
concerns about the potentially limiting effects of the patents on further
research, on the development of new tests and diagnostic methods.539
The debate surrounding technical patent issues, whilst providing a solution to those
who opposed Myriad's patents, is arguably a means to an end rather than exhibiting the
real reasons for opposition:
Much of the debate surrounding the Myriad case, however, concerned not
the validity of the patents as such - similar patents held by other entities
have not attracted the same criticism - but rather the ethics of how the
patent rights were exercised commercially.540
These objections should be addressed because both the protagonists and antagonists in
the debate on the protection of genetic invention have much to lose. The patent
antagonists wish to restrain broad rights but the method that may be adopted will not
appeal to the supporters of strong rights541. The European Parliament for example
539 A von der Ropp and T Taubman, 'World Intellectual Property', Global IP Issues Division, WIPO
magazine 2006. Issue 4.
540 Ibid.
541 The cases led to a change in French Patent Law requiring compulsory licensing of diagnostic tests
(see B Williams-Jones, 'History of a Gene Patent: Tracing the Development and Application of
Commercial BRCA Testing', Health Law Journal). In Canada, the provinces of Alberta. Manitoba and
Ontario carried out their own BRCA 1 & 2 testing, in direct contravention ofMyriad's patent, and in
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called upon the European Patent Office to ensure that the Human Genome is freely
available for research purposes. The Nuffield Council urged that human gene patents
should become '.. the exception rather than the norm'542, the point being that in order
to address objections to the methods of exploitation, the policy appears to favour
restrictions upon what is patentable rather than the curtailment of exploitation:
'[sjeriously taking into account these concerns is the only approach that will be
beneficial to industry in the long run'543.
Three main objections against the methodology of exploitation; reduction in the quality
of patient health care, decrease in access and increased cost to patients, and restrictions
on further research544, underlie the reasons for such antagonistic opposition against the
Myriad patents. Under the terms of the Myriad patents, all DNA samples taken for
breast cancer screening had to be sent to Myriad's laboratories in Utah in the United
States. This was, according to Institut Curie, 'contrary to our conception of public
health...'545. The French Minister for Research said that Myriad had 'an abusive
monopoly in the exploitation of predisposition screening for breast cancer'546.
Europe, the EPO amended Myriad's BRCA1 patent to remove diagnostic methods from protection
and reduced the scope of the BRCA2 patent.
542 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 'The ethics of patenting DNA', 70: 'In the light of these conclusions,
we conclude that in the future, the granting of patents that assert rights over DNA sequences should
become the exception rather than the norm'.
5,3Somsen. 'The Regulatory Challenge of Biotechnology', Ovcrwalle G V, Reshaping bio-patents:
measures to restore trust in the patent system' p 244.
544 Paradise. 'European opposition to exclusive control over Predictive Breast Cancer Testing'.
545 Dr Dominique Stoppa-Lyonnet, Institut Curie, quoted in R Watson. 'France Challenges patent for
genetic screening of breast cancer' (2001) 323 BMJ 888.
546 Ibid.
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Opposition groups argued that the Myriad testing was inferior to other methods
because it carried a low predictive value of testing, offering only a 'general estimated
chance'547 in those women who had a family history of breast cancer and even lower
estimates for those that did not have such a history. The Myriad testing also failed to
detect 10-20% of mutations. In the event that a positive result emerged, Myriad's
marketing and business set-up, which separated the diagnosis from treatment and
counselling, resulted in failure to provide psychological support for patients and
families. Myriad's aim, it was alleged, was to maximise profits without concern for the
consequences for patients548 and this was permitted and enabled because of the hold
that the patent had given them.
Myriad's testing was expensive compared with other tests. The cost of sending results
to Myriad's laboratories in Utah was three times that of French testing549 and the result
was that either an alternative and sub-standard method was used or no testing took
place.
Research was potentially hampered by the Myriad patents because researchers were
restricted in the use of the genes under the Myriad patent and the requirement to send
all samples to its Utah laboratory enabled Myriad to build the only database in respect
of results from breast cancer testing and allowed it a monopoly over further research
upon that material.
54 Paradise, 'European opposition to exclusive control over Predictive Breast Cancer Testing'. 147.
548 Ibid.
549 Ibid. Myriad's test cost 2744 Euros whilst a similar French test cost approximately 914 Euros.
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To allow the exclusive monopoly over human genes to continue in
dereliction of healthcare and scientific research runs contrary to the public
interest and the goals of the patent system, both in Europe and in the United
States.550
Although the end result may have satisfied some of the objections, the underlying issue
that caused the concern in the first place is still at large. Accepted that the case is
evidence that '...the checks and balances within the patent systems have proved to
work rather well in revoking a patent which happened to lack inventive step...it also
demonstrates that if the technical faults are not found to be present there is nothing that
patent law could do in order to redress the true objections to the patents: 'What is
happening today can happen again tomorrow with any patent based on a genetic
,551
sequence
I submit that there is a gap within patent law which has been exposed by these cases
and which is also illustrated, in differing degrees, by the cases outlined below. It is
asserted that if a patent is used in the manner described above then an issue arises as to
the morality of the exploitation. The factors that may give rise to such a situation
include:
• Absence of alternative
550 Ibid., 154
551 Dr Jean-Francois Mattei. Professor of Medicine and Genetics and deputy in the French Parliament,
quoted in Watson. "France Challenges patent for genetic screening of breast cancer".
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• Essentiality of invention - the BRCA patents covered what would have been
for many the difference between life and death
• Unreasonable terms of licences - Myriad insisted that all tests be referred to
their laboratory at high cost to patients
• Further research was hampered
• The above criticisms were enabled because of the grant of patent
• Revocation of patent would be an effective remedy
The main thrust of the objections against the Myriad patents was related to the manner
of exploitation but restitution was achieved by attacking patent validity and not
through addressing the commercial exploitation of the Myriad. If the Myriad patents
had been held to be valid, and similar cases may arise in the future where invalidity
may not be called into question, then there is no other forum open in which to address
the situation. It is submitted that the manner of exploitation adopted by Myriad using
the BRCA raises a moral issue that patent law would be able to effectively address if it
had the mandate to do so and that patent law is flawed by not possessing such a
mandate.
Myriad have manifestly illustrated this tendency and have demonstrated
the potential negative effect of patents on the supply of diagnostic testing
services. According to Matthijs552, other hindering patent seem to be
552
Mattliijs G & Halley D. "European-wide opposition against the breast cancer gene patents", European
Journal ofHuman Genetics 10, 783-784 (2002)
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emerging as well, like the one on Haemochromatosis. Such blocking
patents are worrisome and have to be watched closely.553
CS (3) MSP-1 Protein - Patent Stacks
This second example illustrates how further research can be hampered due to a
plethora of patents and patent law is unable to provide a remedy, instead researchers
having to rely upon a mixture of the goodwill of other patentees and hard work and
expense in tracing patentees and negotiating licenses.
The programme for Approved Technology in Health ("PATH")554, part of the Malaria
Vaccine Initiatives ("MVI")555 set up to develop vaccines for malaria, supported the
development of a vaccine for malaria. Its path was hindered by the proliferation of
patents that had been granted in respect of or relating to MSP-1, a protein produced by
the malaria parasite and which was likely to form the basis of any vaccine. At least 22
related patents were discovered each of which had to be checked for relevance and
ownership had to be sourced so as to obtain relevant permissions. This involved
significant loss of time, futile effort and needless cost, but in the end proved to be
successful.
Different combinations of stacking can also lead to problems. Sometimes drugs have
to be administered via a combination of dosages for different treatments. A single
party could hold several patents which form one treatment, but if several patentees
553 Overwalle G. 'Gene Patents and Public HealthBruylant, 2007, at page 23
554 PATH is an international non-profit organisation set up to improve global health and well-being
555 MVI aims to increase development of malaria vaccines throughout the world
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own different drugs which form part of a combination, and they refuse to co-operate
towards efficient production of one particular treatment, patient care and further
research will suffer as a consequence556. Two companies might refuse to combine
patents to form one treatment with the result that two fees need to be paid, or several
companies with different aims and patents may cause difficulties for one company
wishing to combine all patents to form one medicinal product, as in the malaria
example above.
This type of situation should not be enabled by a system that is intended to encourage
overall access and innovation. In particular in cases where there may be several uses
for an invention and patentees have not either exploited that use or have not realised its
potential there should a procedure available to free up access or at least to encourage
cooperation.
CS (3) Human Genome Sciences Inc. and CCR5 Receptor
Human Genome Sciences Inc. (HGS) was granted a patent over a protein with claimed
functions including acting as a receptor for screening and as a diagnostic tool. HGS did
not appreciate at the time that the same protein was also a foundation through which
the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) enters white blood cells. The protein was
thus an essential step in the pursuit of treatments for AIDS and HIV infection. Once
the connection between the CCR5 protein and HIV had been had been discovered
researchers found that they were prevented from using CCR5 for further research
because of the HGS patent. After public outcry, in particular against the speculative
556 See Medecins Sans Fronticres. 'Drug Patents Under the Spotlight' for further examples.
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nature of the stated utility in the HGS patent, HGS granted a licence so research could
continue.
The case illustrates the dangers of granting broad product patents. One method of
preventing similar problems arising in future is to limit the patent on products to a
specific function. Alternatively a mechanism could be created to be instigated after the
grant of a patent to enable such obstructions to be eased, and the final chapter suggests
a method of achieving this.
Had HGS been awarded a patent only for the particular uses stated in its patent, and
some would argue that the patent system should only award patents with stated and
specific function as opposed to broad product patents, then there would not have been
a blockage. In that case would there be a detrimental effect on initial research? Reports
suggest that research companies rely upon licences of such patents in order to pay for
their own research and continue to develop other research tools. In most cases licences
are agreed without huge controversy but in the event that patentees become over
restrictive, as with HGS, initially, and with the Myriad Genetics example, should a
remedy not be available to force a release of the blockage, or would that also have a
detrimental effect on the incentive to research? The latter is a less restrictive method of
allowing research to flow and it is suggested that post-grant sanction would be a
preferable way ahead in similar circumstances.
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CS (3) Se\>ere Acute Respiratory Syndrome
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) virus, a form of atypical pneumonia557 is
a viral respiratory illness caused by a coronavirus558, which became a world health
concern in 2003 as it spread across the globe from Asia, infecting 8098 and killing 774
people559. Urgent action to find a cure began and included the isolation of the virus by
a network of collaborating scientific institutions. This was also a cause of rivalry
between competitors to obtain commercial protection for their endeavours, so there
was a race to the patent offices to patent part or all of the SARS genome. In this case
the competitors in the race were research institutions (the US Center for Disease
Control and Prevention, the Canadian British Columbia Cancer Agency, and the
University of Hong Kong and Versitech Limited), opting to patent 'defensively' so as
to ensure that the information would remain within the public domain and so prevent
commercial interests from monopolising treatment of SARS in the future. Clearly they
envisaged major difficulties with the current patent system, otherwise they would not
have undertaken such expensive and pro-active measures:
They did so in order to prevent private companies from monopolising the
future diagnosis and treatment of SARS and in the realisation that patents
on early research results can prevent others from exploiting this knowledge
in their quest for treatment. The idea, then, was to ensure that no one had a
557 See M Rimmer, 'The Race to Patent the SARS Virus: The TRIPS Agreement and Access to
Essential Medicines' [2004] Melbourne Journal of International Law, 335.
Available at < http://works.bepress.com/matthew_rimmer/17>.
558 A coronavirus is a cone-shaped enveloped virus that infects the upper respiratory and gastrointestinal
tract of birds and mammals and includes most common colds (Center for Disease Control and
Prevention <http://www.cdc.gov/NClDOD/SARS/factsheet.htm>'). Last accessed 3rd January 2008
559 Ibid.
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monopoly on knowledge about the disease, thus delaying the development
of a treatment for it560.
Altruism may appear to be the winner but there is a dark side too. The intervention was
one-off and did not solve the original problem, namely that in the normal course of
events it was believed by the relevant institutions that private enterprise would have
stifled the search for a vaccine. This therefore implies that in further similar cases
when an open approach like this is not followed, altruism of this sort could be
unsustainable561, and if that proved to be the case then future research will be impeded
because of the very system set up to encourage it.
...as genomic patents increase in number, it will become prohibitively
expensive for public organisations to afford not only the expense of patenting
genomes and DNA sequences, but also the significant costs of entering into
licences and administering those licences. Expecting non-profit organisations
to obtain patents on all their genomic inventions is not a sustainable solution to
maintaining an open free public domain.562
A complete solution has not therefore been found to the openness issue especially as
these were not the only parties to apply for patents over the SARS virus. A number of
pharmaceutical companies and other scientists in Hong Kong and Canada563 were
involved. Moreover a proactive open patent policy would not prevent applications and
560 Danish Council ofEthics. 'Patenting Human Genes and Stem Cells', 55-6.
561 See Rimmer, 'The Race to Patent the SARS Vims'.
562 R Gold. 'SARS Genome Patent: Symptom or Disease?' (2003) 361 The Lancet.
563 Danish Council ofEthics. 'Patenting Human Genes and Stem Cells'.
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product patents that involve the SARS virus from being patented and kept out of the
public domain.
Endeavours to keep research open as illustrated by the above scenario are to be
applauded but clearly they do not present long term answers if similar situations
arise564 where commercial interests react more defensively and perhaps succeed in
impeding further research. It can also be asserted that moving all patents away from
such early stage research is also not really an appropriate response because of the
necessity for patents in the promotion of general research, as outlined earlier. The
patent system therefore appears to be 'caught between two stools' in these cases -
remove patents and research is not promoted or encouraged, but keep patents and
research is inhibited.
There are no clear-cut answers. But when pre-emptive patenting is
necessary to ensure that rapid solutions are found to an important health
problem, something seems to be out of balance. Policy-makers should
investigate what checks and balances are necessary to ensure that the patent
system continues to do its job of stimulating innovation for the public
good.565
The key would seem to be to find appropriate 'checks and balances' in a system that
appears to consist of irreconcilable and opposing tensions; open or closed, patent or no
564 Other examples of similar situations have arisen, such as patents held by Gencntech Inc, over human
epidermal growth factor receptor 2 (HER2) and Trastuzumab. and patents held over two mutations in
the haemochromatosis gene (HFE) which resulted in a reduction in research into genetic testing for
HFE mutations, see B Goldman. "HER2 testing: The patent 'genee' is out of the bottle', 8 May 2007
CMAJ.
565, 'Gene Patents and the Public Good' (15 May 2003) 423 Nature. 207.
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patent. A solution must presuppose a compromise in certain cases but the difficulty is
defining how concessions can be expressed in a system that relies upon the lottery
effect where one winner takes all; therein lies its strength and its weakness: '...the
patent system needs to be adjusted - not discarded - by governments to better reach
the goal of that system: the attainment of the public good'566.
566 Ibid.
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(5) (b) (in) Options for Access
It is likely that biotech patenting will continue despite the objections that have arisen
and regardless of the degree of animosity towards some aspects of biotechnology by
particular interest groups and by governments. The limits of patenting are however
likely to continue to be keenly contested, both in relation to the extent that objections
to science are expressed within the patent system and to whether the granting of patent
rights hinders development rather than promotes it.
Overall patent law is neither an appropriate nor a useful forum within which to govern
the course of research and development nor to direct responses to complex ethical
debate surrounding particular technologies. Patent law nevertheless has a part to play
as a pertinent platform upon which ethical objections to the exercise of patent
monopolies can be coordinated and countered. A number of alternative methods of
addressing access issues have been mooted, and are discussed below, but it is
submitted that none have the advantages of patent law which is, after all, the harbinger
of objections yet also the foundation of incentive. The justification for patent law is the
balance that it keeps between incentive and reward, so it is appropriate for patent law
to be accountable towards the maintenance of that balance. 'The key therefore is to
offer patent protection while protecting society's right to benefit from new
• 567discoveries'" .
567 Goldman. 'HER2 testing'.
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Two main alternatives568 lie within different stages of the patent process. The first is an
extension of the compulsory licence system and research exemptions. The second is
exclusion of more inventions from patent protection by tightening of patent
qualifications or through the morality clause. This work suggests that a solution could
also be found in applying morality more precisely and within the relevant stage of
innovation and this will be examined in chapter six. There are limitations with other
options available at present as the following suggests
(5) (b) (iii) (a) Tightening of patent qualifications
One way of attempting to tackle the access issue is to raise patent hurdles and thereby
grant fewer patents. This suggestion has been advocated by the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development and was mentioned in its report on genetic
inventions: '... patent offices may choose or be asked to apply stricter guidelines when
interpreting whether an invention is novel, useful or represents an inventive step'.
Furthermore the Nuffield Council on Bioethics proposed:
...that in general, the granting of patents which assert rights over DNA
sequences as research tools should be discouraged. We take the view that
the best way to discourage the award of such patents is by a stringent
application of the criteria for patenting, particularly that of utility.569
568 As Van Overwalle noted 'Only two measures exist to temper cases of extreme monopolistic licensing
behaviour of patent holders: the compulsory licensing scheme in patent law and the abuse of dominant
position provision in competition law.' Overwalle G, Gene patents and Public Health, Bruylant. 2007,
page 21
569 Nuffield Council on Bioethics. 'The ethics of patenting DNA', page 71 paragraph 6.11.
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Patent guidelines should be followed when assessing patentability but there is no
justification to increase these hurdles for particular inventions merely as a response to
overzealous exploitation by a minority of patent holders.
Another alternative is to limit 'product patent' and to allow only the specific purpose570
contained in the patent application. Similarly patent law could enable protection only
for end products571 such as drugs targeted at specific diseases. Such 'purpose bound
protection' has been adopted in Germany and France so 'DNA patent can be claimed
but only in respect of a specific use'572. There are difficulties with these approaches in
that issues could remain whereby patents are dependent upon others and so the same
sorts of problems as already alluded to may arise. The risk is that a single purpose
turns out to be so uneconomic or trivial that the project fails without any further
prospect when continued research might have brought success and encouraged
innovators to proceed. Proliferation of patents results in patent stacks and specific use
patents would inevitably result in more patents, which encourages the growth of patent
stacks. It is the ways in which patents can be exploited to advance patentees'
commercial positions that cause the difficulties mentioned above, rather than the grant
of patents per se.
(5) (b) (iii) (b) Compulsory licences
Provisions exist for the award of compulsory licences in strictly defined circumstances.
These may apply, in the United Kingdom, in circumstances where, after a period of
5711 Danish Council of Ethics. 'The Ethics ofPatenting Human Genes and Stem Cells', 36.
571 Overwalle, 'Reshaping bio-patents: measures to restore trust in the patent system', 245.
572 Dutfield. 'DNA Patenting: Implications for public health research".
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three years from the grant of a patent, demand is not being met, the invention can be
worked in the UK, that a license has been unreasonably refused, and is at the discretion
of the comptroller"73. The issuing of compulsory licences is limited and is aimed at
encouraging the use of inventions that have not been worked, rather than tackling the
sort of situations discussed above.
There have been calls for the compulsory licensing system to be extended574. On the
one hand an extension to the use of compulsory licences may harm incentives575 but on
the other hand compulsory licences may not be sufficient and a broader approach to
post-grant control is suggested576. It will also be suggested that one option open to
patent authorities should be compulsory licensing but justified on a moral basis of the
manner of exploitation rather than under the current situation and that such compulsory
license can relate to specific uses of invention. Thus compulsory licenses per se are not
objected to herein but they are seen a part of a broader picture of post-grant control.
(5) (b) (iii) (c) Competition Law
The objections arise in the above instances because the patents have been one of a
number of factors that have contributed to the 'interplanetary alignment' theory,
described above, and because of the method adopted by patentees to exploit their
inventions. One could suggest that competition law would be an appropriate
mechanism to decide the fairness or otherwise of such situations because one can
573 See section one above and s. 48 Patents Act 1977 (UK).
574 See IPI. "Patents for Genetic Sequences: The Competitiveness ofCurrent UK Law and Practice'.
575 See Danish Council of Ethics, The Ethics of Patenting Human Genes and Stem Cells, in particular
SJR Bostyn. "DNA Patents in Europe: Controversy Remains'.
576 See section five.
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clearly see tension between awards of monopolies and provisions that relate to
increasing competition577. As we have seen, though, the existence of monopolies is not
necessarily detrimental as their effect is determined by other factors, including the
behaviour of the monopolist. 'Indeed, both bodies of law share the same basic
objective of promoting consumer welfare and an efficient allocation of resources'578.
Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty deal with European competition law and although
this work is not concerned with competition law, it is worth mentioning these
provisions as they can, in particular circumstances, apply to intellectual property
agreements:
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common
market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the
common market... Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
1) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other
unfair trading conditions;
2) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of
consumers;
3) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
57 The European Commission has declared: 'The fact that intellectual property laws grant exclusive
rights of exploitation does not imply that intellectual property rights are immune from competition.'
Commission Notice. 'Guidelines on the Application of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to technology
transfer agreements' OJ 2004/C 101/02.
57s Ibid.
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4) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to
commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such
579
contracts."
There is some tension between competition law and the granting of patent rights but
the holding of a patent does not mean that the patentee has a dominant position that
amounts to abuse. What amounts to abuse in these circumstances is still being tested
and will perhaps be tested even more in the future as the growth in unique medical-
related patents continues. Refusal of a licence by itself, unless there are 'exceptional
circumstances'580, would not amount to an abuse581.
It is tempting to argue that Myriad being compelled to license the use of the BRCA
tests on condition that the samples must be tested in their own laboratories was going
beyond the specific subject matter of the patent582, but if the tie-in licence is
indispensable for successful exploitation of the patent (which Myriad argue is the case
583
anyway) then this would not succeed" . It is therefore submitted that Article 81 would
not be of assistance in the above circumstances. Furthermore Article 81 does not apply
if trade between member states is unaffected.584 In any event, despite the
579 Article 82 Treaty of Rome
5811 Joined cases C-241/91 and C-242/91P. RTE andlTP v Commission (Magill) [1995] ECR1-743.
581 See also Case C-238/87, Volvo v Veng | 1988] ECR 6211, [1989] CMLR 122.
582 See Case C-l 93/83 Windsurfing International v Commission [1986] ECR 611, [1986] 3 CLMR 489.
583Articles 2 (1) (1) of the Intellectual Property Block Exemptions were replaced by Technology
Transfer Block Exemption in 1996 and again by revised exemptions and guidelines.
584Article 81 applies where '.. .practices.. .may affect trade between member states...' and see also Re A.
Raymond & Co. and Nagoya Rubber Ltd Agreement. EC Commission 72/238, (1972) OJ L143/39.
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unprecedented objections to the Myriad BRCA patents and their chosen commercial
practices, there were no cases brought under competition law and changes to
competition law are not seen as a way forward.
...an antitrust remedy cannot be a panacea to resolve the blocking or
restricted access issue for all time to come. Rather, if the blocking issue
becomes pervasive, it may be more prudent to devise a more focused
remedy585.
It should be noted that the role of the competition authorities in regulating
IP markets should not extend to price regulation: patents are exclusive rights
which enable owners to charge monopoly prices. However, there should be
increased collaboration between the Patent Office, the Competition
Commission and the Office of Fair Trading to establish an understanding of
how healthy competition can flourish in the information market and how IP
can both stimulate and occasionally stunt dynamic competition586.
The problems discussed above have been created because of the grant of patents
and can be addressed through a softening of patents in similar circumstances.
Patents, as noted, are 'blunt instruments' and it is suggested that a sharpening or
focusing of approach to their use in exploitation is the way forward.
Basheer, 'Block Me Not', 2.
586 Gowers Review.
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(5) (c) Where Now for Patent Law
This section has examined some of the objections and controversies that have arisen
during recent years with the expansion of biotechnology research and the patenting of
its derivatives. The objections against biotechnology have been varied but the response
to them has not reflected this variety in that the main instrument of addressing
concerns in European Patent Law has been the morality clause, which is not designed
for such issues nor able to act effectively to answer them.
The three case studies illustrate different scenarios to enable study of the various
regulatory nuances within patent law. The debate in relation to the patenting of human
embryonic stem cells illustrated a number of difficulties in using patent law to address
issues of science. If such a regulatory role is accepted as legitimate for patent law, and
this work has argued against that, then there are criticisms to be made of how the
objections are to be approached by patent law because, for example, there are no clear
guidelines as to what the morality clause is aimed at or how matters of moral balance
should be decided. Furthermore such a role is fundamentally flawed in that regardless
of the merit of the deliberations there is no direct connection between the decision to
refuse a patent over such inventions and the invention per se.
But the relevant debates should begin at the right point, with the research
and its potential uses and not with the wholly subordinate question of
patents. The patent issue is no short-cut to the resolution of the more
244
difficult questions, and until these have been properly addressed, patenting
should not be singled out for attack.587
The grant or potential grant of a patent does not cause unethical behaviour, nor does
the withdrawal of incentive prevent it.
The discussion regarding the issue of obtaining consent for the removal of human
tissue illustrates similar flaws to the HESC cases in that the method adopted by patent
law fails to address the issue with any consequence. Yet the discussion shows a closer
relationship (objection to commercialisation) between the issue (i.e. consent) and the
method (i.e. patent law)588, and it also juxtaposes to this a number of weaknesses in
treating consent with patent law, not least the provision of a link between donor and
patented material589 (yet which, by definition, has no link590) and provision of a
connection between donor and material within patent law when no such link is
permitted in regulation. This rather complicated summary is in part due to the manner
in which the law treats ownership of body material but more usefully however, leaving
the issue of consent to national rules, as stated by Recital 26 of the Biotechnology
Directive, as opposed to tying with patent rules provides a sensible way of going
forward.
587 S Crespi. 'Biotechnology Patenting: The wicked animal must defend itself [1995] 9 EIPR 431 at
441.
588 See Consent case study two above
589 See Consent case study two above
590 See Consent case study two above
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The third case study examined the approach taken by patent law towards commercial
exploitation insofar as the issue of immoral exploitation rather than immoral invention
is concerned. But there would appear to be a willingness to interpret patent
qualifications based on inventions per se in order to exclude inventions rather than
seek to question patent monopoly after grant. Patent law is aimed at promoting
research and development so decisions taken regarding the exclusion of inventions
should be focused upon advancing that goal:
Everybody seems to acknowledge the assumption that the legitimacy of the
patent system lies in its ability to promote research and development of new
diagnostic methods and therapies to the benefit of public health. If patenting
human genes and stem cells fails to further these goals - or even works
against them - it does not fulfil its 'contract' with society and thereby loses
its raison d'etre.591
It is of value to appreciate the contribution that can be made to the debate surrounding
ethical research through the mechanisms of patent law yet this is not matched by an
equal ability to address conclusions that may be reached. In fact in some cases patent
law has been the only forum in which such debates have been aired. Patent law may
have the heart to debate but does not (nor indeed cannot) have the legs to fulfil
conclusions for the reasons discussed.
591 Danish Council ofEthics. "The Ethics ofPalenting Human Genes and Stem Cells'. 8.
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Part of the difficulty with interpretation of objections is that in many cases the
objections that have been levied against patents are for reasons that are not related to
patenting and the questions that have been related to patenting have not been
effectively addressed. In view of this another way of approaching the position of patent
law in the regulatory process is to decide what the cause of a particular objection is and
what will be the result of using the exclusion of a particular invention to address that
specific problem. Thus the way forward should be first to differentiate between
objections which arise because of the grant of patents from those which arise because
of objections to the technology under protection and second to appreciate the
consequences ofusing the exclusion of the grant of patents so that particular objections
are appropriately addressed. The final chapter examines this more closely.
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(6) Chapter Six Moral Relevance
(6) (a) Patent Grant and Morality
Patent law and biotechnology have a complex relationship. Clearly there are
characteristics592 ofbiotechnology that are apposite for the application of patent law as
a motivator and protector. Equally apparent are the tensions593 within this relationship;
tensions that patent law endeavours to address through validity requirements594 and
exclusions to patentability at the time of grant. The discussion has indicated the
failings of this approach and also that current forms of redress through patent or
competition law after grant are sometimes inadequate595 or are not aimed at relevant
problems.
The role of morality within patent law is undergoing a metamorphosis596. One of the
many difficulties encountered by patent law include moral questions that arise
592 In particular the high cost of innovation and often low cost of reproduction, see discussion in section
one as discussed in section three
593 Such as between defining tire line between discovery and invention, keeping a balance between
encouraging innovation through creation of incentives but watchful that incentives do not repress other
innovators. Patent law has acquired a twin but opposing role in that it promotes innovation on the one
hand yet is seen as part of regulatory regimes that restrict innovations for perceived moral wrongs and
it must cany these tasks out whilst keeping aware of differences between incentive regimes and those
that regulate science. See Sections three and four. As discussed in sections three and five.
594 The validity requirements, novelty, inventive step, industrial application and morality must be
interpreted so as to ensure tire standard of patentability is kept high. The temptation is to increase the
standard in an attempt to address other issues such as to question the morality of research or to
anticipate manner of exploitation. The thesis has concluded above that radical changes into the rules
that define the grant of a patent are unnecessaiy
595 See discussion regarding compulsory licences
596 The limit of these changes, discussed with section three and four, has not yet been fully appreciated
nor settled. The pending appeal by WARF may assist in understanding the sentiment of the EPO but it
may not provide a satisfactory answer to national states whose practice and law do not reflect the
perceptions ofmorality as interpreted centrally.
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throughout the innovation time line and the fact that assessments have not taken place
as to what is relevant for patent law nor indeed about what patent law can or should do.
There is not sufficient appreciation of the different moral issues at each stage of the
innovation process. This work has examined the different stages and through case
studies has illustrated how morality can be reflected in different ways at each stage in
the process. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss how patent law can address
morality within each stage. It has been thus necessary to untangle objections and to
find a viable function for morality within patent law. This chapter isolates pertinent
questions for morality and suggests a way forward. The different moral concerns that
arise at each stage of innovation should take into account factors that are pertinent to
each stage. Accordingly, this requires appreciation, not just of the different moral
questions that can arise at each stage of the innovation process, but also of the
relationship of a grant of patent to those moral issues. Rather than envisaging morality
attaching to, for example, research or exploitation of inventions, it is more appropriate
to enquire whether exclusion of inventions from patent protection has direct or indirect
effects upon objections. In other words exclusions of inventions from patentability
should take into account the consequences of excluding specific inventions from
patentability as well as the objections per se. The completed innovation time line
summarises the points made in this chapter which proposes that morality should be
addressed more specifically at each stage of innovation.
The regulatory position at each stage of innovation is different so patent morality has
to reflect those differences. The United Kingdom's Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Act, for example, requires that strict procedures must be followed in
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relation to research upon human embryos. Any resulting invention, however, is clearly
a separate entity from both research and from the material that was used to invent it.
Indeed the biotechnology Directive requires that inventions must be 'new'597. Any
cells that arise from human embryonic research are separate from the original embryo
(which will have been destroyed) and so are no longer reliant upon the embryo and are
subject to different regulations and should such cells be commercially exploited that
exploitation will also be subject to separate regulation. Patent law should reflect such
differences so as to illustrate which moral questions are relevant for patent law and that
answers to applicable moral issues can be addressed appropriately.
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Regulation Ethical and legal rules that
govern the envelope of research
e.g. HFEA. Any other legal
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The increase in the breadth of the application of morality exclusions from patentability,
resulting from objections raised against biotechnology, is fairly apparent but the effects
of this are probably not fully appreciated. The historical moral elucidation is much
narrower than assessing the morality of an invention the purpose of which is to endow
life by beneficially promoting improvements to health598 and wellbeing, or to increase
598 As in any of Ihe following: Case T 1374/04, November 2005: Edinburgh Patent (EP 0695351);
HARVARD/ ONCO-mouse 11991] EPOR 525.
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crop yields599 or to ease the pain of childbirth600 and so on. Even to use the morality
clause to debate such technology is of itself an extension of the ambit of the morality
provisions. This step of considering inventions, which have praiseworthy goals, as
being immoral because of some other factor is also an amplification of earlier views of
morality and patent law because there are no precedent morality cases that display
clearly that the invention was immoral. Furthermore factors that may have led to
inventions being queried could be numerous; objection to the invention per se, to the
research that led to it, to ownership of the rights to exploit the invention etc. Even the
particular grounds of hostility may arise for diverse and emotive reasons such as
animal cruelty, perception of human dignity, religion, potential harm to the
environment etc.
In view of this complex and expanding panoply it is no wonder that there have been
mixed interpretations by national patent offices601, the European Patent Office and the
groups of advisors602 set up to assist with interpretation. This is despite intentions of
harmony behind the Biotechnology Directive and those expressed in case law603. The
elucidation of the morality clause has been aggravated by further extensions through
599 PLANTGENETIC SYSTEMS/Glutamine Synthetase Inhibitors [1995] EPOR 4.
600 HOWARD FLOREY/Relaxin [1995] EPOR 541
601 See UK Patent Office Guidelines compared to interpretations within European Patent Office. The
UKPO will grant patents, providing they surmount the usual hurdles, for pluripotent stem cells
because they do not have the ability to develop into a human body whilst totipotent stems cells, which
can develop into a human body, are not patentable. The EPO. as discussed in sections three and four,
will not grant patents for inventions relating to HESCs if their creation involves "uses of human
embryos for industrial or commercial purposes" even if such uses are not claimed.
602 European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies, 'Study on the Patenting of inventions
related to human stem cell research' Report to the European Commission, Office for Official
Publications of the European Communities, 2002.
61,3 For example Kirin-Amgen Inc and others v HoechstMarion Roussel Ltd and others [2004] UKHL 46
(House of Lords) "It would be most unfortunate if we were to uphold the validity of a patent which
would on the facts have been revoked in opposition proceedings in the EPO."
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the four specific moral exclusions604 within the Articles and two in the Recitals605 of
the Biotechnology Directive. These have been interpreted by the European Court of
Justice606 as being separate and additional to the morality clause rather than as pure
examples of what may fall foul of the clause, clearly extending the reach of the
morality clause607.
There are appreciable reasons behind objections to biotechnology and an
understandable rationale for the expansive interpretation of morality by the European
Patent Office. Moreover the debate over the moral position is as welcome as it is
important but the unchecked expansion of exclusions to patentability without proper
• 608direction and under questionable authority is not. Re-evaluation of exclusions to
patentability is essential. As stated moral questions arise throughout the innovation
time line and any re-evaluation should take account of the whole process, so as to
include the consequences of patenting before and after grant and all of the ethical
604 Article 6 2 (aMd) Biotechnology Directive.
605 Recital 40 Biotechnology Directive.
606 Kingdom of the Netherlands case, and see MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY/Euthanasia
Compositions [2005 J T 0866/01
607 "So it would appear that the specific exclusions refer to those for which a certain degree of
"European consensus" can be gathered, while tire general is open to interpretation by member states
according to their own "ethics or morality". A general provision is essential in so far as it is advisable
to "freeze" morality as per any particular time in history." Thambisetty S, Understanding Morality as a
Ground for Exclusion From Patentability Under European Patent Law, Eubios Journal of Asian and
International Bioethics 12 (2002), 48 - 53
608 The EPO position is in contradiction to practices of national states and it is questionable whether it is
an appropriate role for patent authorities to reach into areas of law that are more appropriately dealt
with by specific regulation. See, inter alia Laurie G Laurie G. Patenting Stem Cells of Human Origin.
[2004] EIPR 59, . .but it is not for patent law to address that concern if the objection is to the science
rather than to the grant of a monopoly right. Not only is it a matter more appropriately tackled by
regulatory authorities using their entire gamut of legal tools, but the deep irony is that patent law
cannot address such a concern."
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issues that arise because of the negative effects of patents upon access. Changes must
consider the aims behind patent law and what effect such exclusions will have.
A number of points can be concluded from this evaluation of moral exclusions from
European patent law. A consistent theme of the concluding points is that there are
different moral issues which cannot be answered in the same way at the same point in
the innovation process. Moral diversity can be arranged into three categories:
(6) (a) (i) Morality One -UniversalMoral Agreement
Some inventions are clearly immoral and are considered so by all European States so
can be excluded from patentability without deliberation. The morality clause as it has
been interpreted historically is a workable solution for patent authorities to express
antipathy towards particular invention of clear and obvious immorality. This
interpretation has been reflected to a greater extent in the original biotech morality case
discussed in section three. This raises the question as to what amounts to immorality
sufficient to determine an invention as unpatentable and how such a European standard
ofmorality should be determined. If an investigation is needed into whether or not an
invention is immoral then there is clearly not a common European standard. In fact if
there is evidence that one country views an invention as acceptable then there cannot
be an agreed European Standard609.
609 See PATGEN PROJECT. The Patenting of Human DNA: Global Trends in Public and Privet Sector
Activity, November 2006, Final Project Report at page 112 "...the acceptability of an invention in
even one Contracting country would constitute evidence of absence of a European wide morality and
ordre public." At page 112
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(6) (a) (ii)Morality Two -Controversial but no Consensus
The situation when no consensus exits causes a different scenario to emerge through
the patenting of biotechnology and the dangers of a change in moral interpretation
have come to light in the interpretation of the Article 6 (2) exclusions. The motives and
results of excluding inventions from patentability in respect ofHESCs place patent law
in the position of a regulator of science rather than of incentive.
"The law must adequately reflect two competing (and often conflicting) public
policy considerations: on the one hand it must facilitate research in view of the
gains in knowledge... .whilst on the other it must repress such research as is
regarded as unacceptable, primarily due to doubts about its ethical
justifiability."610
Similar arguments have been made611 that patent law can express the regulatory tilt of
an amber light, neither encouraging nor prohibiting but clearly exerting an influence
against what are otherwise legal activities. This quasi-regulation should be resisted, at
the very least at European level, and care must be taken at national level to define the
boundaries between regulation and patent law. The interface between patent law and
regulation, on the one hand, and between European Law and patent law, on the other,
require different considerations and breaches between them have different
6111
Halliday S & Steinberg D L, "The Regulated Gene: New Legal Dilemmas". Medical Law Review 12,
Spring, pp 2 - 13. Oxford University Press 2004, at page 4
611 Brownsword R. "Red lights and rogues: regulating human genetics, chapter three in Somsen H. The
Regulatory Challenge of Biotechnology: Human Genetics, Food and Patents, Edward Elgar
Publishing. 2007
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repercussions. To put this a different way, the question whether morality should be
interpreted broadly at European Level involves issues of disharmony among signatory
states. The same question at national level suggests friction between regulation and
patent law.
The second point therefore is that in the event that a European consensus cannot be
found then morality should be an issue for each state to interpret in accordance with its
internal rules and regulations. Different moral perspectives should not prevent the
award of a European Patent as these can easily be reflected at the time of enforcement
within each individual country. Enforcement of patents occurs at national level and
thus provides a method for moral concerns to be raised.
(6) (a) (hi) Morality Three -Moral commercial exploitation
The third category highlighted by this study is the failure to appropriately address
moral issues during commercial exploitation and the final section examines this more
closely.
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(6) (b) All Heart and no Legs
'You can have all the heart in the world, but it doesn't mean anything unless you've
got the legs.'612
The discussion of moral issues provides patent law with an effective platform for the
discussion of complex ethical difficulties. Unfortunately the efficacy is not matched
with the ability to address the issues raised within. The vision of '... higher ranking
613 • •
legal and moral principles...' is directed towards pre-grant activities which have
already taken place and which patent law can do little to influence, rather than post-
grant activities, thus avoiding the area where patent law has the greatest influence and
where there is arguably the greatest need for reform614. It is understandable that some
parties express fear or concern in reaction to any suggested changes that interfere with
the power of patent monopoly after grant regardless of the harm or potential harm of
failure to address issues relating to access. This can be seen in the restricted way in
which the compulsory licensing system is structured, as an example of post-grant
control of patents, and in comments in reaction to suggestions to expand the use of
them, such as:
Lowering the threshold... [i.e. to compulsory licenses],..to e.g. health care
related issues in general can have serious effects, since it would open the
door to a broader application of the system, thereby depriving the patent
612 Lance Armstrong, Lance Armstrong: Tour de Force (Collins Willow 2005) 45.
613 Open Letter from Professor Alain Pompidou former President ofEPO dated 28th September 2006 at
page 34 available from < www.cipa.org.uk/download files/epo warf.pdf >
614 See case study three
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holder of the exclusionary rights he is entitled to under the patent. This
could have negative effects on technological development.615
Refusal of patents for dubious moral reasons may also have a negative effect but that
has not stopped the European Patent Office616 from doing just that. Furthermore
aggressive use of broad patents can also have negative effects on development617. The
question is whether a balance has been achieved. This work asserts that failure to
include post-grant effects of patents in a broader morality is mistaken and indicates a
need for a more holistic approach.
There is little doubt that the morality clause has been the catalyst through which the
array of contentious issues arising out of the development of biotechnology have been
able to be debated in such great detail. It has been said that patent law may have
provided the only forum for concerns into biotechnology to be aired618 and so whilst
those who have concerns about biotechnology have found an effective means through
which to advance arguments against progress that offends them, the remedy wished for
has not been available.
615 Bostyn. "DNA Patents in Europe: Controversy Remains'. 41.
616 As is alleged above regarding the Edinburgh Patent (EP 0695351) and WARF Wisconsin Alumni
Research Foundation, November 2005. Case T 1374/04, G 2/06, stem cell patents See also Hannon S,
the rules of Re-engagement: The use of Patent Proceedings to Influence the Regulation of Science
(What The Salmon Does When it Comes back downstream") (2006) 4 Intellectual Property Quarterly
378-403
617 See Chapter five and cases of Biogen v Medeva [1997] RPC 1, HL. and Kirin - Amgen v
Transkaryotic Therapies [2004] UKHL 46
618 "It is ironic that these ethical questions have not been faced head on. but rather, and then only in an
indirect way, by proxy through the patent system, which has the misfortune to provide the only forum
in which such objections can be advanced." Cook T, 'A Users Guide to Patents' Buttcrworths. 2002,
page 341 See also Hannon S, the rules of Re-engagement: The use of Patent Proceedings to Influence
the Regulation of Science (What The Salmon Does When it Comes back downstream") (2006) 4
Intellectual Property Quarterly 378 - 403
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Despite what has been said above it is not intended to advocate the dismissal of
morality from patent law. Arguments regarding the suitability of morality clauses in
general tend to either extol their virtues or deride them altogether619. This work
suggests that morality should be refocused towards the negative effects of patents.
Rather than seeking to interpret the morality of an invention, the question of morality
should be focused upon the 'added value' that patent law donates to the exploitation of
inventions. Grants of patents carry moral consequences in that they enable holders to
restrict others. The extent of that restriction and the effects that it can have are
620 • i •reviewed herein. Although case law indicates that restriction of access is about
economics rather than morals, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that humanitarian
issues are important so that if people are in need of new treatments or if beneficial
research is prevented or hindered through the use of patents then moral questions arise.
Indeed it would be nonsense to suggest otherwise. This focus is based upon the effect
of patent grants, or more accurately the effect of exclusion of particular inventions
from patentability, rather than the effect of inventions.
Taking the above into consideration it is apparent that there is a role for moral issues
within patent law. However that role must be reviewed in order to provide an
619 See for example Thambisetty S, Understanding Morality as a Ground for Exclusion From
Patentability Under European Patent Law, Eubios Journal of Asian and International Bioethics 12
(2002). 48 - 53, Beyleveld D, Brownsword R & Llewelyn M. The Morality Clauses of the Directive
on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions: conflict, compromise and the patent
community. Pharmaceutical Medicine and European Law, Cambridge University Press 2000, page
157 and Mills O, 'Biotechnological Inventions: Moral Restraints and Patent Law\ Ashgate
Publishing, 2005. and discussion in chapter four above
620 See Ley/and Stanford [2002] EPOR 2, page 44. NOVARTIS/Transgenic Plant Gl/98 [20001
E.P.O.R. 303; [2000] 3 OJEPO 111 and Human stem Cell/BIOCYTE 11999] Opposition Division EP
0343217 and EPO Guidelines
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understanding about what ought to be open to objection and what point defines
whether an issue is or is not moral. The complete period of influence of patent grants
throughout the innovation time line should be considered relevant including the period
of exploitation subsequent to grant. This clearly involves a redefined role for morality
because the question of what is moral is different within each stage of innovation and
the following section outlines some of the features of this more holistic approach. It
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(6) (c) Horses for Courses - Direct and Indirect Effects of
Exclusions from Patentability
Two apparently incongruous objections to biotechnological patents621 were mooted
above. The first objection was that such patents reduce innovation622, referring to
potential difficulties caused by blockage by patents on early stage inventions. The
second objection was that biotechnology patents encourage unethical innovation.
These contradictory objections arise, in part, because at the time of grant the
consequences of granting patents are unknown and partly because encouraging
research and blocking research occur at opposite ends of the innovation time line. Thus
they expose the various objections against patents for biotechnology arising during the
different stages. If both objections are to co-exist there must be two contrasting
incentive mechanisms within patent law, one which encourages innovation and another
which discourages it. These objections can be seen in the balance within patent law
between reward and incentive; factors which arise at different stages of the innovation
time line. The reward restricts others within the parameters of the defined invention of
a patent and the incentive of a reward encourages others. It is of value to examine the
relationship between these objections now so as to illustrate morality three.
621 That patent law can on the one hand be blamed for encouraging unethical research but can also be
seen as liable for discouraging ethical research see chapter one
622 Due to creation of a disincentive effect which for patent law to succeed must be less than the
incentive produced by patent grant
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(6) (d) Direct and Indirect Effects of Patent Grants
A patent once granted enables the patentee to restrict623 others from defined uses624 of
particular inventions. In the event that alternatives to a particular patented invention are
unavailable then everyone without the permission of the patentee is excluded. This
results in reduced access, and is a direct result of the power of patents, but this power
of prevention expressed through patent monopolies is also the reason why inventors
want to be in the position of patentee, which in turn produces the incentive effect.
Clearly the two are distinct for a number of reasons but they are also interdependent
and it is their relationship that determines the effectiveness of the patent system.
One of the undertakings of this thesis is to examine the reasons for either refusing
patent grants or revoking or diluting them after grant for reasons that are unrelated to
62 ^their inventive qualities . This final section proposes methodology within which
objections can be aired and if necessary answered through patent rules and this
particular chapter isolates common factors in objections so that patent law can address
them. The proposal depends upon whether a particular objection is a direct or indirect
result of the grant of patents and in turn this depends upon whether objections are part
of the incentive or disincentive effect. The question is therefore: what is the effect of
excluding an invention from patent protection or weakening/reducing626 the protection
623 For example, s. 60 (1) Patents Act 1977 defined infringement as including any person who
makes disposes of. offers to dispose of, uses or imports the product or keeps it whether for disposal or
otherwise...'.
624 As defined by, for example, s. 60 Patents Act 1977
625 In other words that the invention would ordinarily qualify' for patent protection because it satisfies
the tests of inventive step, novelty and industrial application.
625 For example through compulsory licenses
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that a patent provides? There should be a nexus between objections raised and the
effect of remedy requested.
(6) (d) (i) Incentives Effect
The prospect of a patent encourages inventors to invent and so the incentive effect
upon others occurs pre-grant. Patents will help commercially but are only part of a
bigger picture627 in that there are many other factors that will determine the success or
otherwise of inventions. Furthermore there are other methods of protection such as
trade marks or trade secrets that could also be used. Objections to inventions (whether
to research or the invention) are related to the use of the invention, how it was made or
what it is. In other words objections are made against an existing physical entity; an
invention. Therefore there is no direct effect of a refusal of patent grant upon the
invention in question in these circumstances. It is accepted that the inventor in such a
scenario cannot obtain a patent and market under a monopoly, but that was the case
before application and so the situation stays the same vis-a-vis the hypothetical
patentee. The patentee in these circumstances may have already 'used' or been
influenced by the incentive effect, but only to see the anticipated reward disappear.
Thus the only direct effect of refusal of a patent is that the prospective patentee does
not obtain the monopoly he envisaged.
627 See above 'Interplanetary Alignment"
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Other inventors hoping to emulate similar research may feel inclined to seek their
fortunes elsewhere because of the removal of incentive628. Thus the exclusion of
inventions from patentability for moral reasons at the time of grant may have a
discouraging and indirect effect on others629. Removal of the patent incentive, with the
aim of re-directing research of stem cells away from human embryonic stem cells, was
the aim of Professor Virt in his dissenting opinion of the European Group on Science
and Ethics630, a view that appears to have been adopted by the European Patent
Office631. A narrow view of morality would not encompass this indirect and
constraining effect of patent grants but the emerging European Patent Office morality
would do so.
The following table summarises the position:
628 On the other hand by not granting a patent there is no protected monopoly and so anyone can
reproduce the particular invention and so it could be argued that the effect of using patent law to
reduce innovation in a certain area could have the opposite effect.
629 Research into how policy decisions impact upon industry strategies is part of the many functions of
the Innogen project. For example, one of the particular research questions is To classify policy and
regulatory instruments according to their impact on industry strategies, based on whether they are
enabling or constraining, discriminating or indiscriminate'. Further details can be obtained from
<www. innogen,ac.uk>.
630 European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies, 'Study on die Patenting of inventions
related to human stem cell research'.
631 As with die stem cell cases discussed above
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Table Twelve - Direct and indirect effects of (a) refusal of patent grant and (b)
alteration of patent monopoly
Incentive Effect upon other inventors Disincentive Effect of monopoly upon
competitors/those in similar area or work
Occurs pre-grant Is felt post-grant
Transpires because of inventors' motivation
to invent because of potential for patent
reward and desire to commercialise an
invention - but not necessarily dependent
upon the grant of patent incentive because
invention and/or commercialisation are not
prevented if a patent is refused. Moreover
there are other methods of commercial
protection available, for example, trade
marks, trade secrets and copyright.
Arises because of the effect of monopoly
resulting from granted patents which creates a
complete bar to all within the description of
patent claims. This results from the patent
reward and is the trade off for granting patent
rights.
The moral issue is whether patent grant
would encourage unethical research or be
seen as rewarding unethical research or
ability to derive greater benefit from unethical
work.
The moral issues is whether the grant of a
patent will prevent others and reduce access
but this restriction is seen as acceptable
because the resulting incentive effect upon
others, also hoping for similar reward, should
more than offset short term reduction in
access.
A broad interpretation of patent morality
relates to objections against physical
inventions, what they do or how they were
created.
Research exemption/compulsory
licences/competition law - aimed at how
inventions are exploited - i.e. immoral
exploitation
Reason for refusal of patent grant is
discouraging others from doing similar,
following similar research, for example. But
dependent upon a commonly accepted
understanding of morality.
Reason to interfere in patent monopoly,
whether through compulsory licences,
withdrawal of patent or otherwise is to
encourage others to research and innovate in
area subject to patent monopoly.
Importantly the refusal of patent grant has
only an indirect effect because immoral
inventions or their commercialisation are not
the direct result of patent grants
Whereas restrictions on others occur as a
direct effect of patent grants.
In the event that a patent grant is refused for
moral reasons because of objection to
research, for example, the removal of
incentive does not effect the cause of concern
- the research or the invention, although the
refusal of a patent MAY indirectly effect
other innovation.
The elimination of a patent or alteration in the
scope of patent monopoly has a direct effect
upon the cause of concern - for example
blocking of further research.
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(6) (d) (ii) Disincentive Effect
A disincentive effect on innovation can arise because of granted patents. This is part of
the trade-off for patents but, as discussed earlier, gives grounds for concern in the
event that the trade-off is weighed excessively against the patent paradox632, thus
creating the situation where the disincentive created by patent grants is more powerful
than the incentive as outlined by the examples in the third case study above. Patent law
is equipped with limited means with which to react against such situations; i.e. where
the grant of a patent works against the principles and justifications of the patent
system. Compulsory licensing may seem an appropriate utility with which to address
such a situation but the compulsory licences are aimed at encouraging the use of
inventions that have not been utilised to exploit the invention under protection and
competition law is aimed at different scenarios633. Ensuring the continuity of the patent
paradox lies at the heart of the justification of patent law but there is a gap between the
narrow remedies available within patent law and those that may be available through
competition law. Furthermore in the examples in case study three there are moral
reasons for access issues to be addressed and those moral reasons are associated with
the commercial exploitation of inventions through the monopoly ofpatents. The failure
to examine the need for post-grant morality omits to tackle an important fault and
ignores an important and powerful regulatory device. The solution below suggests
refocusing morality within patent law so that both indirect and direct moral concerns
632 See introduction. The patent paradox refers to the paradoxical methodology with which the patent
system functions: the reduction of access by the grant of a monopoly with a corresponding increase in
access brought about by the provision of incentives in the form of patent monopoly. If the patent
paradox fails then so. too. does the patent system.
633 See above chapter five
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can be addressed. This in turn requires the introduction of a procedure into patent law
which enables objections to patents to be addressed during the exploitation stage and
away from grant stage, thus focusing upon the effects that patent grants have, not what
they may do or what perceived harm the inventions they relate to may cause.
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(6) (e) Morality Three and Commercial Exploitation
The essence of objection to the grant of a patent must be understood. Motives for
opposing inventions are dealt with above but it is asserted here that commercial
exploitation requires a different approach than objecting to inventions; such as: what
does commercial exploitation add to an invention that makes it immoral or is the
particular form of commercial exploitation enabled by patent grant immoral? If
objections to patent grant arise because patents are equated with the perceived
immorality of inventions per se then the essence of such objection is that the grant of a
patent will encourage or increase the availability of immoral inventions. In these cases
then the issue should be addressed through morality 1 or 2 above. Here the thesis is
concerned with objections to patent grants because they have the opposite effect; they
reduce access and restrict availability. Here immorality arises because the grant of a
patent has enabled commercial exploitation to occur in a particular way with the result
that the patent paradox fails.
The aim is to establish a new protocol within patent law that examines the effect that
patents have upon exploitation. In cases where it appears that a grant of patent has
enabled exploitation to occur in a way that is contrary to morality, then the particular
patent is open to reconsideration by the patent office. The object is to examine morality
from the point of the specific exploitation of inventions enabled by the grant of patents
rather than from focusing upon inventions. The crux of examination will be the patent
paradox, so if the grant of a patent results in failure of the patent paradox it will be
possible to rebalance the system subject to certain conditions.
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Objections to patents can occur for various reasons, which need not be repeated634
here, but understanding the root cause of objections is important for appreciating the
role, if any, that patent law can play. For example objections may be consequent upon
the actual grant of patents or they can occur in any event. Objections could also be
classified in relation to the affect that ring fencing particular inventions from patent
protection has; whether exclusion directly addresses particular concerns or whether
concerns are only indirectly influenced. For example the exclusion of patents as a
result of objections to specific inventions does not effect inventions per se. Such
exclusions, however, prevent the specific inventions from being exploited through
monopoly benefit, therefore if objections are directed at that form of commercial
exploitation then refusal of a patent directly effects the relevant objection.
Grants of patent rights result in a number of consequences relating to access to
resources. The initial incentive created by potential of patents occurs within incentive
stage of the innovation time line. There is also a restrictive effect of patent grant
enabled by patentee's monopoly as judged by definition within patent claims. This
may be combined with other factors and aggressive exploitation by patentee creating
restrictions upon (a) potential users of patented inventions and (b) further research
which arises in the exploitation stage of the innovation time line. The negative effect of
patent grant should always be less than the positive.
634 Sec chapters three, four and five
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The act of excluding particular inventions also has indirect and direct effects as
discussed in the previous section. The following indicates a means of using the effects
to create a method of assessing post-grant objections.
The features of such a system ought to include the following:
(1) That the role of patent law in relation to specific objections should be focused
upon excluding patents on inventions for objections arising by virtue of patent
grant and which relate only to cases where exclusion of inventions from patent
protection directly affects the causes of the objections.
(2) Greater flexibility should be introduced into the patent system so enabling
restrictions on monopoly provided rather than removing the protection
altogether.
(3) Expansion of the morality provisions should be focused upon whether or not it
is immoral to enable the applicant or patentee to prevent others from competing
through enforcement of patent monopoly. A range of alternative remedies
should be open to the patent authorities to enable them to exert greater
flexibility into what is at present an inflexible and 'blunt instrument'635. It is
important that is considered as an ongoing role which would explore the
'commercial exploitation' throughout the period of monopolistic exploitation.
This proposal therefore envisages a new element of post-grant control of the
manner in which patent grants are used to exploit inventions.
635 Laddie. Prescott and Vitoria, 'The Modern Law ofCopyright and Designs', Vol. 1.
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(4) That morality within patent law should also636 address questions that are
directly related to the grant of a patent. Such issues would equate with the
repercussions resulting from provision of a monopoly as opposed to indirect
effects upon inventions or research.
636 The aim is to address morality across the innovation time line. The role ofmorality is different at each
stage.
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(6) (f) Direct Morality - Post-Grant Intervention
The morality clause in European Patent law links with commercial exploitation.637
Commercial exploitation has not been defined but has been interpreted as referring to
inventions (with a European moral consensus or with room for national interpretation)
and in Article 6 (2) (a) as reflecting European Consensus but has been interpreted in
ways that fail to reflect such a consensus. The re-evaluation ofmorality by this study
suggests that moral focus should address the additional value that is added to
commercialisation by the grant of a patent. Commercialisation occurs after patent
applications and thus the ramifications stemming from it cannot be envisaged at the
time of grant and so can only be properly assessed throughout the period of
exploitation. The question should be; are there additional moral concerns raised by the
granting of a patent throughout the invention's commercial exploitation and can the
patent system intervene at this stage to address these concerns effectively?
The aim is to arrive at a solution or formula that enables patent decisions to be re¬
evaluated in the event of negative consequences either due to the blocking of further
innovation or the results of patent grants turning out to be immoral. Decisions made in
relation to negative effects of patent grants are to involve a balance between the
incentives created by patent grants and any reduction in incentive brought about as a
result of the manner in which patented inventions are exploited.
637 "Biotech Directive Art 6 (1) Inventions shall be considered unpatentable where their commercial
exploitation would be contrary to ordrc public or morality..
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The effect of granting patents is that patentees will be able to exclude others from, inter
alia, using638 inventions described in the patent claims. The subsequent results of
awards of patent protection are unknown at the time of grant yet decisions regarding
patent morality are centred at that point in time. Thus decisions regarding the morality
of commercial exploitation at the time of grant necessarily involve an element of
supposition in the face of unknown circumstances. In the event that the effect of that
monopoly is negative, judged through an imbalance in the patent paradox, there are no
effective mechanisms in place through which that can be addressed; in other words
cases where the grant of a patent has resulted in overall restrictions of access and even
if a patentee abuses that position the options for redress are limited - and it is
submitted that a form of control is essential in certain circumstances. Inventions should
not be excluded from patentability unless and until there is clear proofof harm directly
linked to patent grant whether because a particular grant, judged throughout the patent
term, has restricted access or whether a particular grant has been contrary to morality.
Patent law would thereby be able to answer and manage moral questions rather than
merely debate them.
The patent paradox should be redressed in cases where the exploitation of inventions is
being abused by virtue of the fact the patentees are beneficiaries of patents. Further
research could be being thwarted or additional investigations and research into
beneficial products for the common good unnecessarily hindered or impeded. A
balance must be struck between the incentive created by patent grant and what is taken
away as a result.
638 See s. 60 (1) Patent Act
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(6) (f) (i) Justification
Patent law can address situations where grants of patents have resulted in unforeseen
effects such as a reduction in overall benefit resulting from grant of patent. Therefore
this proposal espouses a mechanism which can be applied during the validity period of
patents that would enable the validity to be questioned when immorality arises during
exploitation. The basis for this suggestion is that it is not the grant of patents that cause
concerns but rather exploitation or more accurately the way in which patented
inventions are exploited.
The preceding discussion does not touch on the way the holder of any gene
patent might choose to exploit it. Any attempt to suppress research on the
basis of a claim to the gene itself is bound to attract opposition from a
number of research groups.. .Ultimately this may be the real problem rather
than the grant of the patent itself.639
The importance of morality over the exercise of rights once granted is not a new
phenomenon and such a mechanism can be seen in the Community Plant Variety Right
Scheme:
... a Community plant variety right, once granted, does not permit the rights
holder to use the right for any purpose whatsoever, but that Member States
may restrict the exercise of the right by national legislation. Instead of
determining morality by reference to grant, determination over the exercise
639 Crespi. 'Patents on Genes: Can the issues be clarified?'.
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of the right once granted suggests moving the question of morality away
from the intellectual property right per se. This is in stark contrast to the
operation of the patent system where a determination of morality lies in
respect of the grant of the right itself. ,640
Limitations of the exercise of protection have intended to strike a balance between the
rights of plant breeders on the one hand and agriculture on the other.641 Similarly
patent law is intended to strike a balance between diverse and competing interests642
but as discussed this balance is not achieved in some cases because of an absence of
power to prevent abuse of disproportionate patent monopolies. I suggest that efforts
should be made to explore post-grant remedies further as Overwalle advocated:
...efforts should be made to design adequate institutional and
legal responses to this finding and develop ways to further
monitor the exercise of patent rights in an attempt to reach an
adequate balance between private and public interests in the
post-grant stage.643
640 Mills, "Biotechnological Inventions', 159.
641 'In this manner, the CPVR scheme is safeguarding the interests of agriculture while at the same time
protecting those of breeders', ibid.. 158.
642 See introduction 'A Good Armchair'
643 Overwalle G, "Gene Patents and Public Health', Bruylant, 2007
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(6) (f) (ii) Test for Immoral Exploitation
The basic tenet required, before objections to the exploitation of patented inventions
will be considered, is that there should be proofof harm arising because of the grant of
a patent. The object is to gain a degree of control, or at least reduce the negative
effects, of strong and broad monopoly rights, especially in the biotech field where
there are early stage patents covering broad uses and where patentees' actions result in
a lessening of overall incentives. It is easy to envisage circumstances where a patentee
is following one line of approach to a particular problem whilst other researchers are
following different courses with alternative aims. It would be wrong if they were being
thwarted because of an overzealous approach by a patent holder. A test along the
following lines is suggested:
The exercise of the grant of patent rights must not be used in a manner
which offends against morality or where it is likely to result in harmful
consequences upon health, welfare, medical treatment, research and
development.
The factors that should be considered in such a test should include the following:
• Commercial exploitation of the patented invention must tie in with the
immorality under question. Although Article 6 Biotech Directive also links
morality with commercial exploitation it is suggested here that this should tie
in with the way in which exploitation occurs but specifically relating to the
exercise of a patent.
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• Therefore it is not sufficient to illustrate that commercial exploitation by itself
is contrary to the proposed test; the objection must be related to the additional
value that has been provided by the grant of a patent. In other words there must
be a connection between the 'harm' complained of and the award of the patent
in question - i.e. situations where it is the grant of patent that has enabled the
particular situation to arise
• An important balance exists within patent law between incentive for others and
reward for patentees. A potential objection644 against post-grant controls in
patent exploitation is that such interference may influence other inventors with
similar innovation to either not produce the invention in question or to use
other methods to protect such as trade secrets. This could possibly have a
negative effect upon future innovation and so decisions should take into
account whether the disincentive created by interference in the patent
monopoly is likely to be less than the incentives generated to those who stand
to benefit from the opposition.
• Determination of issues likely to arise as a result of this suggested procedure is
going to be a value judgement, perhaps through a reasonableness test.
• One difficultly, as argued in chapter four, with use of patent exclusion as a
method of addressing a concern such as, for example, research is that research
644 See below, page 276. for some of the objections that may be raised against this type of proposal
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will have already occurred and so any effect upon innovation will be against
other patentees rather than the particular applicant. It has been argued that
using patent law in such an indirect way to attack the wider industry is
mistaken. Thus I suggest that if intervention by the patent office is to be
justified it should have a direct effect upon the objection in question. By 'direct
effect' it is intended that reaction is linked to immediate consequences ofpatent
grant and that the action corresponds with the patent at issue rather than
affecting indirectly other patents or potential patents.
• The size of the market and market share of the patentee is clearly of importance
as that will determine the availability to the public of treatment in question or
alternatives. The way in which a patentee uses that position is also important as
the market position may enable him to charge abnormally high prices or restrict
availability against the public interest. Such factors are directly related to the
use of and grant of a patent and if a patent grant leads to unreasonable
restrictions in access then that should central in the decision making process.
The French ex-officio licensing regime justifies the instigation of the ex-officio
licensing procedure in a variety of circumstances taking into account a number
of factors645: (1) insufficiency of quantity or quality of medicines (2)
abnormally high prices (3) exploitation contrary to public health interests and
(4) patent worked in anti-competitive way646.
645 Article L613-16 French Intellectual Property Code
646 See Overwalle G. 'Gene Patents and Public Health', Bruylant. 2007. page 135
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• The grant of a patent enables holders to exploit their inventions in a particular
way. If that form of exploitation is against the public interest then it is
suggested that it is a matter for patent law to address.
Taking the case ofMyriad Genetics:
Much of the debate surrounding the Myriad case, however, concerned not
the validity of the patents as such - similar patents held by other entities
have not attracted the same criticism - but rather the ethics of how the
patent rights were exercised commercially.647
(6) (f) (iii)Difficulty of definition
Parties seeking to use this proposed mechanism against a granted patent would have to
surmount some difficult hurdles:
(1) Abuse may be alleged, but where is the dividing line between exploitation and
abuse? This is likely to be set by precedent, but a number of factors would
guide such decisions, including the behaviour of patentees (marketing or
licensing practices, for example), their market share, alternatives available,
whether their rewards are greater than the contributions made etc.
(2) Ascertain whether the advantage provided by patent grant is the reason for the
objection raised.
647 Von dcr Ropp and Taubman. 'World Intellectual Property". Global IP Issues Division. WIPO
magazine 2006. Issue 4.
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(3) A weighing exercise of the disincentive effect ofwithdrawing a patent against
the incentives created. This criterion is justified on the basis that the patent
system is designed to maximise incentives and change should facilitate that.
(6) (f) (iv) Possible Complainants
The starting point is to consider whether the proposed new procedure is to be open to
all third party opponents as with opposition procedures under the European Patent
Office or whether applications should be limited to, say, direct competitors. The
advantage of an open procedure is that it avoids the difficulties of defining who is
qualified to make objections. This procedure differs from infringement proceedings in
that a person affected by any alleged 'harm648' will be unlikely to have a relevant
patent because the 'harm' alleged will not be determined by reference to another
patent. Furthermore as the questions outlined above involve a moral element there is
likely to be a broader range of affected parties than merely direct competitors and so a
wider range of applicants is envisaged. As a preliminary step applicants ought to be
required to demonstrate a direct and justified connection to the complaint. It is
intended to include a provision, outlined below, that discourages groundless or
vexatious claims or claims that appear to intend to gain commercial advantage to the
648 "The essence of science is cumulative investigation combined with hypothesis testing. The notion of
cumulative innovation, each discovery' building on many previous findings, is central to the scientific
method. Indeed, no respectable scientist would fail to recognize and acknowledge the crucial role
played by his or her predecessors in establishing a foundation from which progress could be made. As
Sir Isaac Newton put it, each scientist 'stands on the shoulders of giants' to reach new heights.'
Shapiro C, "Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses. Patent Pools, and Standard Setting,
Chapter Four. Jaffe A, Lerner J and Scott S, Innovation Policy and the Economy' National Bureau of
Economic Research, London pages 119-120. Thus 'harm' may likely be cumulative which may hinder
this cumulative growth. 'In short, our patent system, while surely a spur to innovation overall, is in
danger of imposing an unnecessary drag on innovation by enabling multiple rights owners to 'tax'
new products, processes, and even business methods.' Shapiro page 121
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disadvantage of promoting innovation. Mechanisms could be available to other
regulatory bodies to apply in specific cases.
(6) (f) (v) Limitation
The basis of the proposal, in relation to post grant morality649, is that morality is
connected to exploitation and as this arises throughout the period of patent, from date
of application until expiry it should then be possible to make an application under the
proposed rules at any time during this period but it is suggested that there should be a
time limit upon objections from the date of knowledge of circumstances that gave rise
to the 'harm' concerned. Therefore, objections can be made at any stage after grant but
will be time barred in the event that there is delay in making an application. This is
important not only for the same reasons that apply to the rules of limitation but also to
ensure commercial certainty. Moreover the provisions are intended to be of relevance
where the consequences are serious, so that should be reflected in the urgency of
application. Of course it may take time before consequences become apparent and for
evidence to be gathered for evaluation, thus a balance should be struck between
enabling investigation and achieving certainty for patentees. Thus an application
against a patent in relation to post-grant morality can be brought at any stage
throughout the life of a patent. However it is suggested that a limitation be placed upon
applications starting from the date of knowledge of reason for objection
649 Pre - grant morality is discussed above
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(6) (f) (vi) Forum for Objection
Various possibilities can be envisaged to facilitate the raising of objections. A form of
amended opposition proceedings to the European Patent Office is one possible
approach. This would have the advantage that a single European body would interpret
the proposed provisions. Yet this strategy may raise similar criticisms to those
expressed above vis-a-vis the lack of an accepted European standard for morality. It
would be better to enable proceedings to be brought within national jurisdictions
thereby providing opportunity for morality to be interpreted in accordance with
national principles and those that are pertinent within the specific market place where
the invention may be exploited.
In this way morality may be determined according to national norms as opposed to the
central position of the European Patent Office. This would also be in line with
principles of national determination ofmorality as discussed in chapter three.
(6) (f) (vii) Options Open to Patent Authorities
The idea injects increased flexibility into a fairly rigid or limited system, so there
should be options in the decision-making process to provide options for patent
authorities apart from revocation, that reflect the circumstances within each case. Such
options may include compulsory licensing, revocation or licensing of a particular use,
monitoring coverage and, as the ultimate deterrent, the revocation of complete patent.
The existence of such a mechanism should encourage reticent patentees from refusing
to cooperate or licence.
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Enabling broad product patents can result in patents covering many potential uses but
patentees may be unaware of all uses or may not intend to develop them all; the
Human Genome Sciences patent on CCR5 Receptor650 is a case in point. In the event
that research is likely to stagnate due to similar conditions then the availability of an
application procedure may encourage cooperation. But if that does not arise then there
may be justification for proceedings under this proposal as one aim is to encourage the
proliferation of all uses of inventions covered by such patents. The suggestion of
limiting patents to specific use may provide a similar result but one which is less
advantageous to patentees. The option proposed encourages specific uses from
subsequent inventors to be enabled without limiting any other potential uses that the
particular patent may have.
(6) (f) (viii)Unjustified Intervention
The proposal aims to liberate inventive activity and attempts to place balance into the
scheme in the event that there is clear and obvious inequity. The mechanism which
could be termed 'abuse of monopoly' is not to be used as a business tool to coerce
patent licences or threaten competition unnecessarily. Certainly the consequences of
unjustified threats of litigation or unreasonable claims made to force negotiations could
be significant and so such a mechanism would seem to be warranted in the
circumstances. Thus unjustified advances should be discouraged through the
availability of a counter claim. The test should be one based upon reasonableness
weighing up all the factors of a given case. Were there reasonable grounds for the
650 See chapter five
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application given the facts that were available to the applicant? If it is shown that
threats were justified, that is not of itself sufficient to succeed with a suit of'abuse of
patent' as more is required. If justification for an application cannot be sustained or if
groundless threats to sue can be established then a counter claim for damages may
arise.
(6) (f) (ix) Consequences of Approach proposed
The intended consequence of enabling intervention in the patent monopoly is that in
the case of inventions that have been exploited in a manner6"1 whereby the grant of a
patent hinders development and/or access, there is an option open through patent law
with which complaints can be raised and action, if appropriate can be taken. It is
anticipated that action will only be required relatively rarely because in the vast
majority of cases where issues that could fall under this provision, as discussed652, the
patent system and flexibility of patentees has resulted in agreement or licences. In spite
of this, the proposal is justified because in the minority of instances, such as those
outlined in case study three above, the implications of not taking action are of such
gravity that it is important to have systems in place that can address the situation.
651 Indeed it may not have been exploited at all
652 See chapter five
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(6) (g) Objections to Post-grant Control
(6) (g) (i) Economic effects are irrelevant for patent law
Post-grant objections to the manner of exploitation have been considered as irrelevant
for patent authorities: 'The EPO has not been vested with the task of taking into
account the economic effects of the grant of patents in specific areas of technology and
of restricting the field of patentable subject-matter accordingly'653.
In the case of LELAND STANFORD/Modified animal [2002] EPOR 2 similar
sentiments prevailed. Thus the consequences of providing a monopoly and the
exclusivity it provides to patent holders has been considered to be (a) irrelevant and (b)
an economic matter rather than a moral one.
Yet there are clear moral issues relating to the use of patents over biotech
inventions654. The influential Nuffield Council report, entitled 'The ethics of patenting
DNA', concentrated in particular upon the restrictions that can arise as a result of
biotechnology patents, thus they clearly must have viewed the difficulties that may
arise from such restrictions as a moral or ethical issue.
Furthermore the most recent manifestation of the morality clause within the European
Patent Convention links morality with 'commercial exploitation' yet exploitation is
ignored in favour of investigations into the morality of inventions. Directing morality
at how inventions are exploited relates morality to the consequence of patent grants
653 European Patent Office Guidelines, paragraph 4.4 quoting from NOVARTIS/Transgenic plant
[2000] EPOR 303. paragraph 3.9.
654 As discussed in chapter five
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and enables patent law to provide an effective remedy. The European Patent Office is
casting a bigger moral net. Thus although case law has previously held that inventions
per se and the research that led to them are not relevant to the question of patentability,
the line of human embryonic stem cells cases and the comments of Alain Pompidou
indicate that a change of attitude is afoot. This work suggests that to address morality
of patenting they are looking in the wrong direction.
(6) (g) (ii) Intervention is unnecessary
It will be seen from chapters three and four above that although there is evidence of
cooperation between patentees it is the forefront of innovation that is likely to be
hampered and that this has the potential for general benefit but at the same time
produces blocking effects. It has also emerged that the morality clause as it stands at
present is in need of some refocusing.
(6) (g) (iii) Weakening of Patent Rights and Creation of
Uncertainty
It is likely that any change to the patent system at the point of exploitation will be
criticised by industry on the grounds that attacks against granted patents deprive
whether through revocation of patent or reduction in scope of potency or breadth of
protection, the holders of the monopoly rights for their commercial purposes, and thus
the prospect of invalidation of valid patents creates a climate of uncertainty.
Companies relying upon such rights and finding that they may be open to attack in this
way will be cautious, thereby creating a negative effect upon development because of
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the obvious uncertainty. However the proposed model may result in an incentive to
competitors to cooperate and to licence without the need for further action. This may
be crucial to the obtaining of venture capital from those who are interested in the
prospect of high returns secured upon a successful and enduring patent.
If a weakening of patent rights is perceived then the rational of the whole patent
system may be in question and is likely be deprived of its basis. The patent system
relies upon strong rights and certainties and if these are weakened it is possible that
some inventors may be disinclined to apply for patents because of the quid pro quo that
has hitherto been built into the system, i.e. the disclosure requirement and
relinquishing of rights after expiry. To put that another way potential patentees may
feel that the patent bargain has changed. This is hypothetical but it nevertheless creates
a potential criticism.
The answer to these criticisms is that there is no intention to create a climate of
uncertainty and it is expected that the invalidation of patents would be a remedy of last
resort and that there may be other options open to address concerns more specifically
than at present; whether through compulsory licences or licences for specific uses. It is
not intended that it should be used as a business tool to enable competitors to challenge
others purely for financial advantage. A system to discourage ungrounded applications
will be built in to deter these sorts of applications. In any event it is in the interests of
every commercial venture that progress opportunities are maximised and if the grant of
a patent causes inequitable reduction of opportunity then it is in the interests of
commerce that the position is redressed.
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Although the numbers of cases that have actually caused concern regarding access are
relatively small, such cases tend to involve particularly important areas of research,
such as cancer and SARS, and because of that there are likely to be many interested
parties, including scientists and the public. The full effects of blocking may not be
known for some time65 , so decisions made at the grant stage about future problems
also cause uncertainty because what might happen in the future cannot be anticipated.
This proposal enables decisions to be made at times when the consequences are
relatively clear. It is important that early stage innovation is encouraged and that it is
not wrongfully challenged nor held back because of moral objections to science when
the ethics of science should be directed elsewhere.
(6) (g) (iv) Difficulty ofProof
The proof necessary to show 'abuse' may have to be assessed by experience but my
proposal is that change is necessary if patent law is to address morality effectively, that
a more holistic approach is important. This would include a review of granted patents
in particular cases. The factors in relation to that relate to the potential for obstructing
further progress and a clear elimination of the patent paradox, combined with positive
steps towards obstruction by patentees. It is beyond the terms of this work to describe
how the hurdle should be negotiated and this may be something that cannot fully be
appreciated in the absence of precedent but it is suggested that it is likely that only a
minority of cases will be relevant.
655 Sec discussion chapter five and also Gowers Review: OECD. "Patents and Innovation: Trends and
Policy Challenges'.
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(6) (h) (v)Alternative methods available
The argument may be raised that there is no requirement for any further restrictions
upon the use of patents because there are sufficient controls already in existence. There
are provisions for compulsory licences in the event that particular conditions are met,
but as discussed above the conditions that have to be met in order to qualify for a
compulsory licence are purposely tough, . .the compulsory licensing scheme has been
designed to be applied in exceptional circumstances only. It is therefore a burdensome
procedure.'6 6 It is also aimed at situations where inventions are not being
commercialised as distinct to those in which inventions are aggressively
commercialised. There may be remedies outside patent law, such as within the realms
of competition law that may come to bear upon a patentee in aggressive pursuit of
monopoly abuse but it is submitted herein that this is inappropriate.
Competition law provides a high hurdle which would not address the issues that apply
to this proposal. Despite the examples provided in case study three not one was
referred under competition rules yet clearly concerns existed as discussed. Changes to
competition law to adapt so as to cater for such circumstances would be unwelcome as
they would also have a knock on effect upon other non-patent cases. The proposal
relates to concerns that are caused by the grant of patents and, more particularly, to
concerns that can be answered by patent law. The provision of compulsory licences
could form part of the proposal as one option open to patent authorities but they are not
able to do so under their limited role at present. In particular licenses for specific uses
656 Bostyn, "DNA Patents in Europe: Controversy Remains'. 27.
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would enable greater use of resources and more research without necessarily
encroaching upon patentees rights.
It can be possible to argue that patent hurdles at the time of the grant are sufficient to
address accessibility issues, as shown in the Myriad case. But this is unlikely to occur
in every such case and weakening of strong patents should not occur as a matter of
course. Ensuring quality within granted patents is to be welcomed but purposeful
extension of patent hurdles to address problems that occur before and after grant is not.
The reasons for such intervention may be understandable but a solution that involves
wholesale exclusion from patentability, merely because inventions are at the cutting
edge of technology, is not the most appropriate or effective way forward. The proposal
therefore suggests that a number of options should be available to address moral
concerns. Yet this is what appears to be occurring657, and is certainly suggested by
some658 as a means of progress. Likewise restricting patents to allow grants for specific
purposes only is also likely to deter innovation. Grant-stage interventions, such as
those which increase hurdles for biotechnology patents, result in withdrawal of
incentive for research at the start of the process and the reason is likely to become
invalid if the next stage receives a full product patent. The problem of access is caused
by the method of exploitation and should be addressed in the exploitation stage.
The purpose of this proposal is to offer a different solution to the objections but one
which does not have the same harmful consequences and which is morally consistent
657 Sec chapters four and five
658 Nuffield Council Nuffield Council on Bioethics. 'The ethics of patenting DNA, a discussion paper",
July 2002 and OECD. 'Patents and Innovation: Trends and Policy Challenges', Report. 2002
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with the aims of patent law and ethical rules that govern science. The difficulty is that
changes to patent rules will always have repercussions somewhere along the chain of
innovation, however patent law is about balance and the aim is to have a more
balanced system than at present.
(6) (h) (vi) Expense Reticence and Complexity
Perhaps the strongest argument against any system that aims to regulate the power or
scope of patent monopoly after grant is the potential cost, for gamekeepers and
poachers and bureaucrats who would fret over the complexity of such a system.
Finance to set-up and administer a post grant process would be required and that would
likely fall to be paid eventually by patentees, within the costs of patenting. In the event
of involvement within such a system the costs of opposing legal action would
inevitably be high. Clearly there would be opposition from potential patentees,
innovators and industry who may feel the costs involved in patenting are no longer
warranted if the scope of monopoly, presuming they surmount the existing hurdles, is
at risk of curtailment. There may be a point at which innovators either do not innovate
or may switch to alternative methods of innovation because patenting no longer fulfils
their need due to additional risk and possible expense.
(6) (g) (vii) Response to objections
Arguments against post-grant intervention in patent monopoly are undeniably potent.
In particular the fear that such a scheme may renter the patent monopoly impotent is of
concern. Nevertheless given the potential for harm to access through overzealous
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exploitation because of strong patents the benefits of such a scheme should not be
ignored659. As Drahos has pointed out660, there is a social contract inherent within
patent grants which should be honoured and not abused. It is worth noting that the
French legislator has already adopted a post-grant system, albeit different in operation
from the one proposed herein, in relation to patents relating to public health, through
an ex-oflficio licensing system through amendment to the French Intellectual Property
Code ('FIPC').
The amendment concerns a rather unique system in the field of public
health. It is regularly highlighted as an interesting option that deserves
more attention on the international level for follow-up.661
In France the Myriad situation is unlikely to arise again because if it does mechanisms
exist to address the situation in the event that opposition to patents fails:
If, in the future, another company - that unlike Myriad may not be
«defeated» by opposing its patents at the EPO - would decide to
impose comparably harsh licensing conditions, the French
government may have a well-tailored instrument to confront the
antagonist662
659 '... efforts should be made to design adequate institutional and legal responses to this finding and
develop ways to further monitor the exercise of patent rights in an attempt to reach an adequate
balance between private rights and public interests in the post-grant phase' Overwalle G, 'Gene
Patents and PublicHealthBruylant, 2007 page 23
660 See Drahos P, A Philosophy ofIntellectual Property'. Dartmouth Publishing Group. 1996, page 220
'Holders of Intellectual Property privileges are subject to those duties that maximise the probability
that the purpose for which the privilege was first created is achieved' and page 221 'If the purpose in
creating the privilege is to fulfil some approved goal then it should also follow that the privilege
[patent] holder is subject to duties not to exercise the privilege in a way that defeats the purpose for
which the privilege [paten] was granted'
661 Ibid Overwalle G. page 125
662 Ibid Overwalle. page 134
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Despite the differences between the system proposed by this work and the French
system the same criticisms as against post-grant regimes arise. Yet they do not appear
to have been realised in practice. Interestingly the French example has not brought the
patent system into question nor spawned an unmanageable quantum of applications. In
fact "In France, for now the ex-officio licensing regime has never been put to
practice."663 Indeed compulsory licensing systems are rarely put into practice664. This
may suggest that both the compulsory licensing systems and the French ex-officio
systems are restrictive and/or cumbersome and so applications are thereby discouraged
or that such systems encourage cooperation between potential licensing partners665.
Observers will have to wait to see whether cases similar to Myriad are brought through
the French system and whether the complexities of interpretation will prove to be too
difficult but it is likely that possible applications under the system will encourage co¬
operation with licensing practice.
663 Ibid page 139
664 See above page 236 "compulsory Licenses" and Bostyn S J R. 'Enabling biotechnological inventions
in Europe and the United States. A study of the patentability ofProteins and DNA sequences with
special emphasis on the Disclosure Requirement' (European Patent Office, Maastricht. December
2001). See also Danish Council of Ethics, The Ethics of Patenting Human Genes and Stem Cells,
Conference Report and Summaries (University of Copenhagen. 2004) available from
htlp:/Avww.ctiskraad.dk/sw475.asp last accessed 27di December 2007
665 This has been seen to occur in some countries through their compulsory licensing systems: 'Lawyers
and patent attorneys argue, however, that the presence of these mechanisms brings pressure to bear
upon non-cooperative patent holders and serves as a convincing argument to settle and drag them into
licensing agreements." Ibid Overwalle page 137
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(7) Conclusion
This work has examined many of the complex interactions that occur through the
promotion of biotechnology by patent law and between various parties and interests.
The most obvious relationship is that between private rights of inventors and public
rights of access which can be seen, at times, to contradict each other; and yet, the
inherent paradox of the patent system is that the former is justified because it is
supposed to benefit the latter. Moreover there are additional and compound pressures
which act upon the complex web of relationships that typify the patent system and its
stakeholders, and which will on occasion favour one or more set of interests over
others. While this is to be expected in an imprecise and imperfect system (as the patent
system surely is) there are good reasons to consider imbalance in these relationships as
a significant moral question requiring an urgent solution in the context of
biotechnology and the patenting of biotechnological inventions.
It is trite to confirm that the patent system is an instrument of public policy which is
intended to encourage and reward innovation. Furthermore it is no surprise that
questions have been raised about the role of patent law in promoting controversial
technologies such as research into human embryonic stem cells, which many regard as
'morality one'666. Yet not to encourage such research - or indeed, to actively
discourage it - are also moral issues. In fact, a range of moral questions surround the
patent system, and these are made more complex by the interactions that occur
between the patent world and other spheres of human activity, such as commerce,
666 See above 6 (a) (i)
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trade, regulation, governance, promotion of public good and the protection of public
health (to name but a few). Fundamentally however, the limits of what is permissible
within science are arguably best set outside of commercial regimes - such as the patent
system - which are dominated by private interests. That is not to suggest that moral
issues cannot be addressed within the patent system, but it is to suggest that we should
not expect the patent system to address all moral issues that arise with respect to new
technologies or their exploitation.
This thesis has examined two particular relationships that are associated with the patent
system - access and ethics. It has utilised a particular version of the innovation time
line and regulation theory to visualize where, and when, various objections arise, their
specific nature, and when and how they can be addressed effectively. Much attention
has been paid in the literature to the role of the so-called 'morality clause' especially in
European patent law, and many of the perceived 'moral' issues in this field have been
addressed within its shadow. Notwithstanding, the argument developed in chapter four
and beyond suggests that, despite the apparent intent of the European Patent Office, the
scope for patent law to address specific moral issues relating to inventions per se and
research is curtailed by practical limitations, and that the morality clause is of limited
utility. Moreover moral questions that relate specifically to the monopoly that patents
provide are ignored or at least considered irrelevant for patent law. There is, therefore,
a dichotomy between morality issues pre-grant and post-grant, suggesting that there
can be no one-size-fits-all approach. Addressing the failure to appreciate the diversity
of moral considerations - and therefore the need for a plurality of moral solutions - is
one of key area oforiginal contribution of this thesis.
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There are understandable reasons for this dichotomy, not least because of the
additional bureaucracy, expense, uncertainty and likely opposition from interested
parties that would arise if we were to turn as much attention to post-grant morality
issues as that which has been invested in pre-grant concerns. None the less, and despite
the objections, it has been argued that the value of post-grant control of the
exploitation of patented inventions should not be shunned altogether and that at the
very least the ramifications of such an approach should be studied. There is an
important social contract between patentees and the public which begins with the grant
of a patent, yet too often the attainment of the patent is characterised as the morally
significant (or problematic) act. I strongly believe that it should not be stretched to the
point where the provision of a patent is abused. French patent law has adopted a post-
grant system, albeit different to the one suggested herein, and it is not without its
merits nor does it appear to have brought the French patent system into disrepute.
Rather, while the mechanism has rarely been put into practice, it has nonetheless
encouraged negotiation between parties.
This is clearly not the end of the story but merely one proposal out of various
alternatives with which to tackle the ongoing questions over the imbalances that so
often arise within the public/private rights relationship in patent law. Further study is
clearly necessary, in particular in relation to the cost of such a system and potential
negative influence on innovators who must not loose the incentive both to innovate and
to share through publication of their invention, as is required by the patent system. Yet
to over-protect can be just as unwarranted and damaging as threats to the exclusivity of
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particularly powerful patents - a better balance must be struck and the above is one
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